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Preface
The book “Media and Communication in Europe” aims to promote research on me-
dia content and its role within the European context. In order to do this, the book
brings together a range of international scholars, drawn from representative disci-
plines in the media studies and journalism. The main objective is to recognize how
European issues and events are covered by media both traditional and online. Equal
attention is paid to other participants of the communication process, namely politi-
cal actors and citizens.
Papers in this volume are structured in three parts. Part I focuses on the role of
media in a process of Europeanization of public sphere. Part II presents relations be-
tween the media and politics within European context, and Part III provides find-
ings of the international research project on “Media Coverage of the Polish EU
Council Presidency”.
Part I, “European Public Sphere” brings results of five empirical studies. In the first
paper Anke Offerhaus, Anne Mollen, and Andreas Hepp analyse (in a longitudinal
perspective) how “Europe” and the “EU” are constructed in a process of reporting
within regional newspapers in 6 countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany,
Great Britain, and Poland) along the main developments and breaking points in the
EU history. They aim in tracing a trend of Europeanization in regional papers, as
well as recognizing other, possibly antidromic trends like trans- or (re-) nationaliza-
tion? In their study, the Authors consider two types of Europeanization, namely
vertical and horizontal.
In a second paper Knut De Swert and Julie De Smedt also presents how much
attention is paid to the EU-related topics in a national media. This time, however,
the object of the study is news broadcasting in Belgium, that is a country that ba-
sically hosts the European Union (EU) in its capital Brussels. While studying
news media coverage, the Authors raise a question whether news about Europe
and European institutions need domestication since news about them is actually
domestic news about one of the relevant policy levels of the viewers (at least
from an institutional perspective). In a third paper, by Veronika Pitrova, the fo-
cus is still on television, but this time the aim of study is to assess the content of
the two prominent children’s news programs, namely Newsround in Children
BBC and Jeugdjournaal in the Dutch public service broadcaster (NOS). The Au-
thor evaluates whether they offer balanced coverage of current affairs in terms of
geographic focus and topics and thus might serve children’s socialization within
the European Union.
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The first section is completed by Javier Ruiz Soler, who in a forth paper investi-
gates bloggers who are listed in bloggingportal.eu – the biggest aggregator of the
EU blogs. They are considered and interviewed as participants of so called Euro-
blogosphere: a virtual space where people can exchange ideas and thoughts about
European issues. The central question raised by the Author concerns the contribu-
tion of the Euroblogosphere into the European Public Sphere.
Part II, “Media and political communication in Europe” includes papers that focus
on the roles of traditional media as well as websites, Facebook and Twitter profiles,
and blogs in processes of political communication in the EU context. The section
opens with a paper by Beata Ociepka who analyzes international broadcasting as
one of the elements of new public diplomacy in Europe. As three examples under
a study (British BBC World Service, German Deutsche Welle, and Polish Belsat TV)
show, TV stations broadcasting internationally are involved in a country branding
as they shape the image of the countries in direct way, presenting the culture and
promoting languages.
In a following paper Sandrine Roginsky gives an overview of the place of social
networking-sites (SNS) within the European institutions (the European Parliament,
the European Commission and the European Council) and investigates the types of
communication activities actually undertaken by spokespersons, other mandated
staff, editorial staff, commissioners, members of the European Parliament, or assis-
tants in their practice.
Next, Gabriella Szabo examines what role web 2.0 plays in a government commu-
nication, using the Hungarian government’s communication strategy employed dur-
ing the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2011 as a case study. The
findings are then discussed in a theoretical framework of public relations culture. In a
following paper, by Arjen van Dalen the focus is still on the EU Presidency. The paper
dicusses the consequences of the changing role of the rotating The EU Council Presi-
dency from a communication perspective. Comparing and contrasting two Danish
Presidencies (in 2002 and 2012) the Author describes how media debate in the presid-
ing country has changed in terms of visibility and prominence of the topic.
During the six-month period of the presidency the country may attempt to at-
tract the foreign media attention as a host of numerous meetings and events. The
same time may be spent on achieving political goals and building the image of the
Member State, as well as an attractive for tourists and entrepreneurs country. Thus,
effectively conducted Presidency of the EU Council may improve an image of the
country holding this position and this is particularly true for countries that hold the
chairmanship of the EU Council for the first time. In many cases, however, the inter-
nal political events such as elections, political tensions, or controversies over do-
mestic issues seemed to take the whole air around the country.
Part III is exclusively devoted to the international project “Media Coverage of
the Polish EU Presidency” launched in 2010.1 The project provided an opportunity
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1 The study was sponsored by the Polish National Science Center (grant no. N N116 614440).
to check how much attention in the news media outside Poland was devoted to Po-
land and how many of them were inspired by the topic of the first Polish Presidency
that started on July 1st, 2011 and ended on December 31, 2011. The aim was to recog-
nize the actual Presidency’s power of attracting media attention. In particular, the
study investigated: frequency of covering Poland in the foreign media during the
period of the first EU Presidency, dominant frames and perspectives used in the
materials, the sources of information presented in the media (journalist, foreign cor-
respondent, news agencies, other media), particular topics (the EU-related and
non-EU related), major actors, as well as opinions expressed in the comments and
analyses and the sources of these comments and analyses.
Besides investigating items related to the Presidency, all the items about Poland
published in the period of six months of hosting this position were examined.
This allowed to recognize the picture of the country that was drawn by the foreign
media in comparison to the image of the Presidency in the Polish media. Journalistic
materials (news items, comments, reports, editorials, etc.) published in three
6 week-periods: June 15th–July 30th, September 1st–October 15th, December 1st–Janu-
ary 15th were selected for the study.
The study included 10 countries: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Germany, Estonia,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. In this volume representatives of
6 countries present findings of their research. The papers are presented in the order
on the names of the foreign countries: Austria and Germany (together), Belgium,
Greece, and Romania. The volume concludes with two chapters analysing Polish
data.
Romy Wöhlert compares media coverage of the topic in Austria and Ger-
many. While studying a content of printed media in these two countries, the Au-
thor considers two factors that may have affected the coverage, namely, the
bi-national relations of both countries with Poland and the self-perception of
both countries with regard to its own membership in the EU as a collective entity.
The findings clearly show that the economic crisis in Europe challenged the Pol-
ish EU Presidency in terms of attracting attention and developing an image of
the country itself.
In a following paper Stijn Joye, Khaël Velders, Daniël Biltereyst, Thibault Bonte,
and Eveline Delcart present findings of the study on the Flemish news media re-
vealing that the representation of Poland’s presidency was largely ‘depoliticized’.
In fact, Poland did not succeed in Belgium in positioning itself as a major political
actor within the European context. At the same time, Poland was very successful in
promoting and improving its cultural and touristic image.
Next paper, by Katerina Serafeim explores the news coverage of the first EU
Council’s Polish Presidency in the Greek media. The comparative research of
printed and online news media brought to the surface the low visibility of Poland in
news coverage in Greece, which was accompanied by a generally neutral attitude
that enhanced the low recognition of Poland among Greeks. Nevertheless, the
Greek media portrayed Poland mostly as a “new EU member” and “a new member
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of the European family”, instead of “a post-communist country”, which might me
perceived as an image enhancement.
In a following paper Valentina Marinescu and Mãdãlina Bãlãºescu discuss how
the existing organizational and professional variables in the field of professional
journalists can explain the covering level of the EU processes and events in the Ro-
manian online and print media. The study on the Polish EU Council Presidency
serves here as a case study. The findings show that covering the Polish EU Presi-
dency in Romanian newspapers and online media was achieved mainly by provid-
ing routine events and, simultaneously, a frequent reference to the quality of the
country’s full membership in the European Union.
Finally, two papers written by Polish scholars reflect influence of political angle
of the media organization on the Polish media coverage of the Polish EU Presidency.
While Agnieszka Stêpiñska and Bart³omiej Secler analyse findings from quantita-
tive part of the study, Artur Lipiñski shares conclusions of his qualitative study on
a content of weekly magazines. Both types of analysis clearly showed that depend-
ing on their political bias, newspapers and weekly magazines varied not only on the
evaluation of Poland’s performance, but also on discursive positions they used.
The volume reflects both the contemporary conceptualizations and research on
various aspects of Europeanization of public sphere, including: media coverage of
the European events, European blogosphere, European media organizations, as
well as Europanization of national politics and mediatization of the Europan poli-
tics. Although written from different perspectives, all chapters provide clear evi-
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Nationalizing Europe Regionally – The Europeanization
of Public Spheres in Regional Newspaper Reporting
and the “Crisis” in Europe
Europe and the regional press
The EU’s history is a story of continuities and breaking points in the light of political
integration in Europe. Corresponding with the institutional progress, ever since the
EU’s founding days theorists of democracy have seen the parallel development of
a European public sphere as essential for its democratic legitimacy. In this tradition
a considerable amount of research has been undertaken, analysing the emergence of
a public sphere within the coverage of the EU and other European institutions in
mostly quality print media (e.g. Trenz, 2004; van Noije, 2010; Veltri, 2012). Research
on tabloids and even more so on local or regional newspapers is rare. When under-
taken at all, it typically investigates cross-border news coverage in European border
regions, considering these regions as motors for European integration (e.g. Roose,
2008; Schäfer et al., 2012). The one-sided focus on the quality press in research (cf.
also a conclusion of several book reviews, Nitoiu, 2013:35f.) is in so far surprising as
the citizens’ view of Europe seems to be strongly affected by regional newspapers
that have comparably high circulations.
Within such an overall frame, we have undertaken newsroom studies in previ-
ous phases of our research. They have demonstrated that regional papers do not
simply follow the same orientations as the quality press in their media coverage.
Due to their specific newsroom routines, resources and restrictions, such newspa-
pers establish their own, mostly pragmatic choices when reporting about Europe.
The regional papers’ orientation towards the everyday lives of their readers, as
well as the journalists’ need to make decisions reflecting daily production pres-
sures, results in differences of this kind of newspaper from other types. From
a journalistic point of view, their aim is often to adapt news stories that relate to
their readers, which they can present in an understandable, informative and inter-
esting way. For that reason, most regional papers belong to a type of paper that can
be labelled as “reporter”. Due to their reader-orientation, main events like the
Euro introduction or the EU enlargement that had a significant direct, or maybe
only perceived, influence on people’s lives, might therefore also be treated differ-
ently in regional reporting compared to other types of newspapers (Hepp et al.,
2012:168–172).
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While arguments like these are based on newsroom studies, within this article
we want to focus on questions of media content. In a longitudinal perspective we
analyse how “Europe” and the “EU” are constructed in the process of reporting
within regional newspapers along the main developments and breaking points in
EU history: Is there a considerable trend of Europeanization in regional papers simi-
lar to that in the quality press? Can we trace other – for example related to the
emerging financial crisis since 2007 – possibly antidromic trends like trans- or (re-)
nationalization?
If we want to answer these questions it is helpful to consider two relevant as-
pects. Firstly, we have to consider the EU’s integration process: from the single mar-
ket to a political union with the treaty of Maastricht, to a common currency until the
current crisis situation. Secondly, we have to reflect very different histories and per-
spectives towards the EU, reaching from founding members of the EU like France
and Germany, to new members like Poland, from countries with a positive attitude
to the EU like the abovementioned, to those that have an ambivalent or rather
sceptical view like Denmark or Great Britain. Within our following analysis we
want to do both: while focusing on an aspect of Europeanized public spheres that
has so far received little attention, we want to identify how regional newspapers re-
port on transnational issues from a longitudinal perspective and in different Euro-
pean countries.
In order to pursue a content analysis on this matter, in the following section we
explicate the concept of Europeanization and discuss the facilities and the restric-
tions of regional journalists reporting on European matters. Subsequently, we intro-
duce our data and methodology. Based on our dimensions of enquiry, we then
present and finally discuss our findings on the Europeanization of public spheres in
regional newspapers.
The multi-segmented European public sphere
and political discourse cultures
Since the middle of the 1990s a growing degree of attention has been directed to-
wards European integration, provoking an ongoing discussion among scholars
from different social science disciplines regarding the appearance and emergence of
a European public sphere. Especially the role of national and transnational media
was considered as providing thrust for this (Eriksen & Fossum, 2000; Habermas,
1998, 2000; Schlesinger, 1999; Schlesinger & Kevin, 2000). Hence, the existence of a
mediated European public sphere is seen as a central feature of a democratic EU,
shaping the coherence of political systems and decision-making processes. Such
a transnational sphere might create various avenues through which citizens could
make their voices heard by the Union’s decision makers. This aspiration has been
also based on the assumption that equal and open access to public debate fostered
by a European public sphere could enhance the EU’s transnational democracy and
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further its collective identity-formation processes. Thus, contestation through pub-
lic debate within the European public sphere could compel the political authority to
explain and justify its actions and policies towards the European citizens.
During the past 20 years of research, it became apparent that a European public
sphere cannot be grasped merely as an extended national public sphere (Gripsrud,
2007:483–485). The European public sphere is a more complex phenomenon that
can be described alongside a shared pan-European transnationalization of histori-
cally mainly national political public spheres. Within media and communication
studies, it is a well-accepted starting point to distinguish a “horizontal” from a “ver-
tical” dimension of Europeanization (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004; Wessler et al., 2008:10,
56; Koopmans & Statham, 2010:41). Vertical Europeanization means an increasing
‘monitoring’ of Europe and the EU in the public sphere of each country. Horizontal
Europeanization signifies an increasing ‘monitoring of’ and ‘discussing with’ other
European countries. For both these aspects of Europeanization, we can identify two
further aspects which offer us four distinct criteria for the Europeanization of na-
tional public spheres on the level of media coverage (Peters, 2008:200): First, the ver-
tical dimension of monitoring EU governance; second, the vertical dimension of
a collective identification with Europe; third, the horizontal dimension of discursive
exchange, meaning a shared pan-European discourse between the national public
spheres; and fourth, a European discursive convergence in the national public
spheres.
A preceding quantitative content analysis within our own research, for example,
demonstrated a “segmentation” of the European public sphere for quality and
tabloid papers in six European countries over the past 25 years: While vertical
Europeanization – the increase of reporting about EU institutions and politics – can
be observed over time, the horizontal dimension of Europeanization, that is the ob-
servation of other EU member states, is stagnating on a relatively high level. Collec-
tive identification with a European community emerges only faintly. Furthermore,
we can argue that a European public sphere remains “multi-segmented”: on the one
hand regarding nations, and on other regarding transnational newspaper types.
While the first is evident, because the European public sphere is articulated through
different levels of the transnationalization of national public spheres, the second
segmentation is more astonishing. Across the researched EU member states, we
find certain types of media outlets that share – in spite of their different national
background – patterns of constructing the European public sphere. Therefore, the
European public sphere is multi-segmented in a dual sense: by the nations whose
public spheres become transnationalized, and by the types of media outlets that re-
port about the EU and its member states (Hepp et al., 2012:63–84; Wessler et al.,
2008:40–54).
Addressing the question of how we can explain such a multi-segmented charac-
ter of the European public sphere and how certain types of media can unfold such
a segmenting force, the concept of “political discourse cultures” is helpful. In short,
we understand political discourse cultures as specific thickenings of cultural pat-
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terns of producing, representing and appropriating political communication as
well as related cultural patterns of regulation and identification. They form the
socio-cultural foundation of the public sphere. While political discourse cultures
therefore constitute multi-level phenomena related to the process of mediated polit-
ical meaning production in total (as shown e.g. through media content), political
discourse cultures also become relevant in their re-articulation in the practices of
journalists.
Our investigation of journalistic practices – undertaken by conducting qualita-
tive interviews and newsroom observations (cf. Hepp et al., 2012:85–178; Hepp et
al., forthcoming) – revealed various patterns of political discourse cultures. Na-
tional segmentations can be explained by ‘national political discourse cultures’ that
are articulated by the ‘nationalising practices’ of journalists. At the same time we
find patterns of journalistic professionalization that vary transnationally, depend-
ing on certain types of newspapers. These types of newspapers, distinguishable by
their ways of addressing imagined audiences in the journalists’ practices, move be-
yond the simplifying distinction of quality, regional and tabloid papers. Different
‘types of newspapers’ across our countries of investigation are therefore themselves
marked by different ‘political discourse cultures’.
Furthermore, we could distinguish between four types: the analyst, the ambassa-
dor1, the caterer and the reporter. Results from our research on newsroom production
processes demonstrated that journalists from regional newspapers can be charac-
terized by the term “the reporter”. They focus on reporting about major events
within EU politics. They feel a need to cover these stories, as major EU decisions are
likely to influence their reader’s everyday lives. Therefore, their readers expect
them to ‘report’ these issues. In that on the one hand they are different from quality
papers, which often apply an analytical approach to fully and thoroughly cover and
analyse European issues as well as contextualize and critically assess them (“the an-
alyst”). Tabloids, on the other hand, often cater to the imagined and pre-defined
opinions of their readership (“the caterer”), for example feeding with their report-
ing into sensitive issues. However, this distinction cannot be drawn so clearly
within all researched countries and for all newspaper titles. Across quality, tabloid
and regional papers we also find newspapers of the type of an “ambassador”. These
outlets follow an explanatory and clarifying, almost pedagogical approach in their
reporting on EU politics.
As background to our content analysis it is helpful to have this newsroom re-
search in mind. Reflecting these findings and distinctions, it seems likely to
find further differences in the re-articulation of political discourse cultures at
the level of content if we compare regional newspapers with quality and tabloid
papers.
16 Anke Offerhaus, Anne Mollen, Andreas Hepp
1 The term “ambassador” was introduced by Heikkilä & Kunelius (2006). However, they the-
orize them in a different way than we do.
Data and methodology
The content analysis we want to present in the following sections is undertaken
within the project “The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in the EU: Citizens’
(re)actions”, which is part of the Collaborative Research Center 597 “Transforma-
tions of the State”. Our current focus on regional newspapers is the final step in
a research succession that has investigated the transnationalization of political
coverage in the Austrian, British, Danish, French, German and Polish print media
from 1982 until 2008 against the backdrop of an emerging European public sphere.
This research started by analysing political discursive articles within quality print
media in the five researched countries Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and
Great Britain. In a next step, the research focus was widened to also include tab-
loids and Poland (Hepp et al., 2012). Our final step now is to complement this con-
tent analysis with the political reporting in regional newspapers, which is the subject
of this article.2
For each researched country, the regional paper with the largest circulation was
chosen, which, however in order to avoid a strong focus on national parliamentary
politics was not to be located within the capitals of the respective countries. The di-
verse sample of countries in this project reflects very different histories and perspec-
tives towards the EU. France and Germany both represent major political actors in
the EU, being among the largest countries population-wise, and also being among
the founding nations. Austria and Denmark are rather small and more recent mem-
ber states. Denmark and also Great Britain are typically in tendency euro-sceptic
and are also not part of the Eurozone. Poland was included as one of the most recent
and larger Eastern new member states with a distinct history compared to the other
researched countries (due to its historical connection within the ‘Eastern Bloc’ and
to the USSR).
Our longitudinal approach has a span of over 25 years of political reporting
within Europe and stretches over very diverse phases of the European integration
process, along the main developments and breaking points in EU history. There-
fore, we also take into account the EU’s long-term development, including main
events like the establishment of the single market in the 1980s, the move towards
political union in the 1990s, the introduction of the Euro, and the enlargement in
the 2000s, up to the triggering of the current financial crisis in 2008. For each year
in the sample (1982, 1989, 1996, 2003, 2008), two constructed weeks were created.
For each day in these constructed weeks, the edition of one regional paper per
country was selected.
From each of these twelve editions for every year in our sample, only the politi-
cal, the regional and local news sections were of interest. Within these sections, only dis-
cursive articles were chosen for analysis in order to reflect the Europeanization of
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2 In order to investigate whether news coverage has changed during the so-called ‘crisis’, we
are currently collecting data for a further content analysis wave of the year 2013.
political discourse as a matter of opinion building. This included articles that where la-
belled by a journalist’s name so that a journalistic editing process within the news-
room was observable; the sample also encompassed editorials and editorial page
opinion articles as well as political columns, interviews and contributions from ex-
ternal authors such as politicians or experts. In addition, a range of other articles
were selected in which political news is analysed, interpreted, argued or justified,
rather than just being ‘objectively’ reported. In this line of argument, pure news
agency material, service articles, features, letters to the editor etc. were not selected
for coding as they do not represent a discursive exchange. Following this proce-
dure, our sample consists of 11,573 articles.
Table 1




















































Following our distinction in the previous section, these articles were analysed
focusing on vertical and horizontal Europeanization as well as on European identi-
fication. The vertical dimension was operationalized by monitoring a certain scope of
EU politics. A process of vertical Europeanization could be stated either when EU
institutions become more visible within the longitudinal analysis or when an in-
creasing focus on European policies as a main topic occurred within these articles.
The horizontal dimension was operationalized by the scope of a transnational ex-
change of arguments. If a considerable focus on other European countries occurred,
determined either by their mentioning or through directly and indirectly quoted ac-
tors from these countries we could claim a horizontal Europeanization. A far more
demanding indicator, reaching beyond the aforementioned processes of Europe-
anization, is the process of collective identification as European. It measures whether
‘objective’ communicative exchange across national borders is acknowledged by its
participants ‘subjectively’ as a common discourse. It hence defines Europeanization
in terms of the emergence of a common transnational “community of communica-
tion” (Habermas, 2001; Risse, 2010:109). Hence the mentioning of we-references
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(e.g. “We, the Brits”) or the naming of collective identities (e.g. “the French people”,
“the Europeans”) were coded.3
Table 2
Dimensions and indicators of Europeanization
Dimension Indicators
Vertical Europeanization Monitoring transnational politics:
– Visibility of EU institutions,
– Focus on EU policies.
Horizontal Europeanization Transnational discourse:
– Focus on EU countries,
– Quotation from speakers from EU countries.
European Identification Level of Identification:
– European “we”-references,
– References to EU countries as collectives.
Nationalizing Europe – Europe in regional newspapers
Vertical Europeanization
Monitoring European governance – as one dimension of the Europeanization of re-
gional public spheres – is measured by looking at the visibility of EU institutions as
well as the focus on EU policies within the regional newspapers in the sample.










Figure 1. References to political institutions (n = 5,225)
3 All relevant variables – references to political institutions, countries, speakers, topics,
we-identities, and collectives identities – could be coded several times within an article.
We see that the overall distribution of references to political institutions splits up
into 72% of references to national institutions (political institutions like local, fed-
eral and national parliaments, governmental departments, courts of justice etc.
were coded as national political institutions) and 19% into EU-institutions (and its
predecessor institutions), whereas UN-institutions and other inter- and transna-
tional institutions such as alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) or the Bretton-Wood-institutions like the World Bank, International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) are almost irrelevant.
Observing the development over 26 years, we recognise a low, but more or less
stable level of references to international institutions and a high, but decreasing
level of references to national institutions. The process of European integration is
accompanied by a continuous increase of EU references in the news coverage up to
the year 2003. Since then trends seem to be returning to a re-nationalization at the
expense of references to transnational institutions. But we suggest that this is not
just a sign of narrowing the horizon of regional news coverage to national politics.
Rather we can understand this, at least partly, as a phenomenon of readdressing na-
tional governments for the solution of European and global problems like the finan-
cial crisis.



































Figure 2. References to political institutions over time (n = 5,225)
Table 3
References to political institutions in different regional newspapers from 1982





























































































Comparing the proportions among the countries within our longitudinal sam-
ple, we notice – as expected – for the euro-sceptical Great Britain a major concentra-
tion on national references (90%) and the lowest percentage of EU-references (6%).
Contrasting this with France, Great Britain also rarely displays references to other
international institutions. The French regional news coverage seems to be the most
transnationalized one. According to our data it has the highest rates of reference to
European (37%), to United Nations (9%) and to other transnational political institu-
tions (6%). The regional news coverage in Poland also has high rates of national ref-
erences, which might be attributable to their shortest duration of EU membership.
Although the Austrian newspaper draws more attention to national institutions, it
also focuses on EU institutions.
Taking political topics as an indicator for monitoring governance on different
levels, we differentiated between ‘domestic policy making’, ‘EU policies’, ‘for-
eign and international policies’ and ‘other societal topics’. In this last category,
we summarized topics that deal with different societal topics like economy, so-
cial problems, crime, health, science, technology, environment, media, leisure,
culture etc. but that do not move the process of policy making into the fore-
ground. Most of the topics (68%) deal with such issues. If we focus only on arti-
cles in the sample that have the subject of policy making and compare their
national or transnational orientation, we notice that domestic policies dominate
with 68%, EU policies are covered by 20%, and foreign and international policies
by 12% of the articles.
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Analysing the variation over time, these proportions are comparatively stable
until 2003. Again, in 2008 we can see a slight increase of domestic policies (from
66 to 72%) at the expense of EU policies (from 23 to 21%) as well as foreign and inter-
national policies (from 8 to 4%).
Summarizing the results regarding a vertical Europeanization of regional public
spheres, both indicators show references to the EU. Compared to the national these
references are on a lower, but nevertheless visible and stable level. However, we
also need to bear in mind that the Europeanization trend is broken from 2003 to
2008, although this can also be interpreted as a tendency of readdressing national
politics for solving global and European problems. It remains to be seen if this trend
will continue in the following years.
Horizontal Europeanization
‘Mutual observation’ and ‘discursive exchange’ are our two indicators for the hori-
zontal Europeanization of public spheres. They focus on the cross-border flow of
opinions and arguments, and thereby show to what extent the public debates in the
member states are integrated in a common European discourse. This dimension
was measured by considering the range of countries being mentioned in the articles
as well as the scope of foreign speakers, being quoted either directly or indirectly.
National references and national speakers are those that are explicitly named or im-
plicitly deducible from the content of the article and relate to the domestic origin of
the regional newspaper. References to European member states and EU speakers re-
late to European nations that are EU members and therefore part of the community
at the particular point of news reporting. Beside US references all other foreign
countries or their speakers are subsumed as “other foreign countries”. Transna-
tional speakers are those who – like Ban Ki-Moon, the Secretary-General of the UN
– work for inter- and transnational organizations and are not explicitly connected to
their national origin.















Figure 3. Thematic focus of the article: all topics (n = 13,257);
topics relating to policy making processes (n = 4,281)
Figure 4 demonstrates the already mentioned dominance of national references.
Also regarding geographic orientations within the articles, our data reveals that
53% of the country references relate to the home nation of the regional newspapers;
18% of the mentioned countries are European countries, 6% relate to the US,
and 23% to other foreign countries. However, comparing the level of vertical
transnationalization we can notice that the level of horizontal transnationalization
is less dominated by domestic references (around 50% rather than 70%). In other
words: Regional news coverage can be considered to be quite transnational – in-
cluding all the abovementioned topics.




Reference to the US









































Figure 5. References to countries over time (n = 20,025)
Referring to figure 5, we can conclude that there has always been a considerable
proportion of references to European member states, independent from the Union’s
extent. Whereas reporting about the EC member states in figure 1982 encompassed
10 member states, reporting in 2008 already considered 25 EU member states. The
leap from 15 to 19% probably mirrors the functional consolidation of the European
Union by the Maastricht treaty, which resulted in a growing general attention for
other member states. Regarding the continuous extension of the Union, it is no won-
der that at the same time the high level of references to other foreign countries de-
creases from 31 to 19%. Furthermore, it is also related to the political situation of the
cold war and the attention paid to the Eastern Bloc states until the fall of the iron
curtain at the end of 1980s. Post-9/11 news coverage and an increasing global activ-
ity of North America in the fight against international terrorism might have re-
sulted in the peak of US references in 2003. But looking at the trend of domestic
references over time, it is fluctuating and difficult to interpret: We can see a peak of
57% in 1996, and a trend of increasing national references from 2003 to 2008. If this
trend continues in future and in case it would be accompanied by lower EU moni-
toring and sinking references to EU member states, we would term it “re-nation-
alization”; in that sense it would indicate an upcoming limitation of news coverage
to national discourses at the expense of a wider transnational discourse.
Table 4
References to countries in different regional newspapers from 1982 to 2008
































































































Although the Danish Jydske Vestkysten is also marked by a higher proportion
of national references than transnational ones, it is again the news coverage of
the Manchester Evening News (weak transnationalization) and of the Ouest France
(strong transnationalization) that mark the opposite poles of the statistical distribu-
tion. On the one hand, the euro-sceptical attitude and the insular position of Great
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Britain go along with low levels of attention towards other European countries
(10%). On the other hand, France pays attention to other European countries (19%),
but even more frequently to other non-European countries (32%). Within our sample,
interestingly it is the newspapers of the newest EU member states, Poland (2004) and
Austria (1995), that monitor their European neighbours intensely. With the exception
of Great Britain, the level of horizontal Europeanization among the long-term mem-
bers France (19%), Germany (18%) and Denmark (17%) is on a similar level. The propor-
tion of references to the US in all regional papers is on the same level, varying from 5
to 7%. This low amount of US references in a British newspaper is quite surprising,
considering the Anglo-Saxon geo-linguistic and political space.
A second indicator for a transnational discourse is the origin of the speakers
quoted within the articles. If actors, irrespective of their function in society, from
other, in particular other European countries, are directly or indirectly quoted, we
could assume an integrated discourse culture among the European member states.
With a proportion of 83% of national actors among all quoted actors, figure 6 illus-
trates the strongest dominance of national references. We can notice a 50-50 relation re-
garding national and transnational country references, a 70 to 30 relation regarding
national and transnational institutional references, and a 80 to 20 relation when it co-
mes to speakers as sources within the articles in our sample. Speakers from other
non-European countries are quoted only in 7%, and speakers from European countries
in only 5% of the cases. American and transnational speakers are completely
marginalized. When analysing our data over time, there are slight fluctuations from
one year to the next: But in the long run the tendency remains stable on each level.
Comparing the proportions among the analysed newpapers, it is the Kleine Zeitung
from Austria that with 72% has the lowest level of national speakers for the benefit of
a higher share of European speakers (11%) and speakers from the US (5%). Likewise to
its country references it is Ouest France, that with a share of 12% speakers from other na-
tions turned out to cover the most transnationalized discourse beyond European reach.










Figure 6. Origin of quoted speakers (n = 18,900)
Summarizing these results regarding a horizontal Europeanization of regional
public spheres, we can conclude an increase in mutual observation, but little discur-
sive exchange: regional newspaper reporting pays attention to other European coun-
tries, but speakers from these countries are hardly represented at all. Related to
country references, we can state a re-nationalization trend between 2003 and 2008
since national references increase at the expense of all references to other foreign
countries. However, on the one hand we have to consider that over this period more
and more foreign states (many states from the former Eastern Bloc) became part of the
group of EU states, and that the peak to other states in 1989 might especially result in
the special Eastern political transformation situation at that time. On the other hand,
between 2003 and 2008 references to EU member states also maintained a consistent
level. Therefore, our data might also indicate an intense internal European discourse
about solving the crisis and not a pure re-nationalisation. Future content analyses
have to be undertaken for a deeper understanding of this matter.
European identification
Our third and final analytical dimension relates to the construction of communities
as they are articulated in the regional newspapers. A precondition for the self-per-
ception as part of the European community is a collective identity, expressed in
statements as “We, the Europeans” or at least the existence of a topos like “the Euro-
peans” within the journalistic content. Hence, we distinguish between the dimen-
sion of identification “we-references” and “collective identities” as the significant
others in the public discourse.
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Figure 7. We-References over time (n = 13,969)
By analysing we-references across time, it becomes obvious that in most regional
newspapers we find exclusive we-references on quite a stable level at an average of
81%. “Exclusive we-references” means that the author of the article or an actor who
is quoted in the article identifies him- or herself with a certain community, not in-
cluding the reader (e.g. “We, the trade union” or “We, the homosexuals”). National
we-references are at an average level of 18%, and increased in the years between
2003 and 2008 from 15 to 21%. Regarding our main focus of interest, the amount of
European we-references, we have to state a constant level of negligible 0 to 1%.
Comparing the proportions among our analysed newpapers, it is remarkable
that besides exclusive we-references the Ouest France shows a lot of national
we-references (20%), and with 2% above-average European we-references.
As presented in figure 8, there is a remarkable distribution of different collec-
tive identities in our sample. Addressing the own nation as a community (e.g.
“The Germans” in the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung) is on the one hand as com-
mon (25%) as addressing other non-western and non-European nations in the
same way (27%). Other European member states are in 18% of the cases individu-
ally addressed, whereas “The Europeans” as a collective is only mentioned in 5%
of the cases. “The West” as a community is named in 7%, and “The Americans” in
6% of the cases. Other transnational communities, for example communities be-
yond the national frame like religious or ethnic groups, are referenced to in 12% of
the cases.
In figure 9 we can notice at first glance that the proportions for all references to
collective identities are quite fluctuant over time. Nonetheless, there are some re-
markable tendencies. References to the own nation are fluctuant, but constantly ris-
ing in the long run (from 21 to 35%). References to the West as an identifiable
collective are fluctuant, but constantly decreasing (from 13 to 3%). Already starting
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Figure 8. References to collective identities (n = 2,674)
on a low level, and then likewise slowly decreasing, are references to “the Europe-
ans” (from 7 to 3%), whereas single European member states are more frequently
addressed as collectives (from 16 to 20%). As in some of the other dimensions, we
can also see here in the collective dimension that references to “the Americans” are
most frequently made in the post 9/11 era in the year 2003. In 2008 the level of refer-
ences however goes back to the pre-9/11 level of 1996. Regarding references to col-
lective identities to other nations, we can see a major decrease from 37 to 20%. This
tendency might be seen as complementing the decrease of references to other na-
tions that we have already seen for the country references in figure 5. Here we have
explained the decreasing interest to other nations as a consequence of the on-going
European integration process and the admission of more member states. In addi-
tion, we have to keep in mind the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 resulting in
dissolution of the Western and Eastern spheres as closed political entities. Refer-
ences to other transnational collective identities are more or less stable at between
10 and 14%.
Summarizing the results regarding European identification within the regional
press coverage, we can conclude that there is hardly any evidence of an explicitly
expressed shared European identification: there is no growing common reference to
“We as European”. To the contrary, the collective “the European” even seems to lose
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Figure 9. References to collective identities over time (n = 2,674)
weight in the public discourse. But it can be noted that Europe is instead perceived
in another way, namely identified by the single European countries that are increas-
ingly addressed as collectives.
Conclusions
The following questions formed the starting point of our analysis of regional news-
paper coverage: Do we find in European regional press the same, however con-
tested trend of Europeanization as we know it from other print media outlets? Or
are there other trends like trans- or (re-) nationalization? And can we link this in
a certain way to the characteristic of the regional newspapers as “reporter”? Sum-
marizing our presented research, we can conclude an ambivalent result. A vertical
Europeanization can be observed until 2003 through an increasing visibility of EU in-
stitutions that is referred to at a middle-range level, whereas explicitly European
policies are quite rarely addressed in the regional news coverage. The latter is
hardly surprising because it seems to be the result of the already mentioned prag-
matic choices of journalists in regional papers as “reporters” keeping their broad
audience and their interests in mind. Maybe also unsurprisingly, we could show
that France and Great Britain often constitute the opposite ends of the scale of
Europeanization, paralleling to a certain extent the countries’ respectively rather
eurosceptic or europhile positions.
From starting already at a quite visible level, a slight tendency of horizontal
Europeanization, i.e. a growing focus on EU countries, can be found up to the year
2003. In contrast to Great Britain, the more recently joined members Poland and
Austria show the strongest horizontal tendencies for Europeanization. However,
when it comes to the possibility of being quoted in the news coverage, speakers
from other European countries are mainly absent. This fact also remains stable over
time. It can be explained by the process of newsgathering within regional outlets:
due to financially limited resources regional papers usually cannot employ foreign
correspondents to get access to international actors as sources and therefore mostly
rely on news agencies... Even less existent are indicators for a European identification.
European “we-references” are nearly non-existent, and “the Europeans” are losing
weight over time. However, what is obvious instead is that references to the single
EU members as collectives are on a good middle-range level and increase over time.
Interestingly, these elementary results are completely in line with our previous
content analyses of quality and boulevard newspapers (Hepp et al., 2012:63–83). We
also found a rising attention for EU politics up to the year 2003, and a flattening ver-
tical Europeanization in 2008. We could already observe a constant interest in Euro-
pean neighbours as a sign of a stable horizontal Europeanization, and only minimal
evidence of a European identification. However, what the analysis of the regional
papers could furthermore impressively reveal is that Europe as community is
founded and is discussed on the basis of still existing and very strong European na-
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tions. Especially between 2003 and 2008, the own nation and ‘the national’ as point
of reference in the news coverage became an important matter in all newspapers; in
our longitudinal research it increased at the time the financial crisis started in Eu-
rope. As already argued, further research is needed to interpret this data in an ap-
propriate way: Is it just an indicator of a re-nationalisation? Or do we have a more
complex pattern whereby the relation between the own nation, other European na-
tions, and the EU is re-negotiated? Both would have resulted in a higher number of
national references in 2008, but the outcome would be quite a different one. Our
content analysis of 2013 will at least provide information about further develop-
ments and give us the chance to discuss this matter more deeply.
Finally, increasing national references in the news coverage in the context of the
EU and Europe is not inevitably an opposition or even contradiction to the process
of Europeanization, nor is it dysfunctional for European integration. And as Georg
Vobruba (2013) argues, the “Eurozone crisis might not be a deadly challenge to the
whole European construct, but rather become a further step towards a European so-
ciety”, since it “set off a new dynamic of people’s action and institution building”
(Vobruba, 2012:276). Therefore, we are confronted with complex processes of
struggle and re-negotiation between European countries that are not contrary to
a step-by-step constitution of a European society but part of it. Here, Vobruba re-
minds us of the classical sociological analysis by Georg Simmel that demonstrated
how far the national society was also constructed by conflict. It remains a subject for
further research whether this ambivalent trend between 2003 and 2008 will continue
and actually result in a re-nationalisation or in a more intense Europeanization.
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Hosting Europe, Covering Europe? Domestication in the
EU-Coverage on Belgian Television News (2003–2012)
Ample research has shown that across Europe, television news coverage on the Eu-
ropean Union is relatively limited, especially compared to the political and econom-
ical significance of the EU (Gleisner & de Vreese, 2005; de Vreese & Boomgaarden,
2006). Moreover, when covered, EU related news stories are generally focused on
specific, key-events (de Vreese, 2001). While European summits are almost guaran-
teed to receive at least some news media attention, this is not necessarily the case for
other (regular) EU-activities or European institutional actors. General EU policy re-
lated news coverage is scarce, and even European elections do not get much atten-
tion by media, as they are considered secondary elections by the people, national
political actors and news makers (see for an extensive, comparative study: de
Vreese et al., 2006). On top of that, large institutional actors like the (members of) the
European parliament only get minor attention. For many observers, this is an unfor-
tunate situation, which does not sync with the overall importance of EU politics.
News coverage on all aspects of the European Union is crucial for the public to ac-
quire enough knowledge about and understanding of the EU, and for the institu-
tions themselves to be recognized by the people as a relevant political decision level
and to be evaluated more positively by them. Increasing the legitimacy of the EU
has proved to be a necessary and continuous priority for the EU.
Even if Belgium basically hosts the European Union (EU) in its capital Brussels,
news coverage in Belgium is not spared from this trend. The scarce scientific re-
search done on this matter shows that Belgian television news does not cover Euro-
pean news stories more frequently and/or extensively than other European countries.
On the contrary, a study based on news from 2006–2007 shows that news broadcasts
in countries like Germany and Italy cover Europe considerably more than Belgian
broadcasters do (De Swert, 2009; 2011).
Apparently, the geographical proximity of the EU in the heart of the country
does not seem to make much of a difference. For several reasons, that is a strange ob-
servation. News value research (Galtung & Ruge, 1967; Chang, Shoemaker
& Brendlinger, 1987; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001) clearly stresses the importance of geo-
graphical proximity as one of the drivers of news worthiness (see also Stêpiñska et
al., 2013). Moreover, the closeness of the EU institutions should also make it logisti-
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cally easier for reporters to cover EU stories, since all the important news sources
are available right at hand. Finally, there is the obtrusiveness of the EU in and
around Brussels. Hosting the EU (which also has its benefits for the city and the
country) namely impacts the local society quite severely from time to time. Whether
it is street destruction by angry farmers or fishermen during their frequent protest
marches, traffic jam because of increased safety measures for EU meetings or excite-
ment about the arrival of international big shots at Brussels Airport, the presence
of the EU institutions in Brussels seems to bring along plenty of occasions for
EU-related news stories worth covering for Belgian television news.
Despite these elements, the aforementioned study seven years ago could not
find more coverage in Belgium than in other EU countries. The reasons for this un-
expected result were not clear from this study. Therefore this chapter wants to re-
connect to this question, utilizing a rich dataset of content-coded television news
of the Belgian1 public broadcaster VRT and the Belgian commercial broadcaster
VTM. This dataset is provided by the Television News Archive of the Media Policy
Research Centre, a scientific initiative supported by the Flemish government
(www.steunpuntmedia.be). This unique archive contains all main prime time tele-
vision news broadcasts of the public and private broadcaster in Flanders (Belgium)
since 2003. At the moment, it consists out of more than 150,000 news items, each of
them coded and on-line available in streaming video for research purposes. This
dataset is not only longitudinal and large, which accommodates urgent calls for
such research by e.g. Riffe et al. (1994) and Wouters (2009), it also includes very re-
cent material. This is important, first of all since especially the economic crisis has
boosted EU-relevance in the news considerably in the past few years. But secondly,
also Belgian links to the EU have formally increased in this time period, mainly by
the appointment of the Belgian ex-first minister Herman Van Rompuy as the presi-
dent of the European Union.
Domestication
Both geographical proximity and the presence of elites with the nationality of the
country of broadcast can be considered natural elements of domestication. Domes-
tication of foreign news, in this case EU news stories, refers to the process by which
newsmakers try to make this intrinsically ‘distant’ news more proximate to the
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1 In this chapter, when Belgium is mentioned, we mean the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium.
This northern part of the country has most inhabitants and surrounds Brussels, which means
the impact of the EU is largest on this part. Since media systems in Belgium are completely
segregated by language, we need to make choices. Since there are rich data available for the
Dutch-speaking part of the country, and not for the French-speaking part, we opted to in-
clude only the Dutch-speaking part. It should be mentioned though, that in the 2006–2007
study the French-speaking news broadcasters were included, and they showed a higher
amount of coverage of the EU than the Dutch-speaking broadcasters (De Swert, 2009).
viewer by linking the news to the home country in one way or another (Clausen,
2004; Uce, Schueremans & De Swert, 2004). Thus, domestication of EU news is one
path newsmakers can follow to ensure a proper stream of EU related information in
television news without losing viewers because of disinterest. In some cases this do-
mestication is forced by creating or emphasizing links between the foreign news
subject and the home country (e.g. by interviewing an expat national present in the
country which is covered). In other cases, like the one discussed in this chapter, ‘nat-
ural’ domestication elements are present, which are totally unrelated to journalistic
influences. However, the decision to use these links of course remains in the hands
of the news makers themselves.
Taking all that into account, this study has three main research questions:
RQ1: How much coverage is there about the EU in Belgian television news? What are
the characteristics of this coverage (topics and actors).
RQ2: How has coverage on Europe evolved in Belgian television news over de last ten
years?
RQ3: To what extent does (natural) domestication of news about the European Union
drive news coverage on the European Union? Which elements of domestication
are most prominent?
To answer these research questions, we will make use of the above described
dataset of Belgian television news casts. From the approximately 150,000 news
items, we will identify the items about the EU, and investigate them in more detail
using the existing coding of the Television News Archive as a starting point, linking
them to the specific topics, contexts and forms of domestication. The basic coding of
this giant dataset is done by dozens of coders of a period of ten years. The variables
used in this chapter are coded with sufficient inter-coder reliability (for an extensive
report on inter-coder reliability of the dataset see Wouters, De Smedt & De Swert,
2013).
European Union-related coverage in Belgian television news
Our first two research questions are very descriptive in nature, referring to the
amount of coverage on the EU in Belgian television news and the evolution of this
(amount of) coverage through the years. Graph 1 provides an overview of the rela-
tive amount of attention for EU-related news stories in Belgian television news
(public and commercial broadcaster combined) between 2003 and 2012, based on
figures aggregated per quarter. First of all, from this graph it becomes clear that the
time period in which the aforementioned comparative data were situated (end of
2006-beginning of 2007) was a time period with exceptionally low attention for the
EU in Belgian television news. The present study does not provide information
about other countries, so it is up to future research to find out if similar evolutions in
attention for EU-related news can be found in other countries. For as far as Belgium
is concerned, we can conclude that there is a quite low, but steady amount of cover-
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age on the EU at all times (2.3 percent, which corresponds to about one news item
about the EU per broadcaster every two days, or on average 48 seconds of
EU-related news on a daily basis, calculated over the full time period of ten years).
Another interesting conclusion is that since 2009, there is a trend towards a higher
share of EU-related news coverage, with a peek in the end of 2011.
Where it is usually fairly difficult to account for the different topics EU news cov-
erage is about in television news because of the small amount of EU news in the first
place, the present data set provides an interesting opportunity to get a reliable indi-
cation of the most and least covered topics in EU news. Gauged over the full time
period (2003–2012), Economy & Finances clearly tops the list with more than 85.000
seconds of attention on Belgian television news in that ten years time period (See
Table 1). More than one third (34.5 percent) of all news attention for the EU was
about economical or financial issues. International relations (including involve-
ment in international conflicts, but also diplomacy and aid) is a solid second,
while internal politics of the EU completes the top three. Other topics which are
very important policy domains on which the EU has significant political decision
power, like agriculture, environment & energy and consumer protection are cov-
ered far less.
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Graph 1. % European policy-related news in television news in Flanders
(public and commercial channel together, weighted by duration of news items)
Table 1
Coverage of topics within EU-related news coverage in Belgian television news
over the period 2003–2012 (in total amount of seconds and in percentage







Economy & Finances 85,240 34.5
International relations 36,489 14.7
Politics (Internal EU politics) 31,244 12.6
Environment & Energy 17,336 7.0
Social issues/Employment 14,594 5.9
Crime 12,228 4.9
Immigration & Human rights 10,085 4.1
Agriculture 7,588 3.1
Consumer protection 6,865 2.8
Mobility 6,546 2.6
Defense 2,742 1.1
Other topics 16, 421 6.6
Even if this topic analysis is done on a large sample (actually, it is the universe of
the EU-coverage in all daily main newscasts) over a long period of time, it can still
be quite misleading. More in particular, the top position of Economy & Finances is
a quite recent phenomenon. While up till 2007–2008 there were about ten EU-related
stories per year about Economy & Finances, this amount grew in 2008–2009–2010 to
about 50 per year, and in 2011 and 2012 this culminated in respectively 266 and 296
news stories involving the EU and a topic related to Economy & Finances. This
means 73 percent of all EU Economy & Finances news coverage over the complete
time period 2003–2012 took place in these two last years.
Linking this trend the previously mentioned factor of the inauguration of Bel-
gian national Herman Van Rompuy as the European President, one might see tenta-
tive evidence of the (positive) effect of this natural domestication element on the
amount of EU news coverage. However, in graph 2 it is clearly visible that this
“Herman Van Rompuy”-effect is only responsible for the peak in 2009, and not for
the complete trend. The largest peak in EU-related news (from 2011) seems to be at-
tributable almost solely to the coverage of the economic crisis. While before 2008
economic and financial news did not determine a large part of the total coverage on
the EU, it does so since the end of 2008. If all economic and financial news would be
taken out of consideration, there would not even be any increase in coverage on the
EU. Concerning the prominence of EU-president Herman Van Rompuy, the graph
shows that the news items in which he is present do multiply as well when these
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economic and financial EU-issues come up, but they do not cause these peaks in at-
tention for Europe in Belgian television news. For that, the economic and financial
news coverage is too dominant.
We started off with the idea that several forms of (natural) domestication could
be at play for EU coverage in Belgian television news. To be able to get a grasp on the
importance of these different forms, we divided all EU-related news items (this was
based on the topic coding of the original database, which includes up to three different
topic codes for a news item and which includes a short summary of the news item in
text) into four categories. The first one is Pure EU-news. This means that the news
item is about an EU-related topic and that there is no link whatsoever with Belgium.
It is important to know that the simple mentioning of e.g. Brussels like in “Today the
EU-council met in Brussels to discuss…” is not coded as domestication, since that is
so common place that it does not really link the EU to Belgium, especially not for
Belgian TV news viewers. This category of Pure EU-news thus includes news items
in which Belgium as a country is not involved, and/or no consequences for Belgium
are named explicitly. The second category is a form of domestication: Consequences
of the infrastructure and organization of the EU for Belgium (Brussels or Belgium).
This includes coverage on the effects of the presence of the EU-institutions and
their working on e.g. the house market, traffic situation, city development, infra-
structural costs, security effects etc. The third category is about Consequences of
EU-related events for Belgium/Brussels. This includes large protests and potential
damage and other problems caused by it, special visits, EU celebrations etc. Finally,
there is Thematic involvement of Belgium, which means that Belgium is involved as
an actor in the EU-topic the news items is about. The most typical case of this is that
a news item is made about the impact of EU-policy on Belgian policy, or that in the
process of EU decision making the Belgian standpoint is mentioned or expressed by
e.g. the Belgian minister in charge of the concerned policy domain. But it also in-
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Graph 2. Amount of European policy-related news items in television news
in Flanders (per quarter, public and commercial broadcaster together)
cludes the appointment of Belgian nationals in EU-institutions. The most prominent
example of this is of course the aforementioned appointment of the EU-president
Herman Van Rompuy, or the appointment or discussion about the capabilities of
the Belgian EU member of the European Commision.
In Graph 3 this division is visualized. The thick black line of the pure EU-news
(non-domesticated EU-news) is always higher than the lines of any of the three dis-
tinguished domestication forms. Only in the end of 2009, when the appointment of
Herman Van Rompuy at EU president was prepared, there were slightly more do-
mesticated news items than purely EU-related news items in the coverage of the
two Belgian television news channels.
While the three forms of domestication are coded in a mutually exclusive way, it
should be noted that the dotted line indicating the amount of items in which
Herman Van Rompuy was mentioned or in which he could speak, is not. It is added
to try to account for the unique effect of this person only. Following the definition
we gave earlier, his appointment as EU-president in 2009 is categorized under Do-
mestication 3: topic (and actor) involvement.
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Graph 3. Amount of European policy-related news items in television news
in Flanders (per quarter, public and commercial broadcaster together), N = 2,734,
divided into Pure EU-news and different forms of domestication
Herman Van Rompuy: culmination of actor-domestication?
In Graph 3, Herman Van Rompuy proves to have been quite present in the coverage
of Belgian news broadcasters on the EU since his appointment as EU president. This
raises more questions. Is the (factual, created or exaggerated) involvement of na-
tional actors an important driver of news about Europe? In Table 2, an overview is
provided of the function of the actors speaking in news coverage about the EU. An
important, but not completely surprising (see e.g. de Vreese et al. 2006) observation
here is that most speaking time goes to politicians with the Belgian nationality. The
latter can be Belgian national politicians making a statement in the context of an
EU-related event or topic, or Belgian politicians who are active in one of the EU in-
stitutions (like members of the EP or EC member).
Table 2
Overview of the speaking time of actors by function
(total speaking time N = 90,943 and in percentages)
Actor function








Politician (Belgian nationality) 28,053 30.8
Politician (non-Belgian national) 26,050 28.6
Expert 8,352 9.2
Citizens 6,728 7.4
Civil society 5,533 6.1




Besides the relatively large share of Belgian voices in EU coverage, the table also
reveals a large dominance of (political) elite sources in European news coverage.
Experts, citizens, voices representing civil society groups and even corporate
sources get allotted a lot less speaking time than the politicians. This indicates that
in Belgium, television news about the EU is still mostly about the higher politics,
which gives the viewers a low sense of proximity to the content of these news items.
This result is in line with the findings about Belgian news coverage on national poli-
tics (De Swert, 2011). This general tendency is interesting, but still a bit vague as
well. Moreover, it does not clarify the role of e.g. Herman Van Rompuy as a (possi-
bly) exceptional case. The next step is to check whether the actor domestication of
EU news coverage in Belgium is just as strongly present in the coverage of the three
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most important EU power centers: the European Parliament, the European Com-
mission and the European Council. Graph 4 presents these results. For each of these
power centers, the chairman/president is shown separately (dark lowest part of the
bar charts).2
The differences between European Parliament, European Council and European
Commission shown in this graph, call for a nuanced view on actor domestication in
EU news coverage. While in European Parliament, actor domestication is the norm,
this is very much less the case for the European Commission and the European
Council. However, also there some tendencies for a preference for links to Belgian
nationals can be perceived. The Belgian member of the European Commission (po-
sition held by different politicians over the research period) still gets more attention
than proportionally would be reasonable for this function (within the whole of the
European Commission). The politicians of the European Council (mainly national
heads of government), where still all large decisions are made, get far most speak-

























Graph 4. Speaking time for EU actors 2003–2012
per EU institution and by nationality
2 For the EU Council this is since 2009 Herman Van Rompuy. For the EP these are Pat Cox,
Josep Borrell Fontelles, Hans-Gert Pötterig and Jerzy Buzek. For the European commission,
these are Romano Prodi and José Manuel Barrosso.
ing time on EU-related topics. Belgian prime ministers are taking up a large share of
this, but since 2009, the president of the EU does so as well. Since no comparison can
be made with any previous presidents, it is hard to say at this point if this successful
exposure in Belgian television news is due to a “fellow-country-man” effect, or
whether this is rather a sort of chancellor bonus, like many leaders enjoy in news
media coverage on all political levels (De Swert, 2011).
Conclusions
First of all, the account made in this chapter confirms that EU-related news cover-
age is not highly present in Belgian television news. Previous research indicates that
in most other European countries similar EU coverage is similarly limited, and most
observers deem this problematic for European democracy. If one would start from
a full news standard perspective (Zaller, 2003:112–116), the importance of the EU
policy level would justify considerably higher amounts of attention in the media.
That level of attention is not reached anywhere. It may therefore be at least a con-
cern to explain why this is the case, what the characteristics are of the EU news that
does receive proper coverage, and what the role of possible domestication factors
could be. This chapter tried to profit from a window of opportunity to do this for
Belgium. The country’s news has been blessed with severely higher quantities of
EU-related coverage in recent years, the country basically hosts the EU in its capital
Brussels, it delivered the first EU-president in 2009, and a reliable, longitudinal
measurement of television news content is available.
Generally, not much evidence was found for the natural domestication factors
related to the location of the EU institutions. Only a very limited part of EU-related
coverage can be categorized as linked to the impact the EU has on local society. The
other domestication element, the link to local actors, seemed more promising. The
appointment of Belgian national Herman Van Rompuy as EU-president coincides
with the start of a few years of significantly higher EU-coverage in Belgian televi-
sion news. However, the thematic analysis indicated that this might be caused by
the increased attention for the EU’s role in (solving) the economic crisis, which
would be a different perspective. To really find out whether the fact that the
EU-president is Belgian has an effect on the coverage of the EU, we need compara-
tive research, measuring topics and presence of the EU-president in the news in dif-
ferent countries on a sample of television news including the same days of broadcast.
Evidently, it would also be helpful to be able to compare with the impact of another,
non-Belgian EU president in the future. In Belgium, at least, the significant attention
for the EU president indicates that the introduction of an EU-president can be called
a success regarding media attention.
Does hosting Europe also lead to covering (more) Europe? Probably not. The
tentative evidence of this chapter on the Belgian case does not provide convincing
support for this statement. Moreover, the general share of EU-related news within
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the total coverage of Belgian television news is rather low. This can be seen as an in-
dication that covering or not covering Europe is still largely an editorial decision
which is only to a limited extent influenced by the proximity of the institutions. The
physical advantage Belgian television news makers have by having their studios
only five to ten kilometers from the location of the most prominent European lead-
ers, actually raised higher expectations. The psychological advantage of Belgian
newsmakers being better able (or even forced) to link European events to local soci-
ety also does not live up to the expectations one might have from it. What remains
are the classic forms of domestication, meaning links made by the newsmakers to
try to create a proximity to the viewer, hoping that this will lead to increased inter-
est, or at least to a news items viewers would not run away for. Using almost only
Belgian members of the European Parliament as speaking news sources when the
European Parliament is relevant, as was found in the study presented in this chap-
ter, is one of those ways to domesticate Europe.
Ideally, Europe and the European institutions would not need domestication,
since news about them is actually domestic news about one of the relevant policy
levels of the viewers. While this may be stated like that from an institutional per-
spective, such thoughts are far from being a reflex in the heads of European citizens.
EU-related news coverage may be one of the parts of news coverage most in need
for elements which can appeal to the European audience. Because appealing to the
European audience actually implies appealing to the different national audiences,
the EU itself can do two things. First, introducing people who can serve as stable
and visible leaders for the EU, like the EU-president, may help. Maybe future EU
presidents may even be (partly) selected on their capacities to deal with the news
media and abilities to attract positive attention to the EU. Second, several key posi-
tions in the EU may be even better distributed among nationals from all different
countries, or at least some may be allocated to countries where attention (and sup-
port) for the EU is low.
Most of all, the tentative results from the present study deserve further and
better research. A cross-national comparative approach is the next step to try to de-
termine the use and impact of several forms of domestication in the context of
EU-related news content. Only then, after making a thorough comparative account
of domestication of EU-related news, the above mentioned conclusions can be set.
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Veronika Pitrová
Towards Cosmopolitan Europeans: Covering Europe
for the Young Audience on Public Service Broadcasting
in the Netherlands and United Kingdom
Introduction
Communicating Europe to young audiences has been severely overlooked by aca-
demic communities in the past decades. It is thus very likely that this fact has only
fuelled current low interest in European integration among young Europeans. The
same holds true for the youth’s disinterest in politics. The EU and politics are gener-
ally regarded both by the adults and the youth as unattractive, complicated and dis-
tant. It is argued that the EU lacks legitimacy (Meyer, 1999) or, as some coined it,
suffers from a communication deficit (Follesdal & Hix, 1993). In a broader sense,
this separation between EU politics and public can be threatening for the democ-
racy not only at EU level but also on the level of individual member states.
European children represent the future of the European Union and unless they
become more cosmopolitan and acquainted with politics and the EU, Europe will
continue to suffer from the lack of solidarity and low political interest which will
hinder any further integration or even threaten the existence of the EU itself. Here,
the media are undoubtedly an important player and especially public broadcasters
should be bounded to fulfil their educational role. What picture of Europe do chil-
dren get via children’s news? Which topics are covered more frequently and which
make it to the news only occasionally? And is Europe presented as a multicultural
space?
Communicating Europe to a young audience has been out of the researchers’ fo-
cus and same applies for the content and production of the children’s news which
albeit being an important actor of political socialization attracted only weak aca-
demic attention (but see Matthews, 2009; Buckingham, 2000; Lemish, 2007). Argu-
ably socialization via children’s news might take place only indirectly for such
abstract topics like EU politics and Europe yet it might still have profound effects on
later information acquisition, attitude formation and interests. Young people, how-
ever reluctant to watch programmes about politics, get the majority of information
about politics from the TV (Russell, 2004).
This study thus assesses the content of the two prominent children’s news pro-
grams in Europe and evaluates whether they offer balanced coverage of current af-
fairs in terms of geographic focus and topics and thus might serve children’s
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socialization within the European Union (see generally Conway et al., 1981; Van
Deth et al., 2011). There are currently 13 children’s news programs on air in 11 coun-
tries of the European Union. The reasoning for comparing the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom is that they both broadcast children’s news for over three decades
and have comparable experience with reporting EU affairs.
Importance of children’s news
Political socialization, often defined as a “developmental processes by which ado-
lescents acquire cognitions, attitudes and behaviours relating to their political envi-
ronment” (Atkin & Gantz, 1978:184), firstly attracted researchers’ attention in the
mid-1960s. These “classical” studies of Greenstein and Hess and Torney (as cited in
Atkin & Gantz, 1978:184) argued that children acquire most of their political learn-
ing prior to the adolescent age. These early studies however barely mention the role
of television or other media. To the contrary, research in the seventies made rela-
tively strong claims about media. Atkin and Gantz (1978) state that a great amount
of children regularly watch TV news which significantly contributes to their interest
in, and knowledge about, political affairs.
Subsequent research in the eighties strictly divided the role of TV and of other
media. TV news is often regarded as children’s first contact with the world of poli-
tics (Atkin, 1981) and has an important role in the development of young people’s
political understanding. The most recent study suggests that the news usage, be-
sides other influences, is an important antecedent of children’s political orientation
as it is positively related to children’s political knowledge and issue awareness (Van
Deth et al., 2011). Moreover, Simon and Merrill (1998) studied American children
(on average 8–18-year-olds) and concluded that adequate provision of political in-
formation can enhance awareness of, and interest in, political and societal affairs.
Yet other research suggests that viewers understand and learn little from what
they watch on TV (e.g. Gunter, 1987). Nevertheless, vast research conducted by
Walma van der Molen (e.g. Van der Molen & Van der Voort, 2000; Van der Molen,
1998) challenged these findings by concluding that, unlike adults, children were
found to remember more news from TV watching than from reading. The reason,
she argues, is the high congruence of verbal and visual parts in children’s news
compared to the adult news. This empowers the role of broadcasters, especially those
of public service, as they have the primary duty to provide educational content.
The key question is whether already young children are capable of grasping po-
litical concepts, or in this case, EU issues. This has been a focal point of early child-
hood socialization research. While early studies recognized that small children
acquire political experiences mainly in family context (cf. Easton & Dennis, 1969), in
the 1970s scientists concluded that political concepts are simply too complicated for
younger children (e.g. Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). Cullingford (as cited in Buck-
ingham, 1999:250) defended the initial findings by claiming that children develop
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‘political’ concepts at a rather early stage, mainly through their daily experiences of
institutions such as the school and the family. Taking the latest studies into account,
Götzmann argues that primary school pupils comprehend basic political concepts
(as cited in Van Deth et al., 2011:150). Similarly, Van Deth et al. (2011) concluded
that already children in the first year of elementary school (on average 6-year-olds)
exhibit consistent, structured political orientations.
Despite the acknowledgement that TV is an important tool for children’s politi-
cal socialization, content of the children’s news has been largely neglected by the ac-
ademic community. So far, most studies about children’s news were single country
studies (Matthews, 2009; Beelen, 2004; Beune, 2003) or two-country-studies (Buck-
ingham, 2000) and the available research regarding the content of children’s news is
mainly single-topic focussed (War in Iraq: Lemish, 2007; Strohmaier 2007; Events of
9/11 in US: Van der Molen & Vries, 2003). This study is pioneering in assessing the
content of the children’s news as a whole with special focus on European and EU
politics news.
The production of the children’s news has certain specificities. Buckingham
(2010:131) argues that children’s news has to provide more background in order to
contextualize the foreground, has to combine entertainment with information in or-
der to educate (which he coined as “edu-tainment”) and is generally based on the
journalists’ assumptions about children’s interests, knowledge and cognitive abili-
ties. The expectations are that European and EU coverage differs between children’s
news in Britain and in the Netherlands, and that it largely depends on the attitudes
and professionalism of journalists who produce the news, especially if some chil-
dren’s news editors openly consider politics as “a pretty dull business” (Russell,
2004:347).
Therefore the first research question states:
RQ1: What do journalists think and how do they feel about Europe and EU? To what ex-
tent do they embrace journalistic professionalism when covering EU for a young
audience?
The EU is generally poorly visible in adult news (e.g. de Vreese, Banducci,
Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006; Peter & de Vreese, 2004; Schuck et al., 2011a; Machill
et al., 2006) and attracts media attention mainly during key events (Gleissner & de
Vreese, 2005). It is likely that these trends are even more pronounced in the chil-
dren’s news. Undoubtedly, the news coverage about Europe matters, as it can influ-
ence knowledge, attitudes, and support for EU and its policies (Schuck et al., 2011b).
More precisely, it is the visibility of the EU and Europe which affects the public sup-
port for European integration (e.g. Maier & Rittberger, 2008; de Vreese & Boom-
gaarden, 2006) as well as general EU support (Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Despite the
visibility not being a guarantee of public support, it can lead to knowledge gains
about EU (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006a). Several studies have already shown
that people rely on media when forming their opinion about EU (e.g. de Vreese
& Boomgaarden, 2006; Maier & Rittberger, 2008) or about remote and abstract topics
(i.e. agenda-setting role of media). Assuming that children and young viewers gener-
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ally lack the personal experience with Europe, in its geographical or political sense, it
could be argued that the same principle applies. The second research question states.
RQ2: How much news about Europe and EU is there in the children’s news?
Besides the visibility, the frames and tone of the EU coverage have been at the
centre of the research (e.g. Schuck et al., 2011a; de Vreese, 2003). Schuck et al. (2011a)
concluded that general EU evaluations remain slightly negative but media cover-
age is overall positive towards the EU. Furthermore, they identify two important el-
ements: EU is positively evaluated with regard to utilitarian benefit considerations
and negatively evaluated with regard to the democratic nature and functioning of
the EU. Building on these conclusions, this study focuses also on tone and frame of
EU political news and the visualizing elements used in this coverage. The subse-
quent research question states.
RQ3: How is EU presented in the youth news? How is this done considering topics’ selec-
tion, frame, tone of actors, multicultural portrayal and visual presentation?
Finally, to put these finding into perspective, another research question was
developed.
RQ4: Are these findings very different from findings about the real television news?
Methods
This study applied quantitative research strategy, using methods of content analy-
sis and interviews. A one day observation in the newsroom of the respective media
outlets was conducted by the author as a supplement. Using comparative design,
two children’s news programs were selected for the analysis.
Newsround is a flagship of CBBC, Children’s channel of BBC. Starting in 1972 un-
der the title ‘John Craven’s Newsround’ this programme has been pioneering in
providing special news bulletins for children and it has been labelled as the first
children’s news ever. Newsround is also the oldest children’s program on air in
BBC, targeting children from six to twelve years old and nowadays reaching daily
around 800,000 children viewers (BBC, 2011). Daily, eight editions are broadcasted
ranging from one to ten minutes, with two main editions at 07:40 and 17:00 hours.
Editions are not meant to be broadcasted in schools. Newsround’s crew consists
nowadays of 35–40 people.
Jeugdjournaal is a similar programme within the Dutch public service broad-
caster (NOS) presenting important domestic and international news in understand-
able form for the young audience (eight – fourteen years old). Jeugdjournaal has
been on air since 1981 and its format has been copied to around thirty countries
around the world. Aired daily in two different bulletins, broadcasted live at 08:45
and 18:45, it lasts five and ten minutes respectively (“Over het Jeugdjournaal,”
2012). While the morning edition is meant to be streamed in schools followed by
short discussion about topics, the evening bulletin targets the individual viewers.
Jeugdjournaal’s crew consists nowadays of approximately 25 people.
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Independent variables are the countries (United Kingdom, the Netherlands) and
dependent variables are all variables as listed here below (available upon request in
more details). This study contained two sub-projects. Firstly, media content analysis
assessed the coverage of European countries and EU politics. For this, the main bul-
letins of Newsround (17:00, BBC) and Jeugdjournaal (18:45, NOS) were taken.
Using systematic sampling, sixty-eight bulletins over the period from June 2009 to
February 2012 were coded. On top of that twelve days of special EU events were se-
lected and coded (e.g. European Parliament elections, EU summit or signing of Fis-
cal Compact Treaty). Overall, 21.5 hours of broadcasting was coded. Research units
were the individual news stories.
The coding was proceeded in three consecutive steps. Firstly, all news items
were coded for three variables: Time, General topic and Content focus of the story
(Part I.). Secondly, selected news was coded for Topic of news item, Talking of Youth,
Multiculturality and Visual representation (Part II.). Lastly, all items dealing with EU
topics were coded for additional variables (Part III.): EU specific topic, Frames of item,
EU Actors, Tone of EU actors. For the news item to be coded as an EU topic, it had to at
least once mention or show one or more EU actors, institutions or symbols. Refer-
ences to European leaders and European ministers were also regarded as EU topics.
In total 160 news bulletins which contained 999 news items were coded.
Krippendorff’s Alpha was calculated for the inter-coder reliability for variables in
section I. and II. The figures ranged from .73 to 1. Due to the rare occurrence of vari-
ables in the third section of coding (for the items about EU), it was not possible to
proceed with the standard procedure of the inter-coder reliability test. Therefore,
the variables in the third section were coded in the presence of an additional coder
for all items of the sample (N = 11).
The second subproject used questionnaires to evaluate journalists’ personal
characteristics, professionalism and EU attitudes. The content and form of the ques-
tionnaire was inspired by Eurobarometer survey and the special edition of Euro-
barometer New Europeans (Eurobarometer, 2010).
To maintain the comparative model of this study, journalists of British children’s
news Newsround and of Dutch children’s news Jeugdjournaal were selected as re-
search units. Eventually, six completed questionnaires were obtained per news out-
let concluding a total of twelve, with identical gender ratio (i.e. four women and
two men).
Profile of children’s news journalist
Journalistic education seems to be more crucial in Dutch children’s news where five
out of six journalists possess the diploma. To the contrary, only half of the BBC sam-
ple has followed higher journalistic education. Dutch journalists are clearly more
multilingual and seemingly, they have more experiences from foreign countries. Re-
garding EU and cosmopolitan attitudes, British journalists appear to be slightly less
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attached to the EU compared to their Dutch counterparts who are also somewhat
more proud to be EU citizens.
When asked for their personal attitudes, the EU apparently means different
things for Dutch and British journalists. Despite sharing answers like free travel-
ling, different cultures, history and beauty of the continent, for Dutch journalists the
EU is also about transparency, coherence, Euro currency and European laws. One
Dutch journalist also stressed the “cooperation among countries to work together
for trade, peace and politics” and “to help each other”, however his British counter-
parts were a lot more cynical stating that “’one policy for all’ does not work” or even
stronger, that EU “gives me nothing but dictates the way my country is run without
any benefit to us, e.g. immigration, farming, economy.” Cynicism among Dutch
journalists is less pronounced stating the “worries about weak economies.”
Country membership in the EU is significantly more positively evaluated in the
Netherlands. The reason as stated by journalists is the fact that the Netherlands is
a small country and as one journalist wrote “cooperation makes us stronger” and
“borders are so 20th century.” British journalists are comparatively more sceptical
about UK’s membership in EU. Generally they state that EU is good for their coun-
try when it comes to trade and economic union but it is rather disadvantageous
when it comes to bailing out weak states or adhering to unified EU laws.
British journalists also think that the current state of European integration is
more than enough. To the contrary, according to Dutch journalists it should be uni-
fied even further. The most significant differences among Dutch and British chil-
dren’s news journalists are in their attitudes towards covering EU for the young
audience. British journalists are clearly less attracted by EU news and even consider
it boring, dry, difficult for adults and not relevant for children. They also believe that
children are “removed from EU politics because they do not pay taxes.” According
to Brits, the EU is simply “too high level” and it is “hard to engage kids” for this
topic. In apparent contrast to this, two Dutch journalists perceive EU as an impor-
tant topic; “let it be the Euro or Eurovision.” They like the topic even more if they
can give a practical example. Only two Dutch journalists did not like the EU as
a topic, because it is boring, too political and has little effect on children.
Another significant disagreement among Dutch and British journalists is whether
the EU is difficult for children to understand. While British journalists strongly felt
that EU is too complex, irrelevant, too difficult to understand, and it makes no sense
to report it unless it affects children personally, the Dutch journalists adopted a to-
tally different approach. They largely agreed on the fact that EU is not difficult for
their audience and stated that it is only up to them to make EU understandable and
attractive. EU can be explained simply, according to Dutch journalists, although it is
not always an easy task but as one journalist said “it depends on the details you pick
up and you leave.” Only one Dutch journalist thought that EU is boring for children
but not difficult.
Lastly, journalists from two children’s news programs did not agree whether EU
news is relevant for their audience or not. While only two of six British journalists
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agreed that EU is relevant for children because all is interconnected in today’s
world and because children might go on holidays to other countries, four out of six
Dutch journalists stated that EU is relevant mainly for children’s futures, because
decisions are being made about them and also to balance the influence of USA. Neu-
tral opinion from one Brit claimed that it all depends on the EU policy in question –
education being of particular relevance for children also on EU level. Only one
Dutch journalist thought the EU is not relevant for children’s daily life, compared to
three British journalists who claimed that children might understand the geograph-
ical meaning of Europe but do not care about its political side. In terms of usage of
the visual elements (maps, graphics, tables, graphs etc.) journalists in both countries
agree that these items help to explain complex issues.
To sum it up, there is a significant disagreement between Brits and Dutch about
the EU coverage for children. While Dutch journalists are more likely to show an ef-
fort to cover EU topics however challenging they might be in terms of explanation,
British journalists perceive the EU as purely irrelevant for children unless it affects
them directly and thus they refrain from covering it.
Europe and EU in the news
The amount of domestic news appeared to be identical for both media and repre-
sents more than a half of coverage. The difference emerges for news about European
and non-European countries (Table 1). While in both news outlets, the
non-European counties predominate over the European, the variance is smaller in
Dutch children’s news. The difference between Jeugdjournaal and Newsround
is statistically significant both for the coverage of European countries (U = 114.357,
P = 0.002) and for coverage of non-European countries (U = 114.457, P = .013).
Table 1
Content focus of the news items





Domestic (N = 636) 64 63
European (N = 203) 17 25
Non-European (N = 399) 44 36
Domestic and European 9 9
Domestic and Non-European 14 11
Note. In percent. N = 999.
Overall, one fifth of the sample represented news in which European countries
appeared. In addition to that only one percent of all news was about European Un-
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ion (despite the large definition for coding). Dutch children’s news featured the
EU news substantially more often (N = 8) compared to their British counterparts
(N = 3).
To answer the second research question, there is news about Europe in children’s
news however it is far from being an excessive coverage. Despite the geographical
proximity, European countries appear in the news less often than non-European
countries. Nevertheless, out of these two outlets, Dutch children’s news seems to be
more Europeanized. European Union, however, remains almost invisible in chil-
dren’s news. Scarce coverage of EU affairs is common for both outlets yet compara-
tively there is more EU news on Dutch children’s news than on Newsround.
Presentation of Europe
The data show that Dutch news portray Europe more in hard news style while Brit-
ish Newsround covers it more in soft news style (Table 2). Dutch European news is
about politics, society & culture or crime & accident considerably more than Euro-
pean news in Britain. In United Kingdom, the European topics are noticeably more
often about sport and rarity. Lastly, it is evident, that British broadcaster put more
emphasis on youth-related topics which are not that frequent in Dutch Jeugd-
journaal. Interestingly enough, political news in Dutch children’s news outweighs
the youth related issues. Out of all these categories, the difference between Jeugd-
journaal and Newsround is statistically significant for crime & accident (U = 4481,
P = 0.043) and sport (U = 4278; P = 0.010).
Table 2
Topics of the news
Topic Newsround Jeugdjournaal
Politics & Economy (N = 28) 10 17
Crime and Accident (N = 45) 16 27
Nature (N = 46) 20 25
Culture and Society (N = 51) 19 30
Rarity (N = 50) 30 20
Sport (N = 52) 34 19
Youth related (N = 20) 13 7
Other (N = 13) 10 4
EU politics (N = 11) 3 7
Note. In percent. N = 203. One item could contain more than one topic, maximum of three.
While Newsround appears to cover almost twice as much of youth-related Euro-
pean issues, it does not give the voice to its audience. There is a statistically sig-
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nificant difference between Jeugdjournaal and Newsround in presenting young
interviewees in the news (U = 4401, P = 0.017). It is the Dutch news which shows
young interviewees in 26 percent of its European coverage compared to only 12 per-
cent in Britain. This is crucial because same-age peers from other countries appear-
ing on TV might help to make the connections with other cultures.
Regarding the level of multiculturality, whether the news represents Europe and
its countries as a multicultural environment, the data showed that the majority of
the news about Europe in both countries demonstrated no multiculturality whatso-
ever. Yet there is some indication about weak multiculturality in both news outlets.
What is surprising though is the usage of European map in European news. De-
spite being an important tool for explaining complex issues, the usage of a graphic
map seems to be a strong asset only of Dutch Jeugdjournaal (Table 3). The difference
between Newsround and Jeugdjournaal is statistically significant (U = 2081, P = 0.000).
British children can only guess where the country lies and how far from them it is
because 96 percent of the European news does not contain any map. Maps on BBC
Newsround were however present in non-European news but these items were not
coded for this variable therefore any data is available.
Table 3
Presence of a map in European news
Type of map Newsround Jeugdjournaal
Domestic and foreign country (N = 29) 3 23
Only foreign country (N = 3) 1 2
No map included (N = 171) 96 75
Note. In percent. N = 203.
Analyzing news about EU affairs in more details, these represented only one
percent of the whole, and five percent of the European sample. Contrary to the ex-
pectations, Newsround covered only one topic of 12 selected EU events of special
importance. The Dutch Jeugdjournaal covered five of them. This corresponds with
opinions of Dutch journalists who deem EU politics relevant for children. Further-
more, it seems that the level of importance of the EU event is not the news criteria
for covering EU on BBC Newsround. This corroborates with earlier results, since
the British journalists expressed that the main criteria for them to cover the EU is the
direct effect on children or whether it concerns a news which is been largely talked
about in the society.
Similarly, contrary to the expectations but in line with journalists’ reasoning,
during the period of regular coverage Newsround featured two of its three items
and Jeugdjournaal three of its eight items. This suggests that while Jeugdjournaal
seems to follow the mainstream news flow about EU and then adapts it for a chil-
dren’s audience, Newsround behaves against this convention and rather looks for
topics itself. Due to the very low number of EU news items (N = 11), no statistical
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analysis can be performed. Instead, a list of all EU topics which appeared in the
news (Table 4) is provided.
Table 4
Specific topics of European Union news
Outlet Date Time Topic
N 8.11.11 115 s Greece: money problems.
N 5.6.09 140 s Brown’s party in troubles, to lose in EP elections.
N 11.7.11 120 s Common Fisheries policy about to change in Europe.
J 18.9.09 25 s Farmers’ protests against low milk prices in EU.
J 25.11.09 30 s Van Rompuy as a president of EU, new PM in Belgium.
J 10.6.11 35 s Croatia to join EU in 2013, all conditions accomplished.
J 2.3.12 165 s Situation in Syria: what to do with Assad?
J 5.6.09 160 s 2009 EP Elections; Wilders won 4 seats in EP – success.
J 26.3.10 100 s “Will EU help Greece?” summit. Yes, under conditions.
J 26.10.11 185 s Eurocrisis, what to do with Greece? Eurozone summit.
J 27.10.11 100 s Closing the summit about how to help Greece.
To summarize the EU news on British Newsround, these items were relatively
long yet they featured EU rather marginally without further explanation and the
EU was mentioned fairly indirectly. Consequently, very few graphic elements were
used and only one map (of Greece, not Europe) featured in the items.
To summarize the EU news on Dutch Jeugdjournaal, these items were longer
and featured EU prominently. The role of EU was generally well explained. Cover-
age of a large part of the important EU events on Jeugdjournaal was done very origi-
nally and it was obvious that an effort had been made in order to make the topic
understandable. Contrary to Newsround, Jeugdjournaal largely used special visual
elements, including the map of EU member states or a map of countries with Euro
currency.
To conclude, four out of eleven EU items were about Greece and related financial
problems in Euro countries. This issue has been featured a lot in the news during the
past three years and children’s news could not neglect it. However, British chil-
dren’s news did not cover any of the EU summits where Greece was discussed, con-
trary to Jeugdjournaal. While Newsround sent the journalist to Greece to make the
story relevant for their audience, Jeugdjournaal used various creative ways in the
coverage (Monopoly, graphics, cartoons of leaders etc.). Secondly, agricultural pol-
icy represented two of eleven EU items. This corresponds with the fact that if the EU
topic covers an area which could be linked to children’s daily life such as eating fish
or drinking milk, this news is more likely to be picked up by children’s news edi-
tors. Consequently, two items of eleven mentioned the EP elections, yet in both
countries this topic was covered within a strong national angle. Topics of Enlarge-
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ment, Common foreign policy and the appointment of EU officials were absent in
British news which again corresponds with the views of British journalists about
the irrelevancy of the political side of Europe for their audience.
Adult vs. children’s news
The adult news considerably differs from children’s news in space which is devoted
to political information. While political topics are predominant in adult news, ac-
counting for almost half of the coverage (Heinderyckx, 1993), they are generally
marginal in children’s news. Secondly, the most noticeable difference between
adults’ and children’s news is the amount of EU coverage. The European Union was
present in only one percent of the children’s news coverage while in adult news the
EU is generally more salient, accounting for less than ten percent of political cover-
age in routine periods (Peter & de Vreese, 2004) up to around twenty percent of the
whole coverage in EU events (Schuck et al., 2011b). In the later case, the amount of
EU items on adult’s news on BBC and NOS was almost identical, which is not the
case for British and Dutch children’s news.
Comparing the EU specific topics of children’s news and of adult news, there is
a correspondence in covering EU economy, Euro currency and economic policies the
most frequently (Schuck et al., 2011b). However, further EU topics of adult news,
such as enlargement or political system remained almost absent in children’s news.
Conclusions & discussion
The comparison of content and journalists of children’s news in two European
countries gives an interesting insight in the news production for a young audience.
The expectations that European and EU coverage depends mainly on the personal
attitudes and professionalism of journalists seem to be correct. Britain is tradition-
ally seen as Eurosceptic while the Netherlands is usually termed as pro-European
and the overall results correspond with these tendencies. Dutch journalists consid-
ered EU more relevant for their audience and there was consequently more EU
news on Dutch Jeugdjournaal, compared to BBC Newsround.
The aim of this study was to find out what picture of Europe and European Un-
ion children receive through their news. Political socialization research states that
children experience the first contact with politics through TV news. Public service
broadcasters, from their role of information providers and educators, should sup-
ply this. However, as this study shows, British coverage of European countries pro-
vides significantly more soft news while Jeugdjournaal provides rather hard news,
including seventeen percent of politics, compared to ten percent in Britain.
It seems that British children’s news tries to present an uncomplicated peaceful
world by minimizing violence and crime related stories. This was also confirmed
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during the observation in the newsroom of Newsround which followed the inci-
dent of a shooting in a French Jewish school.1 Despite being breaking news it was
not, according to the personnel, covered on the day when it happened. In the fol-
lowing days, the coverage was rather brief and mainly reassuring children that this
had been an uncommon event. Overall, the findings point to the fact that children’s
news bulletins are likely to follow different news values than adult news (Harcup
& O’Neill, 2010). Yet these values might not be identical for all children’s news.
The European Union and its political side appeared to be almost invisible in chil-
dren’s news. This is not surprising considering the fact that EU is not an attractive
topic for adult news either. Yet this finding is alarming because it tells us that chil-
dren’s news does not in any way help to decrease communication deficit. Europe
and its politics will remain distant, boring or complicated because how can we ex-
pect a knowledgeable and participative European public if we do not provide them
with the information so they can, as they grow older, make an opinion about it?
Or is EU really too difficult for children? According to early political socialization
research children are capable of understanding political concepts and Dutch jour-
nalists largely agree with these findings. Yet it is still questionable whether social-
ization actually takes place at this young age for such an abstract topic as the
European Union and whether simple information provision can serve it.
It is true that Newsround targets slightly younger audience but this does not ex-
plain why a ten-year-old Dutch can understand EU and make a statement about the
bailout fund for Greece while a ten-year-old Brit cannot. Well, the British is not even
asked. Clearly, there is a problem which lies mainly in the function and concept of
the children’s news. The everlasting conundrum of whether public service broad-
casters should provide what the audience has to know or what it is interested in is
even more crucial for production of children’s news. I would argue that considering
the fact that children’s news is a means of political socialization, besides of course
other factors, it should not be blindly following the dogma of what the audience
wants, especially when it concerns public service broadcasting. Naturally, if covering
“boring” politics makes the audience go away, the effect on political socialization is
again zero. The challenge lies in making the political and EU topics interesting so
that they communicate the message in an accessible, clear and simple way which
will attract and inform the young audience; a reporting style coined by D. Buck-
ingham as “edu-tainment”. This is not an easy task, quite the opposite. It requires
time, creativity and will.
The amount of EU and political coverage on both children’s news is not satisfac-
tory. Nevertheless there is one difference. Journalists at Jeugdjournaal seem to have
at least good intentions and show some will to put more EU in the coverage. During
my observation in the newsroom, a journalist and editor were discussing why the
story about the newly elected French president was important. They agreed that it
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1 On 19th March 2012 three children and a teacher were shot dead by a gunman at a Jewish
school in the French city of Toulouse. More information: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-us-canada-17426313.
was because of the EU where François Hollande replaced Nicolas Sarkozy in tan-
dem with Angela Merkel. Eventually, this comment was not part of the news item
due to time restrictions. The journalist concluded that she would have to explain
why the Franco-German tandem is important.
In Britain, however, no such intentions were perceived and from informal talks
with journalists I got the impression that nothing is more boring than EU. Answers
from the questionnaires proved my impression to be right. The data from content
analysis and journalists corroborates. The topic of agricultural EU policy was re-
ferred to through traditional fish & chips and Greek financial problems were ex-
plained by the familiar face of journalist Lea who travelled to Greece. To the credit of
Newsround crew, they also have creative ideas and can make difficult topics acces-
sible for children. When journalist explained about taxes, in connection to the Brit-
ish state budget, a part of the report was shot in a candy shop and the journalist used
the analogy of buying candy to demonstrate tax payment.
After mapping the situation and raising the points, let me now suggest some so-
lutions. Firstly, slipping the EU more often into the coverage, possibly without fur-
ther explanation, might help children to perceive the EU as something normal.
After all, visibility already triggers some awareness. Secondly, there is enormous
potential which lies in cooperation with the educational system. The morning edi-
tion of Jeugdjournaal is specifically made to be broadcast at schools followed by
a short discussion about current news. Furthermore, Jeugdjournaal is also involved
in producing School TV2 and since 2011 they have also produced small one-topic
video stories (e.g. political crisis, elections) which are then supplemented with text
and exercises3 and are distributed to around 3,000 Dutch schools subscribed to this
service. Arguably, all this might explain why Dutch journalists think that their audi-
ence understands the EU while British journalists think the opposite. Yet all these
examples should be an inspiration for BBC as it is a commitment for NOS to con-
tinue covering political topics and increase the EU coverage in order to fulfil the ed-
ucational role and in theory serve the children’s political socialization.
Besides, isn’t the quantity of eight news bulletins of Newsround per day to the
detriment of the quality? If less time is spent on quantity, more time could be de-
voted to cover difficult topics in interesting ways. If the change comes gradually, it
is likely to be accepted by the audience. This way, BBC could help the political so-
cialization by making politics and EU just as normal as anything else.
Undoubtedly, children’s news, their journalists and the audience requires
more investigation. Cross-national research might help to find out a suitable con-
cept of this news format and comparative study could provide insights into its
news values. Furthermore, the bulletins should be assessed for their level of
infotainment and edu-tainment. New interactive ways to engage children through
media should also be tested as well as children’s knowledge and attitudes towards
politics and EU which are of societal significance. Current situation is not comply-
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2 Weekly, 30 minutes long bulletin about current affairs intended to be used in schools.
3 Produced by CED-group Rotterdam.
ing and the challenge lies right here. Thus unless we want to bring up more and
more generations whose interest in politics and Europe will be declining, change
is inevitable.
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The Role of the Euroblogosphere in a Context
of the European Public Sphere
Introduction
The lack of a European public space where the citizens can share their thoughts and
expressions about the decisions taken in European level correlates with the demo-
cratic deficit that the European Institutions have. Many commentators agree that
democratic deficit is linked to the existence and function of EPS and the deliberative
democracy it creates (Papanagnou, 2013). According to a pan-European online
newspaper, “the Euroblogosphere represents a large number of European citizens
who criticize the democratic deficit in European institutions, or more simply those
who want to share criticisms, suggestions or gossip in an online community”
(Sforza, 2012).
The argument of this article is that the Euroblogosphere seems to be one path
that holds out much potential in this regard, given that it comprises many inde-
pendent bloggers writing their personal opinions on EU matters, usually in more
than one language (Ruiz Soler, 2012). At the same time, the Euroblogosphere could
be a central bridge between national and European discussions (Fossum & Schles-
inger, 2007). It might foster participation in European discussions, as it is easier to
reach international audience without having to pass through and be filtered by na-
tional mass media that invariably angle the EU issues through the lens of national
political cultures (Ruiz Soler, 2012).
At the moment, one of the main reasons of the democratic deficit of the EU is that
there is no regular feedback flow from the citizens to the EU decision making cen-
ters (Michailiodou, 2009). The internet, due to its characteristics, that is cheap,
global and two way communication (Papanagnou, 2013; Michailiodou, 2009) may
be seen as one of the contributions to the development of a European Public Sphere
(Michailiodou, 2009). The nature of the European Public Sphere can be described as
interconnected national public spheres, multilingual community and geographical
distance between members of the public (Michailiodou, 2009).
It seems that there is no full understanding of ways in which various groups and
individuals engage in civil society and political processes in the development of su-
pranational developments such as fostering of a more integrated Europe (Wessels,
2009). Hence, it is necessary to conduct empirical studies and theoretical explora-
tion of the role of the online media. This paper aims in filling in a gap in academic re-
search on a topic of the Euroblogosphere and to complement the existing literature
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about the European Public Sphere by focusing on relations between these two con-
cepts. The main question of this paper will be: “What is the contribution of the
Euroblogosphere into the European Public Sphere?”
Literature overview
There is not much literature about the specific topic of EU blogosphere and the role
it has on society. Academically, two papers written by Feldhof (2009) and Ondarza
(2007) have been published about the Euroblogosphere until 2009, when an
aggregator of blogs about EU topics was created by independent citizens. The
aggregator “bloggingportal.eu” contains today more than 1000 blogs written in dif-
ferent languages.
Feldhof (2009) concludes in his research that Euroblogosphere fails fostering po-
litical participation of the masses and that blogosphere has a limitation in a control
of policy-makers. Ondarza (2007), on the other hand concludes that the Euro-
blogosphere is a partial public sphere, where European institutions are responsible
to provide a basis for the growth of it. The Euroblogosphere can be understood as
a virtual partial public sphere of people who are interested in European politics and
social issues.
Recently, a new academic article was written by Papanagnou (2013). The paper
presents the results of the empirical research conducted on the emerging EU-blogo-
sphere and relates them to the Habermasian notion of the public sphere. Concep-
tually, it traces the development of the public sphere as a normative category and
establishes a series of criteria that seem to guarantee its effective operation as a dem-
ocratic bridge between publics and authorities in a transnational context. In the pro-
cess, it refers to the various empirical works in this area which aim to trace the
public sphere in Europe. The empirical part analyzes the findings of the qualitative
research conducted with EU-bloggers (expert interviews and content analysis). The
results show that the EU-blogosphere to some extent exhibits characteristics of an
effective (if inconsistent) transnational public sphere (extension of democratic de-
bate, promoting an EU-common identity, achieving at times influence). Papana-
gnou suggests that further systematic studies and explorations of the phenomenon
of the Euroblogosphere are more than necessary to get a more balanced picture
(Papanagnou, 2013:25).
The debate about the European Public Sphere (EPS) is more intense. One may
recognize different perceptions of the EPS. For example, Maria Heller and Ágnes
Rényi (2007) claim that all preconditions for a development of the EPS are set, but
there are problems for its development that must be solved. In particular, there is
still an open question regarding the way the EPS may be developed: by the
Europeanization of national media, or by the creation of a transnational, pan-Europe-
an media. Jos de Beus (2010) supports a concept of the Europeanization of national
media, while Bruggmann (2009) points that a multitude of EU transnational media
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has evolved over the last 20 years and that they have a small, but significant and
growing audience. Bruggmann (2009:694) even defines a typology of transnational
media.
The common conclusion is that the existence of an arena for interaction between
the nations is necessary (Van de Steeg, 2009). Without informed citizens and the
possibility to participate, there is no interest in Europe and democracy. The demo-
cratic deficit of Europe can only be eliminated only if the EPS, in which a democratic
process of participation is incorporated, will be developed (Papanagnou, 2013). In
this regard, communication environments that historically provided platforms for
a public debate are changing with the development of digital technologies and the
World Wide Web (Wessels, 2009). The current emergence of an information society




Scholars have been studying the concept of the European Public Sphere (Koopmans
& Statham, 2010). They recognized some particular stumbling blocks, including na-
tional media, a variety of languages, and national cultures (Kaitatzi-Whitlock,
2007). However, it is worth mentioning that there are simultaneous public debates
on the European issues on a national level. This means that information required for
a participation in a public debate on the EU issues is available to the majority of the
Europeans through conventional media. Consequently, an all-inclusive, democratic
European public sphere may, potentially, emerge (Michailiodou, 2009).
John Erik Fossum and Philip Schlesinger (2007) established two models of the
EPS development: the regulatory model and the federal model. Both of them are
political models for the EU with different characteristics and different concepts of
public sphere. First model defines the EU as a “regulatory entity engaged in prob-
lem-solving.” The purpose of the EU is ultimately a “network governance,” where
members should use the institutions as platforms for discussion and for seeking the
problems’ solutions. The second model, the federal EU, is opposite to the first one.
Based on the EU as a democratic constitutional state, it assumes a need for the Euro-
pean identity developed by “a public opinion mobilized to influence.” This model
aims for the Europeanization and transnationalization of national spheres, taking
into consideration “a respect of democracy, difference, pluralism, human rights and
vulnerable identities.” Interestingly, none of these two models contemplate the use
of the internet.
Maria Heller and Ágnes Rényi (2007) claim that the EPS might be close to the
first model, the regulatory one. However, due to the development of the online me-
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dia and the Internet access, it may change. The increase of interaction may lead to
more active participation of the citizens in the EPS.
Blogging
Blogosphere is a platform for citizens to express their ideas and share their com-
ments with other bloggers without any restrictions. Bloggers do not only produce
content to post on their blogs, but also build social relations with their readers and
other bloggers. Discussions “in the blogosphere” are occasionally used by the me-
dia as a gauge of public opinion on various issues. Because new, untapped commu-
nities of bloggers and their readers can emerge in the space of a few years, the
Internet marketers pay close attention to “trends in the blogosphere” (Bahnisch,
2006).
A political blog, that is a central object of this study, is a form of the Internet blog
covering politics. There are differing views as to whether political blogs constitute
political participation. One view is that political blogs are used as a public forum for
discussing the community, candidates, policy, and voting processes. Another view
is that political blogs are not about political participation, but are online ‘soapboxes’
for people’s political expression.
It is worth mentioning that there is a relation between reading political blogs and
voting, support for political candidates, and attempts to persuade others to vote in
some a particular way. The readers of political blogs may also interact with the au-
thors through a comment section or social media (Bahnisch, 2006).
Model for the research: semi-structured online interviews
Since the aim of the study is to illuminate a perception of Spanish/English bloggers,
the semi-structured online interviews were conducted (Mann & Stewart, 2000:75).
In particular, the object of the study is a person who is behind the blog site:
a blogger. Online written interviews seemd to be the best option to understand first-
hand the social function of the Euroblogosphere inside the context of the EPS. The
selection of twelve Spanish and English bloggers – six for each language – was
made in order to give a study a broad and comparative dimension. With the sample
of bloggers of two different languages, and – a priori – two different styles of politi-
cal blogging, the study offers more nuanced analysis and more robust picture.
In order to select the blogger the biggest aggregator of the EU blogs (blogging-
portal.eu) was used as a poll. The selected bloggers share the following characteris-
tics: (1) are listed in bloggingportal.eu; (2) write mainly in Spanish/English; (3) are
users of Twitter, with more than 300 followers; (4) focus mainly on European affairs;
(5) published their last post no later than 3 months ago; (6) have a personal blog do-
main; and (7) speak on their own.
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Following a sampling illustratively strategy (Mann & Stewart, 2000:126), one
should assume that the result of the research is not an absolute truth that can be
generalized to all blogosphere. Using the overview for planning and preparation
procedure for qualitative interviews developed by Jenifer Mason (2002:75), a ques-
tionnaire with ten main questions and several sub-questions was created and sent
to the bloggers’ personal emails (in English or Spanish). Some of the questions pro-
vided an opportunity to present some comments by the bloggers. The methodology
of data-driven coding (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009:205) was used during indexing,
coding, and categorization of the data.
What do the bloggers say?
The influence of the Euroblogosphere
The bloggers coincide in two points. The first one is that in general the Euro-
blogosphere is not big enough yet to be influential in any topic. James, an English
speaking blogger perceives the Euroblogosphere as: “Still small, still very few par-
ticipants,” and José María, a Spanish speaking blogger points out: “[...] It is very
much atomized.”1
The second common point shared by the bloggers is that the Euroblogosphere
has a huge potential for setting the agenda: “Given that a public sphere is all about
public communication, blogs can definitely play a very important role in both shap-
ing and dominating the general debate” (Protesilaos, an English speaking blogger).
However, the blogger Pau Solanilla claims the opposite: the Euroblogosphere lacks
an ability to influence a selection of the topics. According to Pau, the Euroblogo-
sphere, is a “microcosmos of multiplicity of isolate opinions,” an atomized space
without any kind of organization.
The main question here is what the Euroblogosphere needs in order to be more
influential. There is a diversity of opinions among the interviewees, but in general
they express that the Euroblogosphere needs more integration and cooperation be-
tween them: “Building links by promoting a culture of reading widely might in-
crease the size and participation of the Euroblogosphere, and so the Euroblogosphere
may become more influential” (Conor, an English speaking blogger).
Some bloggers compare the European blogosphere and the US blogosphere. The
US blogosphere seems to be, in their opinion, more influential. According to the in-
terviewees, some the US bloggers have a huge potential in affecting the mainstream
media and itroducing the issues to the public debate. In Europe, as interviewed
bloggers claim, there is almost no individual blogger who have such a huge influ-
ence:
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1 Original in Spanish: “Está muy atomizada.”
“The EU blogosphere remains a rather elitist talking shop between young
academics and EU professionals. Secondly, and related to the first point,
there are few connections between the European blogosphere and estab-
lished national media which could allow blogposts to reach a wider audi-
ence in one of the member states. Other than in the United States, it rarely
happens that an EU blogger’s post inspires an article in a national news-
paper.”
[André, an English speaking blogger]
The European Public Sphere and a role of blogs in the online EPS
Both contributions: of the bloggers to the Euroblogosphere and of the Euroblogo-
sphere to the EPS seem to be evident for the bloggers. According to them, the
Euroblogosphere bears a responsibility of developing debate and sharing informa-
tion. However, this contribution is very small if we take into consideration all the
channels of communication the citizens may potentially use (newspapers, radio sta-
tions, etc). Also, the interviewees’ general claim is that although the Euroblogo-
sphere has grown in size, and some sort of influence, it is still very narrow and
elitist:
“Bloggingportal.eu may list around 1000 EU-focused blogs, but most
aren’t regularly updated (my own included), and the vast, vast majority
would struggle to get daily readership numbers in triple digits. It’s now
become a closer-knit community (partially through Bloggingportal, as
there’s now a core of c.25 Eurobloggers who are all (theoretically) editors
on that site who all email each other fairly regularly.”
[James, am English speaking blogger]
There is not entire unanimity of what role the Euroblogosphere has to play in-
side the EPS, however the participants think that the Euroblogosphere is a space
where everyone can have a voice and can express their ideas, regardless of their
own worldviews. Furthermore, every blogger, but one, believes that the EPS is not
existing yet but still developing. Indeed, only one interviewee claimed that “As an
elitist concept, I think the European public sphere already exists and brings people
from different cultures together under a common umbrella” (André, an English
speaking blogger).
Among the others, one may distinguish between two opinions: while some ex-
pressed their doubts whether the EPS will ever be developed, the others hoped that
it would be developed in future. The former name stumbling blocks such as a lack
of the political union and of a transparency of the EU political institutions. Conse-
quently, since the citizens do not feel they can participate in their actions and control
politics, is very hard to engage them and to create debate.
The later discussed conditions that must be met to develop the EPS. Some
bloggers think that there must be a common institutional policy to make the citizens
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feel that the institutions are for them and not just for national leaders in Brussels.
The others recognize a need to show people how the EU affects them, in order to
create interest:
“People will care about the EU when they know that they are directly af-
fected by it – and a very good way for that to be realized is through direct
taxation. Once you get European-level taxation, you will get Euro-
pean-level discussions on how to reform the executive and legislative
branches of the EU, how to decisively address the democratic deficit,
how to make everything more approachable, understandable, transpar-
ent and human. Yes human, since now everyone is acting like an emo-
tionless drone, thanks to the kind of ‘super-official’ status EU institutions
have.”
[Protesilaos, an English speaking blogger]
Other blogger José María argues that the EU must be listened, by “imperative”.
His proposition is to launch a series of TV commercials to explain what the EU is do-
ing: “Now is when the Union must commit itself to be heard and seen on radio and
television, even by legal imperative that public television must run the ads the Un-
ion considers. Citizens must feel close to their institutions as they have been created
by and for them.”1
One part of the questionnaire included questions about the relations between
the European Public Sphere and democracy. For some scholars the public sphere is
central precondition for democracy because it enables widespread public debate
(Fossum & Schelesinger, 2007:4). Scholars have consistently stressed that an impor-
tant component of the EU’s democratic deficit is the absence of the viable European
Public Sphere.
Regarding this point, the bloggers stated that democracy and the EPS need each
other. In other words, there cannot be democracy without the public sphere, and
there cannot be public sphere without democracy. What is clear is that in this pro-
cess the blogs are an element of democratization, and a necessary element to create
a public debate: “I think this is absolutely true. No democratic debate, no democ-
racy, it’s that simple” (Craig, an English speaking blogger).
The role of the European institutions and institutional aspects of media
Some of the bloggers think that the European institutions must participate in some
sense in a public debate by providing a framework, but never actually interfering
with it. Other bloggers think it is better that European institutions are totally out of
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1 Original in Spanish: “Ahora es cuando la Unión debe apostar por hacerse escuchar y ver en
radios y televisiones, que incluso por imperativo jurídico las televisiones públicas deban
emitir los anuncios que estime la Unión. La ciudadanía debe sentir cerca a sus instituciones
pues han sido creadas por y para ella.”
any kind of management, organization or creation of framework for debate. These
bloggers think the public sphere must be developed just by the citizens. If the EPS
has not been developed so far, it is because citizens are not ready yet. For the
bloggers, the EU needs to change, if we want the EPS to be launched.
In that sense, the Internet has the potential to improve public communication.
As it was mentioned by the bloggers, institutions should try to communicate and
make the citizens feel that institutions are for them. In order to get close to democ-
racy, institutions must be sensitive with the reality and problems to keep in touch
with people by elections and referendums.
The bloggers agree that the Internet is the best way to communicate and to create
debate. However, it is a very elitist channel of communication and the number of
users is still rather low compared to traditional media, such as TV, radio, and news-
papers. A significant advantage of the Internet is that everybody can have a voice. It
is good that citizens can have a channel of communication to stand up and to orga-
nize themselves. Furthermore, the Internet offers alternative sources of information
and supports a diversity of opinions.
On the other hand, the Internet might be perceived as a source of unreliable in-
formation. As the bloggers see it, the Internet loves extremism, and it is more com-
mon to find euro-skeptic comments as it is a easy way for the people with these
ideas to express them. These comments and not accurate information are spread
very fast and might create a false image of the EU. Furthermore, aside of publishing
their own material they explicitly comment the Europhiles blogposts: “[…] The pro-
liferation of Euroscepticism can be virulent in some countries, and can be spread
easily on the Net, sowing the seed of populism, so easy to turn in times of severe
economic crisis”2 (Eva Peña, a Spanish speaking blogger); “If a medium says one
thing, the citizen can immediately check it on the Internet”3 (Macarena, a Spanish
speaking blogger).
The bloggers, in the opinion of the interviewees, can contribute to such a discus-
sion, but there are many other groups of people who can do it as well. Namely,
members of associations, or local media might contribute to the EPS. The question is
whether all of them share the same concept of the EU and the EPS.
Some interviewees suggest that bloggers could be somehow ‘employed’ by the
European institutions to promote pan-European debate. Another interviewee indi-
cates that policy-makers fail listening to the Internet. In this case the Internet is
viewed by the bloggers as a forum where all opinions are expressed and where in-
stitutions and organizations can learn. Additionally, the interviewee expresses that
bloggers can provide a feedback from citizens to the European institutions.
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2 Original in Spanish: “La proliferación de un euroescepticismo que puede ser virulento
en algunos países, y puede contagiarse fácilmente por la Red, sembrando la semilla del
populismo, tan fácil de prender en épocas de grave crisis económica.”
3 Original in Spanish: “Si un medio dice una cosa, el ciudadano puede inmediatamente
comprobarlo en internet.”
Finally, the bloggers agree that media such as TV, radio, or newspapers play
a role of gatekeepers and control a flow of information. Furthermore, the informa-
tion provided by the traditional media is domesticated. All these factors limit the
role of bloggers.
Discussion
The Euroblogosphere can be seen as a current embodiment of the public sphere in
Europe, but on a rather small scale. It means that the Euroblogosphere fulfills the
characteristics of the European Public Sphere, and by examining the Euroblogo-
sphere one can grasp a contemporary reality of the actually existing EPS. Within the
Euroblogosphere people may virtually meet exchanging ideas and thoughts. Any-
one can start a blog and publish opinions about European topics, regardless of his or
her economic, social or identity background. There is not limitation or filter to any
citizen to spread content and all of them share the same possible audience.
According to the Eurobloggers, their population and strength is growing slowly
as they are present not only at the bloggingportal.eu website, but also at the confer-
ences, seminars, or talks.4 Also, at least some of them start to be influential in politics
by providing a criticism on political decision or decision makers. At the same time,
the bloggers, like scholars, do not share one single model of the blogosphere or the
EPS. Eriksen (2005:351) explains that is difficult to reach a common EPS in the fore-
seeable future, but that there are traces of a segmented EPS. In fact, a small commu-
nity of citizens specialized and interested in the European issues who interact on
various levels (local, regional, national, international and transnational) can de-
velop such a sphere.
In this paper two models of EPS were presented in order to describe the
Euroblogosphere in their respective contexts. It seems that a current version of the
Euroblogosphere should be placed between these two models. Euroblogosphere
has developed from being focused nationally to start an interaction within other
countries, in a pan-European debate. It has grown in size and specialization, al-
though nowadays the Euroblogosphere is facing a problem of deepness of discus-
sions. Internet and the social media have changed the behavior of reading and
writing, promoting the speed of information more than the argumentation of the in-
formation.
The experience of the bloggers provides arguments for those who are studying
the Euroblogosphere and try to recognize its contribution and position inside the
EPS. Bloggers show that there is a real intention to build the European blogosphere
where people can share thoughts and expressions despite of their economic, politi-
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4 Bloggingportal.eu has been contacted by the EU representation of Cyprus in Brussels to
organize a meeting. “Cyprus Presidency meeting with bloggers: Call for involvement!,”
Bloggingportal.eu, accessed July 29, http://www.bloggingportal.eu/blog/cyprus-presi-
dency-meeting-with-bloggers-call-for-involvement/.
cal or religious backgrounds. Only with more engagement from the bloggers and
together with other associations and groups, online and offline, the European Pub-
lic Sphere can be developed.
The study on Eurobloggers leads to a conclusion that the Euroblogosphere is
a factor supporting the political participation by integrating more people and more
voices. Blogging has shown to be very important for the interviewees as a way of ex-
pression, keeping an eye to the European institutions and any other companies, or
NGOs.
European institutions should pay attention to debates on both – national and
international (European) levels and the role of the Internet such a communica-
tion processes. Regarding this point, Margot Wallström, ex Vice-President of the
European Commission responsible for institutional relations and communica-
tion strategy, said: “I believe the Internet is the new channel for debate and com-
munication. The EU needs to get more into the blogosphere and engage in real
debate” (Walström, 2012). However, despite of the Euroblogosphere and the
Internet, traditional mass media still will be the main sources for citizens to
gather information.
Finally, we should consider other tools bloggers are using nowadays in order to
interact, such as Twitter and Facebook. Live blogging also seems to be more and
more important, as an example of the live blogging of the last EU summit celebrated
29 of June showed (Rachman, 2012).
Conclusions
While much scholarship has focused on the media, less is known about the audi-
ence and the authors of the messages (Sicakkan, 2012:105; Statham, 2010:299). The
aim of the research was to study opinions and experience of the bloggers. This study
provided findings that support our understanding of the Euroblogosphere and the
European Public Sphere. The bloggers give evidence of an actor-based online Euro-
pean transnational blogosphere by describing the existence of a community of indi-
vidual citizens that share information and thoughts about the European topics. The
website bloggingportal.eu is just one platform with hundreds of blogs, and hun-
dreds of websites, projects and platforms fostering for more integration and Euro-
pean project. However, the Euroblogosphere is, still rather small, elite, and limited
by language differences.
The European elections in 2014, or any other big political event in Europe,
might be the best moment to conduct a research how and why EU-oriented
bloggers interact across Europe and what is a significance of bloggers for political
participation and influence. In addition, further research on the Euroblogosphere
might explore other languages, or nationalities, and other platforms of online dis-
cussions, such forums or social media in order to draw more detailed picture of the
Euroblogosphere.
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Part II
Media and Political Communication in Europe

Beata Ociepka
University of Wroc³aw, Poland
International Broadcasting:
A Tool of European Public Diplomacy?
Although public diplomacy is in fashion in Europe nowadays, there is no agree-
ment how the term should be understood. The definition is elusive, and in conse-
quence many researchers equalize it with propaganda or international public relations.
Governments and academia develop their own understandings. I represent the
opinion that after the collapse of the bipolar system and because of the inclusion of
nongovernmental actors into international relations, a new public diplomacy model
is emerging. The profound changes in the patterns of international communication
contribute to this development. In Europe public diplomacy has been included into
strategies of foreign policy during the last decade. The research has to follow up this
development urgently as European countries and the European Union display im-
portant actors in international politics and international communication.
From the perspective of political communication research, public diplomacy is
a strategy of international political communication that is adopted by democratic
countries with open media systems. It materializes as a choice of the strategy of in-
ternational communication, including branding and basic tools of public relations.
However, there is no agreement whether, an international broadcasting makes
a constitutive element of public diplomacy. In this paper I will follow the P. Taylor’s
(2011:27) approach, that perceived cultural diplomacy and international broadcast-
ing as essential parts of public diplomacy.
The question about the nature of relation between public diplomacy and inter-
national broadcasting based on American experiences was posed by M. Price
(2003). Price analyzes Voice of America (VoA) and Radio Free Europe (RFE). His
findings might be adopted nowadays to the contemporary US broadcasters: Radio
Sawa and television Al Hurra as components of American public diplomacy model.
In 2010 A. O’Keeffe and A. Oliver – researchers from Australian think tank Lowy
Institute – in a report “International Broadcasting and its Contribution to Public
Diplomacy” shed some light on the governmental investments in international
broadcasting in order to prepare recommendation for Australia as a middle power
and to lift Australian international broadcasting profile (O’Keeffe & Olivier, 2010).
The report convinces that not only big powers include international broadcasting
into the soft power tools. Also J. Bahrke in his study on German Deutsche Welle
shares the opinion that public diplomacy contains international broadcasting
(Bahrke, 2010:198).
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In the approach presented in this paper, the new public diplomacy is a tool of
soft power. The next fashionable term coined by J. S. Nye (2004) comprises in my
research not only culture, values and foreign policy, but also the soft lining of eco-
nomic power. As such, it derives much from public relations and reflects eco-
nomization of foreign policy. Thus, I understand public diplomacy in its new, post
cold war version, as a dialogical form of international political communication, and
a tool implemented by foreign policy in order to position the state internationally.
Image and public opinion are the most important terms for understanding the con-
temporary public diplomacy. The stress put on symmetry, dialogue, listening and
engaging characterizes approaches close to public relations. R. Zaharna names new
symmetric public diplomacy a relational model, opposite to informational one-
sided public diplomacy (Zaharna, 2007). There is a question whether international
broadcasters, stemming from the era of mass communication, are able nowadays to
serve as tools of dialogical public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy will be defined as a form of international political communica-
tion aimed at foreign publics. As such, it supports the achievement of the goals of
foreign policy of the state and includes non-state actors in the process and integrates
cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting. The aim of public diplomacy is
to create or reinforce a positive image of the country and its society and to make the
achievement of international policy goals easier by influencing public opinion to
shape positive attitudes toward the country. It should be understood as a long
– term, symmetric, dialogical communication of governments and NGO’s with
broad audiences (stakeholders) abroad. The communication frame attributes to the
governments communicators’ role, which due to the logic of symmetric communi-
cation includes both sending and receiving messages. Political international com-
munication is understood, as in the Denton and Woodward’s concept (1990) as
a process of cross border flow of messages, engaging participants in debate on allo-
cation of goods, privileges, regulations needed for achievement of common good.
Consequently, public diplomacy might be analyzed as a process aimed at setting the
agenda of media (international broadcasting), politicians (government to govern-
ment level) and the agenda of audiences (government to people, and people to peo-
ple).
Cynthia Schneider (2004) describes public diplomacy as “all a nation does to
explain itself to the world.” It might therefore be understood as a narration that
the society presents abroad – a story the society has to tell the world, filtered
through the political goals of the country, government, or incumbent political
party. National versions of public diplomacy give insight into the way societies
translate their culture by using the means of international communication and
cultural diplomacy. International broadcasters are channels for spreading the sto-
ries of societies.
The main idea of this paper is to analyze international broadcasting as one of the
elements of new public diplomacy in Europe. European countries pioneered the use
of radio for foreign policy purposes, in the beginning as both means of informing
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Diaspora (or colonial populations) about the politics at home and of foreign (war)
propaganda. When the Soviet Union collapsed and the cold war was over, foreign
image policy became no less important as an objective of international broadcast-
ing. Despite the fact that global communication, relying on networks of information
flow, defines a new context for broadcasting for foreign policy goals, radio and tele-
vision still remain important tools of political communication. By the online access
governments reach and engage new target groups. Furthermore, international
broadcasters are identified with the country and count as icons of soft power, as it is
in the case of BBC, one of the most prominent and credible global broadcasters,
identified with the UK and contributing to the positive image of the country.
In order to analyze the position of international broadcasters nowadays and to
understand their relationships with Foreign Ministries, I will focus on three cases:
(1) the British (BBC World Service), because of the long tradition of international
broadcasting of the BBC and the company’s (still) high international prestige; (2) the
German (Deutsche Welle, DW), as DW seems to play important role as a tool of Ger-
man foreign cultural policy; and (3) the Polish (Belsat TV), because Poland is a new-
comer in public diplomacy and Belsat TV, aimed at Belarusian audience, makes an
exceptional project authorized by a middle size country.
Polish case will be purposefully confronted with the experiences of two bigger
states, which are much more significant in international broadcasting. The size of the
countries matters – their hard assets contribute to the quality and territorial and lin-
guistic reach of their international broadcasters. Their international position is re-
flected in the strategies and objectives of their international broadcasters. Therefore,
Polish international broadcasting profile has been and will be different than British
and German and there is no attempt in the study to equalize the cases. The main idea
is to draw conclusions from three cases to understand the place of international
broadcasting and its relevance in the European model of public diplomacy. Thus, the
stress is put on the members of the EU, not at the EU as an actor of international com-
munication.
All three countries are members of the EU (Poland since 2004). However, their
international positions are not the same with Poland as a country striving for a role
of a middle power and a regional leader among Eastern members and neighbors of
the EU. Polish language does not play the role of the language of wider communica-
tion as English and German do – it also affects broadcasters’ performance. In the
United Kingdom and in Poland international broadcasting is operated by public
service broadcasters. Also DW is an institution of public law.
In the UK, the BBC is acknowledged as an official partner of the government in
the field of British public diplomacy. In Germany, the Deutsche Welle plays a role of
a go-between organization (Mittlerorganisation) of German foreign cultural policy.1
In the case of Poland, the role of public service radio and television in public diplo-
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1 The term public diplomacy is not widely used in German foreign policy, instead the notion
of foreign cultural policy is implemented.
macy has not been defined yet due to the relatively short period of the development
of this field. Nevertheless, while Western countries cut their budgets for interna-
tional broadcasting, Poland launched in 2007 a new channel broadcasting to
Belarus – Belsat TV. The station follows the idea of democracy promotion as an es-
sential issue of European normative power. In contrary to the BBC World Service,
or DW, Polish international media do not compete with other global media broad-
casters.
The British, German and Polish public service institutions rely on governmental
subsides and license fee financing. Therefore, they are supposed to follow the instruc-
tions of governments in international broadcasting. In particular, they are expected to
broadcast messages serving the country’s promotion, as well as to be involved in de-
velopment cooperation (Official Development Aid, ODA) and democracy promo-
tion. It may, potentially, affect the media impartiality. One of the presumptions of this
study is that public service broadcasting itself is proliferated by the EU media assis-
tance as a model for countries undergoing transition to democracy.
International communication as a frame of analysis of public diplomacy stresses
the role of the government. The changes in the international environment – de-
scribed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) as the emergence of a noosphere – signalize
still important, although changing role of the state in international communication
and public diplomacy. The role of the state is weakened by the growing participa-
tion and significance of non-state actors of international relations (international
communication). On the one hand, the development of the media sphere defines the
limits of controlling function of the state in public diplomacy. On the other hand,
new technologies constituting the virtual public sphere supply the governments
with new tools to put the citizens under their surveillance. Symmetrical social me-
dia that are prone to share, to involve, and to mobilize respond well to the model of
relational public diplomacy.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
British public diplomacy is globally recognized as an outstanding example of for-
eign policy soft tool in a democratic country. British public service broadcaster
(BBC) is an essential asset of UK’s normative power. BBC Royal Charter (2006) ex-
plains the role of British international broadcasting as “bringing the UK to the
world and the world to the UK.” BBC World Service (BBC WS) is one of the most
prominent international broadcasters globally. It won this reputation during the
Second World War, while sending radio information to the US (Cull, 2010) and after-
wards during the Cold War broadcasting to the Communist bloc (Leonard, 2002).
The officials of BBC as well as researchers in international communication often
quote Kofi Annan, to display the global prominence of BBC. The former UN Secre-
tary General evaluated BBC as “British greatest gift to the world in the 20th century”
(Dyke, 2003).
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Nowadays, BBC World Service consists of television, radio and online news
and information. It has been funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO). According to the BBC World Service Agreement, BBC operates BBC
World Service under the BBC Trust and in agreement with the Foreign Office.
FCO has the right to agree strategy of the BBC WS and to close services. Both in-
stitutions agree on Three Year Plans, deciding on financing (BBC WS Broadcast-
ing Agreement). Thus, the financing by the FCO will be over in 2014/2015. After
that moment, BBC will cover World Services from the license fee. The close rela-
tion of the BBC World Service to FCO is counterbalanced according to the BBC
Royal Charter and the Agreement (above) by the independence of BBC, granted
also for World Service. BBC World News – one of the mostly recognized broad-
casters worldwide and BBC’s most watched – is a separate commercial channel
of the BBC.
BBC World Service (2013) consists of 31 language radio services and two televi-
sion stations, broadcasting in Arabic and Persian (launched respectively in 2008 and
2009). Their start was the reason for closing other (as Polish, operating in years
1939–2005) language sections. Arab Spring in 2011 proved that the decision to
launch the Arabic service was taken right on time. The BBC Director for Global
News Peter Horrocks reported in 2012 that the number of Arabic version viewers
grew significantly during the Arab Spring. He outlined:
“The consequence of the BBC successfully blending traditional journalis-
tic values with modern means of gathering and delivering news has been
a noticeable increase in respect from our audiences in this region. Among
BBC Arabic TV audiences, trust in us is up from 67 per cent in 2008 to
90 per cent in 2011.”
Even after the viewing was not possible, the audience switched to BBC radio in
Arabic. According to Horrocks (2012), the trust originates from “impartiality and
independence (…), accuracy and depth [of coverage – BO]; transparency (…) and
accessibility (…).” Trust contributes to the credibility of the broadcaster and in the
consequence to the credibility of the country. It should not be overlooked that credi-
bility as a value is currency of soft power. Winning credibility will be essential for
middle size countries, striving for recognition internationally, but it preserves sig-
nificance also for the UK as a former Empire.
The positive perceptions of the BBC World Service stressed by K. Annan or Di-
rectors of the BBC are supported by international surveys. The Lowy Institute re-
port from 2010 relates to one of them emphasizing that:
“In an effort to demonstrate the effectiveness of the BBC’s international
broadcasting operations, the BBC commissioned a survey in 2010 on atti-
tudes to the BBC and other international news services in Kenya, Egypt,
Pakistan and Turkey. Respondents were asked which British organiza-
tions and programs make them think more or less positively about the
country, including the armed forces, the British Council, the UK Govern-
ment and UK foreign aid. According to the Director General of the BBC,
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Mark Thomson, 80 per cent of respondents said that the BBC made them
think more positively about the UK, far more than any of the other British
institutions mentioned, including UK foreign aid.”
[O’Keeffe & Olivier, 2010:312; Thompson, 2010]
BBC is officially named a partner of British public diplomacy, next to British
Council and Wilton Park. The close relationship with the FCO, outlined in the
BBC World Broadcasting Agreement, is supported by sharing the same objec-
tives, as defined for public diplomacy and for the BBC World Service: supporting
positive image of the country and engaging with publics. Although engaging
with publics seems to be difficult for a radio and television station, it might be
achieved by the online services, generating feedback from viewers and provid-
ing them with in-depth information and deeper contexts of issues discussed and
presented in the programs. The role an international broadcaster might play in
the country’s public diplomacy was illustrated well with the case of BBC in Po-
land by Mark Leonard in a book on public diplomacy. BBC was mentioned twice
by M. Leonard among the strengths of UK public diplomacy in Poland as “highly
regarded for its role during Communism” and BBC World Service in Polish (not
existing any more, see above) as “widely recognized (…), respected for its qual-
ity and trustworthiness, (…) the highest – quality news provider in Poland”
(Leonard, 2002:138).
BBC contributed a lot, due to its prominence in Poland, to the inclusion of inter-
national broadcasting into Polish democracy promotion aimed at Belarus. As it
was stated above, documents of BBC World Service put much stress on its editorial
independence (Review, 2005). FCO and BBC express it in every official document
as the core value of British international broadcasting. Nevertheless, interna-
tional broadcasting seen as an instrument of public diplomacy imposes limits to
journalistic independence. Still, the good reputation of BBC, reflected in the opin-
ion surveys, seems to confirm that the broadcaster found the balance between
serving the objectives of the FCO and respecting the core value of journalism.
BBC engages also in media assistance, partly thank to BBC Media Action. This in-
ternational charity of BBC provides – while supporting media and access to them
– to social change abroad. The international involvement of BBC Media Action
(www.bbc.co.uk/mediaction) illustrates how the official public service partner of
the FCO in the field of public diplomacy has been included into development aid
(media assistance).
The promulgation of the British model of public broadcasting itself turned to an
important asset of British soft power and BBC itself to a myth of democratic and in-
dependent media, influencing among others Central and Eastern European coun-
tries undergoing transition after 1989. The model constitutes now British but also
European normative power even if its spread was stopped on the Eastern borders of
the EU. The similar objectives in the field of media assistance are attributed to Ger-
man and Polish foreign broadcasters.
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Deutsche Welle (DW)
In Germany, the objectives of international broadcasting are explained in the Deut-
sche Welle Act (Deutsche – Welle – Gesetz, 2005): DW is:
“…intended to convey the image of Germany as a cultural state in the Eu-
ropean tradition and as a free and democratic constitutional state. (…)
should provide a forum in Europe and on other continents for German
(and other) points of view on important topics, primarily in the areas of
politics, culture, and economics, with the aim of promoting understanding
and the exchange of ideas among different cultures and peoples. In so do-
ing, Deutsche Welle shall, in particular, promote the German language.”
These objectives follow up the main concept of German foreign cultural policy
as outlined in “Konzeption 2000” – basic document of German Foreign Office in
2000. “Konzeption 2000” defines Deutsche Welle as one of the main actors of Ger-
man foreign media policy. The role of DW as a part “of German foreign relations,
but not as a part of German foreign policy” was stressed in the document evaluating
the broadcaster in 2008, presented to the German Bundestag (Unterrichtung,
2009:3). The formulation emphasizes the distance from German Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
The history of German international broadcasting is to some extent dominated
by the notoriety won by German Nazi radio propaganda during the Second World
War. After 1949, West German media gained better reputation internationally en-
gaging in conflict areas and in transition countries, while substituting missing im-
partial sources of information. J. Bahrke claims that during the military rule in
Greece Deutsche Welle was “the only not censored broadcaster, which could have
been listened to in Greece in Greek language” (Bahrke, 2010:198). For the listeners of
the Communist bloc, the programs of DW before 1989 were much less relevant than
VoA, RFE and BBC (Ociepka, 2013:90).
Deutsche Welle was established in 1953. In 1960 its operation was regulated by
DW Act and in 1962 it became a member of German public service broadcaster
ARD. DW represents Germany and promotes German culture abroad. It is sup-
posed to cater for growing presence of Germany internationally. This obligation
rests on the concept of Germany as “a nation rooted in European culture” as the key
message of German foreign image policy. Deutsche Welle is a media visiting card of
Germany (Unterrichtung, 2009:3–4).
Since 1992 it has been operating also as television, nowadays it broadcasts in
30 languages. The television service broadcasts to North America, Asia, Australia
and Africa in English, whereas the program for Europe is split into English and Ger-
man services, and for Latin America into Spanish and German. There is also a ser-
vice in Arabic and English for North Africa and Near East. Although German serves
as a language of wider communication, the governors of DW decided on adding
English to the basic offer of the television and online services. Nevertheless, promo-
tion of German language is still one of the most important objectives of DW.
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Deutsche Welle engages in media assistance. Deutsche Welle Act obliges the
broadcaster to participate in German development cooperation, particularly in
democracy promotion. DW’s financing comes partly from the federal budget for de-
velopment aid (Unterrichtung, 2009). DW has been providing courses and voca-
tional training for journalists in developing countries since the mid-1960s. Along
with the new public diplomacy concepts, DW searches for longstanding coopera-
tion with stakeholders abroad. According to the information given on the website of
the broadcaster, about 3,000 people every year are involved in trainings offered by
DW. They constitute “a global network for Germany”. Many of the participants of
DW’s projects and programs are future opinion leaders, essential members of pub-
lic diplomacy networks. The broadcaster claims that it engages with and listens to
the audiences, fulfilling the main objectives of an intermediate of a new symmetric
public diplomacy.
Deutsche Welle plays the role of a go – between in German foreign cultural pol-
icy. As it was stressed above, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather scarcely
uses the term public diplomacy. Still, foreign cultural policy makes one of the three
pillars of German foreign policy. Since 2000, it has been implemented as means pre-
venting conflicts. By engaging and listening, foreign cultural policy is supposed to
contribute to conflict solving. DW values equate the values, Germany wants to
share with the world. They are defined in Deutsche-Welle-Act from 2005 as well as
in basic documents on German foreign cultural policy.
Deutsche Welle as an intermediary of German foreign cultural policy operates
under Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federal Government Commissioner for Cul-
ture and the Media. It is financed from the budget of the Commissioner for Culture
and Media (Michalek, 2009:37). This pattern of financing gives Deutsche Welle
some independence from the direct control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
supports the expectation that DW is a part of German foreign relations and not Ger-
man foreign policy.
The position of German international broadcaster is not as strong, as the BBC
World Service’s. Traditionally, during the Cold War and after 1989 DW was
geopolitically more focused on Eastern Europe, one of the most important regions
for German language policy after 1982. Promotion of the language is in the case of
DW weakened by the implementation of English in order to reach as large audi-
ences as possible. Branding Germany and promoting the language require putting
a stress on German culture while providing “a forum in Europe and on other
continents for German (and other) points of view” and “promoting understand-
ing and the exchange of ideas among different cultures and peoples” result in the
use of English. DW follows the main objectives of German foreign policy strat-
egy that potentially results in the clash between representing the governmental
stances and the journalistic impartiality. Based on this case, Johannes Barke
shares the opinion that public diplomacy contains international broadcasting
(2010:198).
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The Polish Case: Belsat TV
Poland is a newcomer in public diplomacy but not in international broadcasting.
Polish Radio External Service has been broadcasting abroad since 1936. In 2013 it
broadcast in 6 languages. The language reach reflects differing priorities of Polish
foreign policy during and after the Cold War. Under the communist rule Polish
Radio broadcast mainly to Western European countries and offered service in
Arabic. After 1989 a reallocation of geographic priorities to Eastern Europe took
place. Polish Radio External Service informs about Poland, contributing to re-
shaping the country brand. The main document on promotion of Poland from
2009 (promotion was until quite recently the main term used by the Polish Foreign
Ministry to describe efforts to use soft assets and economic diplomacy in foreign
policy) signalizes the need to invest in radio and television broadcasting – includ-
ing online service for the publics abroad – but it does not define the role of interna-
tional broadcasters.
This part of Polish public diplomacy seems to be underestimated by the Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Belsat TV has been coordinated by an Advisory
Council, consisting of representatives of Polish Public Service Television (TVP) and
two MFA Departments: Department of Development Cooperation and Eastern De-
partment. The Advisory Council limits its activity to very general intimations for
the programming. Thus, it is not the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy
of the MFA that coordinates Belsat TV on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The objectives of the broadcaster were outlined in the agreement between the MFA
and TVP reached in 2007. The agreement introduces supporting of “positive image
of Poland abroad, especially in Belarus” next to democratic values promotion of
a “good neighborhood” (Porozumienie, 2007). These objectives are in accordance
with the remit of Polish public service broadcasters.
Neither BBC, nor DW broadcasts in Belarusian language. Belsat TV, broad-
casting via satellite in Belarusian for Belarus and Belarusian minority in Poland,
is of relevance as Belarus is an example of an authoritarian country, neighboring
to the EU, with a closed media system, for which international broadcasting is
a source of information about domestic and foreign policy. Belarus is also a re-
ceiver of development aid and many countries focus their promotion of democ-
racy efforts on Belarus. DW offers news and information for Belarus in English
and German. BBC WS operates radio program in Russian and Ukrainian. The
first one reaches also Belarusians since a majority of them speaks Russian as
a mother tongue. Belarusian is, according to UNESCO, one of the endangered
languages (UNESCO, 2013).
Poland was a recipient of Western and American public diplomacy messages
from the period of informational public diplomacy. The fact that it broadcasts now
to Belarus might be seen as a follow up of the experiences of Polish society under the
communist rule. The communist authorities classified Western broadcasters as
a hostile propaganda, although the classification was not shared by citizens who
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used to search for political news from Voice of America, or the BBC. Based on its
own experience as a recipient of democracy promotion campaigns, Poland laun-
ched Belsat TV.
Therefore, the launching of the channel is a considerable effect of Cold War West-
ern international broadcasting. Belsat aims to compensate for the lack of uncen-
sored information sources in Belarus. It is financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and partly by TVP. Online version gives Belsat opportunities to become an
interactive medium. In this case online presence is a must as for many Belarusians it
is the only way to receive not censored information about politics. Belsat reached
11% of Belarusian society in 2009 to almost 23% in December 2010 and 16% in Mai
2011 (Zerkalo-Info, 2011). The number of viewers increased in 2010 before and dur-
ing presidential elections. The station was the first in the country which broadcasts
the whole program in Belarusian. The language is associated with opposition to
Lukaszenka regime.
Its viewers – according to surveys undertaken by Zerkalo-Info agency (2011)
– were seeking alternative sources of information on politics. Both Belsat TV and its
online version reflect the efforts of Polish public diplomacy to reach and attract the
society, not Belarusian political elites. As 87% of viewers trust the station, and 60%
of viewers explain watching because of the opinions different to official media, it
makes an outstanding, oppositional source of information (Zierkalo, 2011). It can
serve as a platform of public debate online, replacing official channels of informa-
tion in Belarus. Belsat was supposed to contribute to social change in Belarus by
providing Belarusians with information on politics not available for them at home
via censored Belarusian media. The station supported the oppositional movement
“Revolution via social media” that organized demonstrations in a form of flashmobs
in Minsk in 2011. Belsat, due to its growing audience online and a high level of trust,
illustrates the opportunities online media provide for democracy promotion. It po-
tentially creates an issue alliance for Belarusians searching for information on poli-
tics online and for individual, and NGOs interested in supporting social change in
Belarus.
Although the channel is recognized as Polish only by 13.9 per cent of viewers
(Ponad, 2012) it preserves relevance for public diplomacy purposes in long term,
which responds well to the relational model of new public diplomacy. Live stream-
ing of Belsat TV is followed by accounts on social media as Twitter, Facebook and
You Tube. You Tube makes a natural place for Belsat presence.
There are also two radio stations broadcasting from Poland to Belarus, sup-
ported by the Polish MFA and the EU (Radio Racja, and European Radio for
Belarus). Television and radio for Belarus follow the idea of American and Western
European radio stations during the Cold War, operating for social change in author-
itarian systems. Providing alternative information on politics to Belarusian sources,
Belsat promulgates the core values of the EU – such as democracy and freedom of
the press. However, because of the cultural identity of Belarusian society, Russian
media seem to hold more appeal.
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Conclusions
International broadcasters presented above are members or divisions of national
public service radio and television. All three share basic values of European public
service broadcasters such as impartiality, catering for minorities, as well as for all
tastes and interests. There is no conflict between these values and international ob-
jectives of broadcasters. The other thing is an institutional autonomy relevant for
the public service broadcasters’ operations and, in consequence, for relations be-
tween media and foreign policy. As it was outlined above, there are some govern-
mental guarantees for programming independence. For example, BBC WS
emphasizes journalistic independence as the core value and the reason of the
broadcasters’ global prominence. Usually, the broadcasters are given the same
structure as national public service radio and television. Belsat TV makes an ex-
ception by being structurally closer to the MFA, than BBC or DW. Financial auton-
omy is not less relevant. All three broadcasters suffer from cuts and reductions
and all but BBC World Service from 2014/2015 depend on the stately budget.
When international broadcasting is financed from the license fee, the domestic
public should be informed about the programming. The host country’s audience
is often not aware of international operations of their national public service
broadcasters (Meyen & Scheu, 2011:116). It is one of the tasks of the new public di-
plomacy at the domestic level to inform the public at home about the strategy of
international broadcasting.
All three countries reduced numbers of language services in last ten years, in-
vesting in the same moment in new target audiences as Arabic and Persian in the
case of BBC, Belarusian in Polish case, and Spanish and Arabic in the case of Ger-
many. Investing in Arabic and Persian services paid off during the Arab Spring in
2011. Still, governmentally funded broadcasters, operating in more and more com-
petitive media sector, have not been the unique players worldwide any more. Com-
mercial broadcasters joined the competition in proliferating global news. The same
relates to big powers, who used to be the main players in the past. Nowadays more
and more smaller countries develop their international broadcasting media, usually
combining satellite access with online services. The launching of Al Jazzera’s ser-
vice for the US in August 2013 symbolizes the changes in the landscape of global
communication. Despite technological revolutions, radio has been supported by
governments as it preserves its relevance in such regions as Africa, and in specific
circumstances (such as military conflicts).
Due to the obligations included into their public service remit Deutsche Welle
and Belsat are more inclined to promulgate European integration than BBC. For
DW Europe seems to be one of the most important regions and a relevant context of
German foreign image policy. DW cooperates with Polish TVP on producing pro-
grams for Belsat about the European integration. Informing and educating about
the EU is an essential objective for this channel. It should attract Belarusians to the
concept of European integration and European idea of democratic rule.
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For bigger European countries with languages which serve as languages of
wider communication the inclusion of international broadcasting into public diplo-
macy is evident and natural. For smaller countries such as Poland – it has not gained
such an importance yet due to limited sources that can be invested in such a tool of
foreign policy.
All three broadcasters are also involved in country branding as they shape the
image of the countries in direct way, presenting the culture and promoting lan-
guages. Indirectly, they promote the country by attracting attention and engaging
the audiences into long-term relations. Their success – as in the British case – adds
new value to the assets of soft power. Trust won by an international broadcaster
pays off at the time of crisis.
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Introduction
The lack of European Union (EU) legitimacy is often viewed, at least partly, as
a communication deficit (Meyer, 1999; Andersen & McLeod, 2004; de Vreese,
Banducci, Semetko & Boomgaarden, 2006; Spanier, 2012). Spanier (2012) defines the
EU’s communication deficit as “the apparent impossibility for the EU of communi-
cating with its citizens”. Lilleker & Koc-Michalska (2011) state that both “the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) and European Parliament (EP) are keen to reduce the
democratic deficit which is at the heart of critiques of politics at the European level.”
Meyer (1999) highlights the role of political communication in legitimating gover-
nance. Michailidou (2008:348) argues that “for the EU institutions a first step towards
democratic legitimation is to establish public dialogue between the EU deci-
sion-makers and the public, with the latter’s feedback incorporated in the deci-
sion-making process.” Amongst the communication tools mobilized by the European
institutions, Michailidou (2008:348) believes that the “Internet offers a viable alterna-
tive to an offline, more conventional media-regulated communicative platform.”
The Internet has indeed been recognized as offering new means of political com-
munication in democratic societies and extensive research has been conducted on
the democratic potential of the Internet (Chadwick, 2006; Coleman, 2004; 2005;
Coleman & Blumler, 2009). Blumler and Coleman (2010:147) note that “with the
emergence and evolution of the Internet, in its many shapes and guises, there has
been a range of hopes and speculations about its redemptive potential.” At the Eu-
ropean level, this belief is even stronger. Lilleker and Koc-Michalska (2011) empha-
size the potential the Internet offers for legitimizing the European institutions.
This article proposes to assess whether new political communicative spaces are
emerging in the European Union as a result of the use of internet, and more specifi-
cally social networking sites (SNS), by political actors and civil servants within Eu-
ropean institutions. What are the consequences for European policy makers and
what is the impact on European political communication? The aim of this chapter is
to present the features of EU communication on SNS and to examine whether the
European media ecology has been transformed by social networking sites, in partic-
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ular the EU media relations. In order to identify, describe and analyze the main
characteristics of EU digital communication, the article focuses on the three main
European institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament and
the European Council). The research investigates whether SNS make it possible, or
not, to overcome the communication deficit of the EU. First, the paper gives an over-
view of the place of SNS within institutions, second it investigates the type of com-
munication of European institutions on SNS. After focusing on civil servants and
political actors in the European Commission and Council, the presentation turns to
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) for eventually highlighting the situa-
tion of the “Brussels bubble”1 as a whole.
The paper adopts a multi-disciplinary approach that encompasses theories from
political science, linguistic, sociology and communication studies. Its focus is on
contexts, actors and practices, because “it is people who conduct European pro-
cesses” (Adler-Nissen, in Busby 2011). This approach justifies the proposed research
methodology: participant observation, interviews and discursive analysis. As
a parliamentary assistant in the European Parliament between 2009 and 2012, it was
possible for me to develop a deeper exploration of the institutional and political
context and to understand better the relationship between people’s practices and
their context. Following this ethnographic fieldwork, a number of interviews were
conducted in 2012 with civil servants, staff and politicians in the three institutions.
The objective was to muster a very heterogeneous corpus which extends across dis-
courses on SNS as well as discourses about SNS. Official and internal documents of
institutions, texts emanating from SNS as well as interviews actors were incorpo-
rated into the corpus.
Theoretically, this paper is a continuation of Oger and Ollivier-Yaniv’s research,
whose work is at the crossroad of interpretive sociology and discursive analysis.
“This rapprochement was initially suggested by problems of research emanating on
the one hand from the sociology of political and public institutions and according to
an important place to actors’ discourse, and on the other hand from institutional
discourse analysis” (Oger & Ollivier Yaniv, 2013). Such an approach brings actors
and agencies into the study of the EU communication, focusing on meaning, under-
standing and interpretation. The objective of this research is to appreciate the logic
of practices and actors’ understandings of the EU communication on SNS in order
to assess whether the EU communication on SNS is innovative.
Communicating Europe: the growing place of the Internet
and social network sites
“Commission staff are increasingly called upon to communicate with the general
public and stakeholders via a wide variety of channels. One recent development is
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1 The Brussels bubble refers to the working settings inside and outside the European institutions.
that social media (...) are growing more popular for people-to-people communica-
tion.” This is how “the guidelines to all staff on the use of social media” produced
by the European Commission are introduced.2 On the side of the European Parlia-
ment, the assessment is similar: its strategic plan of communication 2011–2014
mentions: “Parliament’s presence on social media platforms offers a unique,
cost-efficient opportunity for interactivity with citizens.”3
Furthermore in a resolution entitled “On journalism and new media – creating
a public sphere in Europe,” supported by a majority of Members of the EP, the EP
believes that “social media are particularly adequate for communication. (...) One
must be where the conversation takes place i.e. Facebook, Twitter and other online
social networks.”4 There is no similar document for the European Council. In this
institution, communication is viewed as “a service to specific users,”5 i.e. journalists
and bloggers, European and national civil servants, researchers and students. How-
ever the three institutions are active on Twitter and Facebook. As recalled by
Podkalicka and Shore (2010:100), the EU “has been particularly keen to mobilize on-
line technologies, including popular social network sites.”
Digital social networks appear to offer its users a tool for expression which is
both personalized and institutionalized, and therefore could fit perfectly in the
communication apparatus of European institutions.6 Moss and Coleman consider
three communicative characteristics of the blogs which all relate to impression
management (Goffman, 1959): “politicians attempts to seem like ordinary people”
(Moss & Coleman, 2008:9), they develop relationships with citizens which are live,
spontaneous and direct, they are both “conversing with and listening to the pub-
lic” (Moss & Coleman, 2008:9). All those three characteristics are today attributed
to SNS by academics.7 Therefore there is an injunction for actors, both in the EC
and the EP but also – to a lesser extent – in the European Council, to use web 2.0
tools in order to interact with citizens and to create space for moments of delibera-
tive democracy. “The use of social networking platforms, it is argued, can play an
essential role in politics broadly by attaching visitors to these online presences to
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2 European Commission, Social Media Guidelines for all staff, http://ec.europa.eu/ipg/docs/
guidelines_social_media_en.pdf.
3 European Parliament, “Action plan for the implementation of the Parliament’s updated
communication strategy 2011–2014”.
4 Report on journalism and new media – creating a public sphere in Europe, 2010/2015(INI),
2/7/2010.
5 Interview 1.
6 The Communication officer of a Commissioner explains that on SNS’ accounts, the Com-
missioner writes both “in her capacity as a commissioner and as a person” (Interview 8).
7 About Twitter, for instance, Jackson and Lilleker write: “the most popular use of Twitter is
for self-promotion (...)” (2011:87). “Through the promotion of self, MPs encourage voters to
develop an empathy with the politician as an ordinary human being. (...) That tools such as
Twitter offer an easy, convenient and controllable way of communicating such personal in-
formation” (2011:90). See also Castells (2001), The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet,
Business and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
the host and their political campaign” (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2011).8 Hence,
Lilleker and Koc-Michalska call for a greater use of SNS. Boyd and Elison (2007) de-
fine SNS as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with
whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections
and those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these
connections may vary from site to site.” This definition focuses on SNS9 such as
Facebook. In this paper, the two social network sites that are the most commonly
used by the EU are examined: Facebook but also Twitter. Twitter is “a microblogging
site which allows users to deliver statements, thoughts and links in 140 characters to
followers as well as a wider Internet audience” (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011).
Counting the different accounts of the institutions on Twitter and Facebook is
not an easy task, especially as regards to the European Commission. In April 2012,
on Twitter there were one main institutional account (@EU_Commission), 20 DGs
Twitter accounts, 16 personal accounts of Commissioners, 16 personal accounts of
Commissioners’ spokespersons, three personal accounts for spokespersons of the
entire institution, plus a number of accounts for specific projects or services. On
top of that, not included in the research, there are 27 accounts of national offices of
the Commission as well as the official offices outside the EU. The communication
of the EP as an institution is less diffused, with one main Twitter account in Eng-
lish, different Twitter accounts for each official language of the EU as well as ac-
counts of parliamentary committees and the press media team.10 But in this
institution, there are also 766 MEPs11, politicians directly elected by citizens,
amongst whom a majority is now using SNS according to different recent stud-
ies.12 Besides, the institution has developed a specific platform entirely dedicated
to political actors of the EP, which is called EP Newshub and displays items that
those actors have published on other platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook.13
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8 See this press release by European People’s Party group in the European Parliament: “Web
2.0’ tools are a constitutive element of our contemporary societies and are crucial to enhance
direct contact with EU citizens. Promoting and enhancing the use by MEPs of 2.0 tools con-
tributes to getting Europe closer to citizens on a daily basis.”, October 1, 2010.
9 In this paper, social media, social networking sites and social network sites are used inter-
changeably.
10 The different platforms are presented on the EP website: http://www.europ-
arl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00fd7b595a/Social-media.html.
11 At the time of writing, there are 766 MEPs, but there will be 754 MEPs elected at the 2014
elections.
12 Studies conducted by various research and public affairs consultancies, such as “EU Social
Media Usage: New trends, new opportunities” in May 2013 (http://www.digitalpulse.eu/
EUDigitalPulse_2012.pdf); “Fleishman-Hillard’s 2nd European Parliament Digital Trends
study” in December 2011 (http://www.epdigitaltrends.eu/) and “New MEPs survey: atti-




Communication of European institutions on SNS:
political, institutional, or personal communication?
Ollivier-Yaniv and Oger (2006) define institutional discourses as those which are of-
ficially produced by an individual or collective actor who has a legally registered
position, whether he or she is a civil servant or a political representative. In other
words, the institution circumscribes the status of the addressers,14 the types of con-
tents that are said or not, etc. As Maingueneau (2002) explains, “the speakers enter
a pre-established frame which, generally, they do not modify”. On the contrary, SNS
seem to alter and modify this “communication contract” (Charaudeau, 2002).
Charaudeau defines communication contract as follows: a speaker and an ad-
dressee are bound by a reciprocal recognition contract that allows them to under-
stand each other. This contract has the function of constraining the operating
procedures of production and interpretation of the communication act, while at the
same time allowing the participants to co-construct the meaning (Charaudeau,
2002). However, SNS aggregate and mix together, in a single space, not only the dif-
ferent status of the addressers (e.g. a Commissioner may talk as a spokesperson for
the institution and he may talk as a national politician) but also the addressers who
have different statuses (i.e. a Commissioner and a spokesperson). In other words,
the status of the issuer is not perfectly clear and is fluctuating: a representative of the
institution for some messages, a representative of him/herself for others. Statuses
of addressers vary, which impact upon communication itself, both in terms of types
and contents. Denton and Woodward (1990, in McNair, 2011:3) characterize politi-
cal communication in terms of the intentions of its senders to influence the political
environment. As they put it: “the crucial factor that makes communication political
is not the source of a message but its content and purpose.”15 Political communica-
tion is argumentative. “It is, first and foremost, politics. It is about all the communi-
cation efforts by those addressers who try to make people adhere to public
perceptions that will orient their preferences” (Gerstlé, 2004:6).
Therefore the question here is whether communication of European institutions
on SNS is political or not. If not political, communication on SNS can be institutional
or personal. Pasquier (2011) defines institutional communication as a form of com-
munication focusing on promoting institutions and public organizations. “It is not
about emphasizing activities but the organization itself”, as “organizations need to
position themselves and to build a positive image which makes it possible to
achieve the objectives” (2011:77–78). According to him, institutional communica-
tion is a form of public communication. It is mainly focused on informing. Aperson-
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14 I use the notion of «addresser» as it entails that speech participants are construed as roles.
In this respect, any statement is the result of enunciation and the elements intervening in this
enunciation or communicative act are the addresser, the addressee, the content and the con-
crete moment and place which make up the situation of enunciation.
15 The research highlights that communication of European politicians often follows edito-
rial rules that usually apply to press writing, providing more and more factual analysis.
alized form of communication, on the other hand, relies on an expressive form of
communication (Breton & Proulx, 2002). If we go back to Jakobson’s functions of
language, this type of message “aims at a direct expression of the speaker’s atti-
tude toward what he is speaking about. It tends to produce an impression of a certain
emotion, whether true or feigned” (Jakobson, 1960). On Facebook, communica-
tion of EU institutions is mostly informative and explanatory. On Twitter, the ac-
tors in charge of communication who have been interviewed point out that there
are:
“two types of Tweets: [firstly] political tweets, [which are] more interest-
ing [and] more personal, in order to communicate on things that we can-
not find in press releases, and [secondly] tweets to push information, that
are more institutional tweets, to send people to the website.”16
The institutional messages follow “the lines to take that are disseminated among
everybody, defensive points that are disseminated among cabinets, commissioners,
spokespeople, so that there is a certain degree of coherence.”17 The discursive analy-
sis conducted in this research shows that these types of message are the most fre-
quent ones on Twitter, on all the different accounts, in each institution. But the
specificity of SNS is the possibility to juxtapose different types of messages – as il-
lustrated by the example below. On one particular day, ten messages are published
on the European Commission and European Parliament’s Twitter account that ad-
dress various topics and, more importantly, swing between an informative and
political register – following the definition that Gerstlé (2004) gives of political com-
munication. According to him indeed, messages that encourage the follower to give
his or her view are a form of political communication. In the example below, we find
three political messages on the European Commission’s account. The EP also uses
this type of editorial messages, mostly on Facebook.
However, those messages seem to serve communication purposes only: it is not
clear whether and how the feedback of followers on SNS is taken into account by the
institution.
These messages are what Ollivier-Yaniv and Oger (2006) call “institutionaliz-
ing discourses” that can be carried out by any institutional addresser, and can be
easily understood, but are removed from the specific contextual circumstances
of the enunciation. These institutional discourses are updated on a permanent
basis and are therefore always of-the-moment. Thus, even on contentious topic,
such as ACTA,18 the communication of the European Parliament is mainly de-





18 ACTA – Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement – is an international trade agreement deal-
ing with intellectual piracy around the word. ACTA is no longer a planned treaty for the EU
as the European Parliament voted against.
Indeed, “the editorial line must respect political neutrality and share the plat-
form equitably across the different political opinions expressed by Members of the
European Parliament.”19 Such a process consists of “smoothing of political content”
through two procedures that Oger and Ollivier-Yaniv (2006) have highlighted:
firstly the change of timing and secondly the deletion of partisan politics. The ac-
count of the President of the Commission is the best illustration: it was first called
“European Commission”, then the name changed to “EC_live” and it is now
“BarrosoEU”. This account is particularly interesting:
“Throughout 2011 there was an awareness that this catch-all account
would not do the trick for political communication anymore. That’s when
we separated it and kept the EU_Commission for more general collegial
communication, and factual information about the Commission as the
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central Twitter account for the Commission. But then [we] established in
September 2011 the EC_live Twitter account. And the EC-Live Twitter ac-
count has also the image of President Barroso which indicates already that
it’s really something more presidential. So this is now about the political
messages coming from the President.”20
However, building on the definition of Gerstlé (2004) and Pasquier (2011) of po-
litical and institutional communication, those messages appear to be part of the sec-
ond and not the first category following a process of “smoothing of political
content” as described above.21 Such statements tend to be decontextualized: they
extend over the long time and are of universal capacity. Oger and Ollivier-Yaniv ar-
gue that this type of timeless enunciation characterizes the institution rather than its
representatives. In other words, messages survive the addresser who produces
them. However, a comparative analysis of the Twitter accounts of the President and
the Commissioners of the European Commission adds a nuance to what has been
said. Some particular actors on rare occasions circumvent the rules of enunciation of
the institutions. This is the case of Commissioner Andor who uses his Twitter account
to sometimes broadcast political views different from the one of the institution, using
regularly external hyperlinks to newspapers to make outside voices heard.
Another interesting example, very rare if not unique, is the insight into an inter-
nal dispute given by another Commissioner. The meeting of the “College of Com-
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20 Interview 3.
21 Pictures also participate in the smoothing of communication.
missioners” are held in camera, it is therefore even more surprising to read such
a comment on a social networking site.
As expected on SNS, some personal messages are diluted amongst publications.
Overall, if SNS mix together different genres of communication (informative/in-
stitutional, argumentative/political and expressive/personal), there are a great
deal of institutional discourses (i.e authorized discourses) and, more rarely, political
discourses or personal stories. Even if theoretically SNS allow the communication
to be more personalized, the institutional constraints of the enunciation minimize
this process of personalization. This is also the case in the European Council: “we
don’t do politics, only institutional communication.”22 Oger and Ollivier-Yaniv
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(2006) have noticed that institutional discourses are most of the time explicative,
sometimes disjunctive, but very rarely argumentative. Furthermore, account pro-
files bring further confusion into communication: in the European Commission and
European Council, the name of officials usually includes “EU”. By tying the name
of the person and the institution together, it makes it difficult to distinguish one to
the other. Such a procedure participates to the process of decontextualisation and
institutionalization of communication. Even though actors interviewed for the re-
search all argue that “you need to be as political as possible,”23 “consensus is boring,
people feel there is nothing at stake”24 and “consensual and authorized messages
are not good communication. It is better to have a political opinion,”25 the messages
they produce are mostly consensual and institutionalized: “they are a mix. I would
say 30% political communication, 70% institutional communication.”26 As pointed
out by Aldrin and Utard (2008), “communication has always been the subject of ac-
commodation between the competing logics of the institutions and the political
constraints of compromise.” On top of that, it is important to keep in mind that com-
puted-mediated discourse is also shaped “by the technological features of com-
puter-mediated communication systems” (Herring, 2004), such as SNS.
Communication reflects organizations
In each institution, constraints borne by official and prescriptive institutional enunci-
ation impact on the discourse produced by actors on SNS. In the European Commis-
sion, the activity of producing speech on SNS is explicitly and officially constrained
by contradictory injunctions: the injunction to be on SNS, which is perceived by the
actors as being a personalized and an interactive media, while respecting a series of
rules that go against these characteristics, such as objectivity, impartiality, discre-
tion, circumspection.27 In other words, staff and members must write freely under
constraint. Validation processes highlight the type of constraints that some civil ser-
vants have to follow. In the European Commission, “within DG, the validation pro-
cess is heavy. It makes interaction difficult.”28 In a very decentralized organization,
this means that the validation process is repeated in each DG. “In the European Par-
liament, it is more centralized. In the Commission, there is a DG COMM but there is
a DG COMM in each DG. Here, it is smaller, it’s easier.”29
However, in the European Parliament too, there is a validation process: the edi-
torial content is discussed and decided once the week by the social media team, and






27 European Commission, Social Media Guidelines for all staff, op. cit.
28 Interview 2.
29 Interview 4.
a strong legal tradition and resistance on the part of administration”30 and a small
marge of maneuver with regards to communication on SNS. If SNS are supposed to
enable a form of direct dialogue and interactivity, some addressers are nevertheless
constrained to keep some reserve and must go through a validation process before
publishing a message. “It is difficult to take it upon oneself to write, it is not our rule
to perform in the interface, to be in direct contact, to reply.”31 Nevertheless, this as-
sessment is somewhat mitigated when looking at specific civil servants, such as
spokespersons and other top officials of the institutions. According to Georgakakis
(2010:117), “there is a growing gap between people who have invested in the EU
and invested by the EU as their political representatives.” In the European Commis-
sion, he argues that Commissioners are becoming more and more “professionalized
politicians” who are only passing through the Commission whilst civil servants are
permanent staff of the EU and have a central role. “Members and civil servants in
the European Commission have never been so distant from each other” (2012:44)
and civil servants have even more autonomy than before. Communication on SNS
is both an illustration of such a situation and a tool to gain autonomy. The Commu-
nications Officer of a Commissioner regrets that “too many tweets come from the
services. There is a lack of coherence.”32
Georgakakis (2012:75) believes that “the problem of the Commission comes
more from the capacity of its staff to embody politics rather than its decline as orga-
nization.” His observation on the functioning of the organization brings some light
on the specific question of communication. Such communication carries the collec-
tive constraints which impact on the enunciation of the institution. Communication
is generally neutralized and consensual: conflicts and debates are absent. To put it
simply, Commissioners on SNS follow similar rules and display clear affinity with
administrative representatives when it comes to publishing messages. Even though
“European Commissioners nowadays clearly embody the political function within
the European Commission” (Georgakakis, 2010:128), it does not seem to be neces-
sarily reflected on SNS where civil servants appear to also carry this function.
Digital platforms provide civil servants, and in particular spokespersons, with
a new room for expression. If originally the spokesperson function and purpose
was to communicate with journalists, with SNS the spokesperson can now commu-
nicate directly to a wider audience. The spokesperson of the European Parliament
explains: “this is the first time that we can use tools that put us directly in touch with
people, with ‘the man in the street’, without going through intermediaries, whether
it is journalists or others.”33 SNS redefine the concept of “spokesperson” in expand-
ing it beyond the official function.
Bourdieu (2004) talks about “authorized speech”: “in contrast to individual
speech, shouts or protests, the speech of the spokesperson is an authorized speech





which owes its authority to the fact that the person who speaks it draws his author-
ity from the group which authorizes him to speak in its name. When the spokesper-
son speaks, it is a group that speaks through him, but one that exists as a group
through that speech and its speaker” (Bourdieu, 2004:41). Marcoccia (2004) argues
that a spokesperson is both a representative and an intermediary. In a platform in
which political representatives themselves are present and while those tools are
praised for improving the “direct and regular contact” (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011:90)
between politicians and the general public, SNS bring together those two types
of representatives: political representatives (politicians) and institutional repre-
sentatives (civil servants, such as spokespersons). While spokespersons’ public
discourses are usually constrained by the organization and therefore depersonal-
ized, we find this is not necessarily the case on Twitter where Commissioners’
spokespersons or European Commission’s spokespersons sometimes talk on their
own names.
The European Parliament towards a more political communication?
In the European Parliament as well, administrative and political officials communi-
cate in parallel. The Parliament as an institution has been using SNS for a few years
emphasizing everyday life issues and proximity to people especially on Facebook,
not without success.34
Civil servants in the European Parliament in charge of communication on social
media believe that they have more space for expression than their colleagues in the
European Commission and Council:
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34 The European Parliament is one of the top public institutions worldwide for the number of
Facebook fans.
“The European Parliament had the tremendous benefit that it can express
political opinions, it can relay the controversies amongst MEPs. In the Eu-
ropean Council, we cannot even defend the position of a Member State.”35
“For us, it is easier than for the Commission. There is a need for drama, for
political conflict. It is more interesting. Compromise is good if there is con-
flict beforehand. This legislative term is more interesting. Since Lisbon,36 it
is more interesting. Compromise should not be made behind close doors.
Before, it was sometimes the case.”37
However, an analysis of the Facebook and Twitter accounts of the institution
shows that political conflicts in the European Parliament are not really brought
forward. As highlighted before, communication is consensual, giving essentially
the results of votes on Facebook and Twitter accounts and creating an illusion
of harmony in the EP. As an official in the WebComm Unit puts it: “we are in an in-
stitution, we have to stay within scope, we cannot be rock roll all the time.”38
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Source: EP Facebook account, 4 July 2012.
35 Interview 1.
36 Interview 4.
37 The Lisbon Treaty further empowered the EP and expanded its competence into new leg-
islative areas since 1 December 2009.
38 Interview 4.
Nevertheless, communication of the EP as an institution benefits from its members
who, contrary to the European Commission and the European Council, are directly
elected by the citizens to sit in the assembly. They bring political communication to
the institution.
The remit of the Members of the European Parliament when it comes to commu-
nication is indeed more clearly defined: MEPs communicate their personal views
and opinions without any institution constraints, contrary to Commissioners.39 “It
is not possible for Commissioners to express personal opinions, they are required to
collegiality, to consensus.”40 As pointed it out before, Commissioners generally opt
for institutional discourses rather than political opinions on SNS, their messages on
SNS are usually much more consensual than MEPs’ messages. Even though MEPs
use SNS as a tool of impression management (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011), the analysis
highlights that additionally they view SNS as a way to spread political opinions.
Even if messages are not necessarily about the EU as such but rather about them-
selves, a specific legislative issue or a political event, Beauvallet (2007:409) argues
that “it would be the duty of each MEP to explain Europe, if not making it likeable,
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Source: EP Facebook account, 11 July 2013.
Source: EP Facebook account, 5 July 2013.
39 Costa (2002) argues that MEPs enjoy considerable level of freedom as regards to their man-
date, both in terms of priorities and experiences. They can act freely as interpreters and inter-
mediaries of citizens’ expectancies. Besides, because of the lack of interest of people in the
European Parliament, their marge of maneuver is even bigger.
40 Interview 4.
and to inform citizens.” Therefore individual communication of MEPs would then
contribute to the communication of the EU as a whole and supports its legitimacy.
Besides, as in the other institutions, a significant proportion of messages published
on SNS by MEPs are also informative, giving details about important votes or de-
bates in the EP.
The e-“Brussels bubble”: a transformation of European media ecology?
“The value of social media lies in their potential to connect with citizens,
[to] listen and dialogue with them, and [to] access user groups that are less
likely to be reached [through] traditional media.”41
“I am confident that SNS can change the image of the European Commis-
sion.”42
“Social media are the best and only way to give a good image for the Com-
mission.”43
A significant proportion of officials that were interviewed highlight two main
outcomes of using SNS to communicate, i.e. direct communication with “the man in
the street” and impression management of EU institutions. However, the results of
this research show that there are some discrepancies between this objective and the
functioning of the organizations, especially the European Commission and the Eu-
ropean Council. As highlighted by Michailidou (2007), it is still not always clear if it
is the Commission and other institutions’ view “that the Internet should be used to
address a niche public, i.e. the European elites, more than it should be used to com-
municated with the general public”. In the European Commission, “we need to get
in touch with a specific audience, what we could call a niche-interests communica-
tion.”44 In the European Council,
“on SNS, we only target specific audiences that use this tool: journalists
and bloggers, civil servants from other EU institutions, national civil ser-
vants in Members Stages, researchers and academics, students. (....) We do
not try to over communicate, we do not try to seduce, we are not looking
for more followers, we do not do advertising.”45
This is even more the case on Twitter, which is perceived by all the interviewees
in the three institutions as a “more professional” SNS. “Twitter is useful to communi-
cate on things that we don’t find elsewhere. On Twitter, people are a bit more spe-
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cialized, they know where to find the information;”46; “On Twitter, there is over
representation of politicians, organizations, journalists, people in official capac-
ity... .”47
Arguably, EU communication on Twitter is expert driven. Therefore, the obser-
vation of Spanier: “the information addresses a few initiated persons rather than the
average citizens” (Spanier 2010:85) should be expanded to SNS. The Brussels bub-
ble refers to the working settings inside and outside the European institutions,
“a multinational and multilingual space, an intense environment with a distinct
rhythm of life, where people come and go often but which feels like a small village
where everyone seems to know each other and news travel fast” (Busby, 2011). After
monitoring the EU institutions on SNS (Facebook and Twitter), it has become evi-
dent that an e-Brussels bubble has emerged on Twitter and possibly, to a lesser de-
gree, on Facebook. SNS, and in particular Twitter, serve more as a means of
self-observation of those individuals involved in the Brussels bubble. Besides, the
use of English as the main language of expression on the main institutional accounts
of each EU organization is a complementary illustration of a certain closure of those
networks.
However, if SNS do not seem to have fundamentally alter political communica-
tion, EU media relations have been transformed to some extent: SNS contribute to
reshaping relationships with journalists. The relationship politicians maintain with
traditional media is crucial in political communication (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995).
SNS, mostly Twitter, are a supplementary tool to build up this relationships be-
tween representatives, both institutional and political, and journalists.
“We have quite a number of journalists of course, which is natural because
they see us as spokespeople in the Commission and they are the ones ask-
ing the questions in the press room everyday, they’re the one calling us
also on the phone, but they follow us also on Twitter and more and more
journalists are also on Twitter. They literally can see when they start Twit-
ter account with 5, 6 followers and then they put you pretty soon among
their people to follow as well, so they really recognize that the Commis-
sion has opened new communication channels here by social media, that it
is important to stay tuned on that one as well.”48
Twitter is appreciated for its function of direct dialogue with journalists; this is
particularly true between spokespersons and journalists, as illustrated with the ex-
ample below: Koen Doens (@ECspokespersonKoen) is a spokesperson for the Euro-
pean Commission and Peter Spiegel (@SpiegelPeter) is the Brussels Bureau Chief
for the Financial Times. On the left side, the print screen from Twitter shows a direct
communication between both actors. On the right side, on top of those two actors,
the dialogue also involves someone from the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council





Guardian (@traynorbrussels). The dialogue shows some kind of acquaintance be-
tween this different types of actors. Baisnée (2007) talks about the complicity and
social proximity between journalists and “political and administrative actors”. SNS
shed some light on those specific ties. In a way, they publicize private and interper-
sonal communication and contribute to render more transparent the mediatization
process of the EU – at least to researchers if not the general public.
Conclusions
Traditionally, the Commission’s discourse tends to depoliticize EU decisions in pre-
senting them as the consensual result of a confrontation of expertise (Aldrin
& Dakowska, 2011). According to V. Schmidt (2006), the EU produces “policy with-
out politics”. Social networking-sites do not fundamentally alter communication of
European actors, leaving the situation largely unchanged. Discourses on social net-
working-sites lead indeed to the blurring of politics and to a consensual form of
communication. Communication on SNS is constrained by various variables, such
as the functioning of institutions, the rules and relationships between actors but also
the technical interfaces (Facebook and Twitter follow themselves a series of editorial
rules).
Communication of the European institutions on Twitter and Facebook is there-
fore institutionalized and de-politicized, thereby suggesting that the innovation – if
real – is limited to some specific attributes. Generally, SNS bring a form of confused
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innovation while maintaining the traditional functioning of the organizations. They
provide a platform of expression to a multiplicity of actors with a multiplicity of sta-
tuses. In particular, SNS tend to give prominence to important actors such as
spokespersons who might have been not as visible to a wider audience while ob-
scuring some backstage key actors who nonetheless have a key role as communica-
tion and information managers. In other words, they lighten up the validation
process for some actors while maintaining it for others. That said practices and un-
derstandings of SNS are not homogeneous amongst EU actors. On the contrary, this
research highlights hybrid usages of social networking-sites. There are as many us-
ages and practices as there are different types of actors (spokespersons, other man-
dated staff, editorial staff, commissioners, members of the European Parliament,
assistants, etc.).
In such a context, there is no clear and common communication strategy, at least
in the European Commission which is nonetheless responsible for the communica-
tion of the EU as a whole. In the European Parliament there is a clear attempt to use
SNS to emphasize proximity and closeness to people. However, SNS do not really
modify the communication of the European institutions, notably because “SNS add
to without questioning the other information tools.”49 SNS are indeed often used as
an intermediary to direct the follower to other source of information. “Social media
platforms are being used to draw people’s attention to relevant information on the
Europa website. Hence the investment the Commission is making to continuously
improve the Europa website.”50 The capacity of SNS to reduce the so-called commu-
nication deficit of the EU seems in this context limited. It remains to be seen whether
MEPs, through a less institutional type of communication, are able to strengthen EU
communication as a whole.
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GOVCOM 2.0: The Role of Web 2.0 in Communicating
EU Presidency
Introduction
There is nothing new about the fact that techniques from the non-political environ-
ment (popular culture, business, and church) have also been widely used in political
communication too. The expanding role of political consultants and the intensive
use of marketing mix, segmentation, databases, media/relationship management,
image/identity campaigns, audience and adverse party research in political com-
munication are evaluated as a global phenomenon (Gibson-Römmele, 2001; Plasser,
2002; Sussman, 2005).
It is also argued that this is not only just a matter of new tools in the arsenal, it is
rather an emerging new attitude in political communication; Public Relations culture
which is a way of meaning attribution and valuation in the strategic decisions of po-
litical organizations that refers to the political communication “as an activity to es-
tablish/maintain relations with the publics.”1 So, examining a seemingly technical
question, namely; what role web 2.0 plays in government communication, might
have a lot to say about the whole new political communication environment which
is inseparably connected with the cultural and societal shifts that appeared in the
new millennium (Nash, 2000; Norris, 2000; Tedesco, 2004; Van Santen-van Zoonen,
2009; McQuail, 2010). Analysing the new developments in political communication,
such as the PR culture is it, will help in understanding the major changes in the party
and government organization and in political human resources too (the prominent
role of communication experts and strong focus on the leaders/communicators
personality and integrity).
With this study my aim is to identify the patterns of the web 2.0 uses in the Hun-
garian government communication as undertaking the Presidency of the Council of
the European Union between the 1st of January and the 30th of June 2011. The paper
is divided into three parts. First, as a theoretical background, the compound of the
relational paradigm of PR, which is mainly based on the concept of the book ‘Public
Relations as Relationship Management: A relational approach to the study and practice of
public relations’, edited by John A. Ledingham and Stephen D. Bruning and the
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1 The term of Public Relation culture in political communication resonates the terminus of
Marketing culture which is designed by Philip Kotler (1972) and later upgraded by Jennifer
Lees-Marshment (2004), Dominic Wring (2005) and Kiss Balázs (2005).
PR 2.0 approach, which sees social media as the major platform to reach, communi-
cate and stay connected with targeted audiences (Breakenridge, 2008), will be high-
lighted. This, I believe, provides a solid analytical framework to comprehend the
novelty that web 2.0 applications bring into the politics. Then, the methodological
issues and the results of the empirical research will be presented. Finally, I will con-
nect the findings of the study to the contemporary scholarly discourses on the trans-
formation of political communication in 2000s (Lilleker & Michalska, 2011; Lilleker
& Jackson, 2010; Jackson & Lilleker, 2009; Chadwick, 2009; Osimo, 2008; Coleman,
2005).
Persuasion, relationship management, and community building:
approaches of political public relations
It is not an easy task to point to an exact year when Public Relation appeared in poli-
tics. Even Quintus Tullius Cicero and Eric the Red are mentioned as the early repre-
sentatives of the political PR practitioners (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011:2; Jackson,
2010:2), Sidney Blumenthal in his book of ‘The Permanent Campaign’, however, ar-
gues that despite the long history of formal or informal communication consultants
in politics, it was Edward Bernays who provided the foundation for modern politi-
cal public relations practises (Blumenthal, 1980:12–13). Bernays is credited with the
invention, among others, of the media event, the latent message, the appeals of indi-
rection, and he initiated the use of market research in politics too. In his classic essay,
‘The Engineering of Consent’ (1947), Bernays introduced a coherent concept for politi-
cal (organizational) communication and this doctrine has been used to understand
and influence the voters’ (consumers’) mind and attitudes for decades.
In the Bernaysian paradigm political PR is a sub-set of propaganda; manipulative
promotion of ‘good’ (conceptually it is what serves the order in society) ideas, val-
ues, events or persons. As Larry Tye highlights Edward Bernays regarded Public
Relations as the collection of instruments that helped the ‘creation of public consent’
(Tye, 2002:96). The emphasis on persuasion makes the Bernaysian paradigm of PR
a role model for propaganda as well. Since then, the PR toolkit has been exercised in
managing political organizations’ media relations (e.g. press releases, briefings, meet-
ing journalists, creating media events). The successfully cooperation between the
Saatchi & Saatchi Group and Margaret Thatcher in the late 1970s and the early 1980s
demonstrated that PR could also be seen as a complex and permanent service includ-
ing strategic planning, image building/cultivation, targeting, positioning, relation-
ship management, opposition research and evaluation. Ronald Reagan’s presidency
is also often cited as an example for extended use of Public Relations not only in cam-
paigns but also in the governmental context (see Denton & Woodward, 1998:102).
By the end of 1980s, communicative manipulation was perceived as the practice
of anti-democrats and oppressors (referring to the Nazi and communist practises)
or unethical political behaviour. After all these historical experiences, PR had no fu-
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ture as are accepted concept if it was (self)defined as propaganda or connected
solely to persuasive intent. The Grunig & Hunt’s seminal book titled ‘Managing Pub-
lic Relations’ (1984) was the first attempt to elaborate not only an ethical version of
(political) public relations but an academically-valued theory of it. They define PR
in a very plausible way: it is the “management of communication between an orga-
nization and its public” (Grunig & Hunt, 1984:5). Based on this notion, James
Grunig and Todd Hunt identifies four models of PR in the modern history of public
relation practises. This approach, later referred as Grunigian Paradigm (Moloney,
2006; Jackson, 2010), admits that much PR is propagandistic indeed. In their classifi-
cation asymmetrical communication is detected in the three (press agentry, public
information and two-way asymmetric model) of their four-part typology. Asym-
metrical communication is when the (political) organization wants nothing more
than to persuade publics for its own benefit. In the Grunigian paradigm this is con-
sidered “unethical and socially irresponsible action” (Grunig & White, 1992:38–42).
Grunig and Hunt clearly breaks the link between PR and propaganda by establish-
ing the 4th model of PR; the two-way symmetric model is a dialogical, participative
and power distributing concept with the honest attempt to balance the interest of
the (political) organization and its publics. Hence, the two-way symmetric model
appears to be a normative ideal for PR practitioners. Building upon the two-way
symmetric model, James Grunig introduced his new PR approach called the ‘Excel-
lence Theory’ (Grunig et al., 1992) which identified and described the success fac-
tors and best practises in PR. The Excellence Theory suggests that (political) public
relation should be a strategically-coordinated management function and an inte-
grated activity. It also should focus on developing equal and fair relationships and
maintaining the personalised connections between the (political) organization and
its publics. Furthermore, the Excellence Theory argues that symmetrical communi-
cation is more effective than doing it asymmetrically, so fostering mutual trust and
respect is not only ethical and meets the demands of democracy but pays off in
terms of public support/consumer decisions as well.
In spite of the numerous critical remarks on it (Moloney, 2006; Leitch & Neilson,
2001), the Grunigian paradigm highlights the importance of relationship in concep-
tualizing organizational communication. The relational perspective sees “PR as the
management function that establishes and maintains mutually beneficial relation-
ship between the organization and its public on which the success or the failure of
the organization depends” (Cutlip, Center & Broom, 1994:2). In this regard the
scholarly literature on PR activities received new impetus; (political) organizational
communication can be seen as the infrastructure of maintaining relationships
which resonates the concept of the ‘bonding’ or ‘phatic’ function of the communica-
tion (Senft, 2009). The key principles of the relational paradigm2 are the reciprocity,
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2 The relational paradigm of PR has developmented side by side with the contemporary (po-
litical) marketing. The relationship marketing is defined pretty much in the way of PR 2.0; it
is a strategy designed communication activity to foster interactions and long-term engage-
ments with customers.
trust, mutual legitimacy, openness, mutual satisfaction, and mutual understanding
(Grunig et al., 2002), but without the strong emphasis of moral and ethical aspects
(that differentiates it essentially from the Grunigian paradigm).
Having armed with the relational paradigm, PR practitioners in the 1990s
started to promote the wider use of conversational communications, which sig-
nalled a sharp shift from the mediatized communication to the direct reach and in-
teractions. In transition to PR 2.0 the first experience was that the traditional
instruments such as broadcast advertising and generic messages did not function in
the online spheres. It has also become widely accepted fact that old mind-sets
worked even counterproductively in the contemporary communication environ-
ment (see the interview with Brian Solis in Breakenridge 2008:261–268). The new
approach, PR 2.0, is based on the advocacy of interactive, humanized, personalized
and targeted communication. Moreover, the ambition of the PR 2.0 is to create or to
get connected to communicative communities in which PR practitioners are ‘just’
like the other members of the group. To be able to act as accepted members of the
community, communicators must become the people he/she wants to reach. Conse-
quently, the differences between the communication patterns of the (political) orga-
nization and its publics are vanishing. PR 2.0 is about the collage of peer-to-peer
interactivity, a personalized mass communication. It must be emphasised that PR
2.0 should not be equalised with the online PR, it is defined as a whole new attitude
which put the participation and connection into the heart its activity no matter if
you are online or offline. It is, however, true that the web 2.03 and the social media4
are the excellent fields for PR 2.0 to blossom.
The relational paradigm/PR 2.0 approach deeply concerns political problems as
well, for example the one of the (political) community building. The early theorist of
nation-building, Karl W. Deutsch argued that individuals/small groups integrated
into politically relevant communities when various communication channels al-
lowed people to share common (political) views, habits and culture. Thus, for
Deutsch political integration and disintegration directly related to maintaining rela-
tions via communication and communicative behaviours (Taylor & Kent, 2006:302).
More precisely, the characters of the political community are largely influenced by
the communicative competencies of both governments and citizens. Integration
through communication is much more than a one-way, mass media-oriented activ-
ity (Dayan & Katz, 1992); dialogical interpersonal and inter-organizational relations
are equally important features of the process. With the help of this approach we can
follow how communication flows contribute to the dynamics of political communi-
ties (communities around issues, organizations and personalities) as Kruckeberg
and Starck argue; “public relation is a way to rebuild community” (1988:xi).
The ‘integration through communication’ idea may have an implication to one
of the most ambitious community building project, to the European integration
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as well.5 In this sense, the relational paradigm/PR 2.0 provides a beneficial frame-
work for describing the communication strategies and communication manage-
ment of political organizations which desire for contributing EU level political
discourses. National governments undertaking the task of the rotating Presidency
have not only had the duty of organizing meetings and initiating new agendas but
the Presidency is considered as an opportunity for building/maintaining the repu-
tation of the country in Europe and vice versa; it is an occasion to increase national
publics’ confidence in the EU. But the main question is what makes the relational
paradigm/PR 2.0, with its utopist-like (some say naive) idea of symmetrical (con-
versational and interactive) communication, relevant in researching EU Presidency
communication. The reason might be the non-hierarchical relations between the
government (who undertakes the role of the Presidency) and its perceived publics
(EU Institutions, international bodies, and highly professionalized press corps).
The independency of the key players and the ‘equalizing’ logic in their relations
(derived from the concept of democratic deficit at the supranational level) create an
atmosphere in which any actions of direct manipulation or one-way communica-
tions are considered as inadequate, even harmful steps.
Thus, the Presidency can be regarded as a tool for constructing communities in
which the feeling of free entities’ common belonging can be experienced. It is based on
the perception that no matter how different we are in the European Union, we have
common interests and issues to deal with. In the language of emotional politics, in spite
of all dissimilarities we take care of each other. This sensual dimension is crucial to un-
derstand the assessment of the Hungarian EU Presidency communication, since the
key publics (such as members of European Parliament, journalists, international bod-
ies) expressed very strong and negative feelings against the Hungarian government.
Before discussing it in details, let’s see the methodological issues of the study.
Communicating EU Presidency on web 2.0
Research questions and methods
In order to assess patterns of web 2.0 applications in government communication of
the Hungarian EU Presidency corresponding with the relational paradigm/PR 2.0
approach, the research question was designed as follows:
RQ: What are the main characters of the web 2.0 communication of the Hungarian govern-
ment in undertaking the role of the rotating Presidency of the Council of European
Union?
This overall research question was divided into sub-questions, such as:
(RQa): In what ways has web 2.0 been integrated into the strategy of the government com-
munication policy?
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(RQb): Who are the key publics targeted by the web 2.0 communication?
(RQc): What web 2.0 instruments are applied to reach the targeted publics?
To answer the research questions a combination of the follow-up study of web
2.0 activity in the Presidency communication and semi-structured interviews were
conducted. Regarding the follow-up; the official website of the Presidency,6 the
Facebook7 and Twitter8 profiles, and blogs9 run by the governmental officials were
included into the data collection. The pages were carefully observed, regularly
downloaded (twice a week) and the governmental web 2.0 activities were regis-
tered over the period of the Hungarian EU Presidency (1st January–30 June 2011).
The statistics of the Facebook profile of the Hungarian government dedicated to the
EU Presidency issues were generously provided by the Hungarian Foreign Minis-
try’s EU Presidency Communication Department, other figures were numbered by
the authors.
Concerning the interviews, 4 semi-structured interviews were organised during
the summer of 2011 with government officials in charge of communicating EU Pres-
idency. The interviews contained a set of closed-ended and open-ended questions
which were emailed to the interviewees in advance. All interviews were recorded,
transcribed and lasted an average of 60 minutes. All officials were in decision-mak-
ing positions in departments directly linked to the Presidency communication strat-
egy design and implementation units at the time of the interviews. The technical
information about the interviews is listed in the following table:
Table 1
List of interviewees with position they held and the date and place of the interviews
Interviewees Position




Head of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s EU
Presidency Communication Department
28.07.2011, Budapest





Deputy Head of the Department for Strategic
Communication at the State Secretariat for
Government Communications of the Ministry
of Public Administration and Justice
2.08.2011, Budapest
HAJDÚ Márton Spokesperson of the Hungarian Presidency
(delegated to Brussels)
6.09.2011, Budapest–Brus-
sels (via Skype call)
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The research material will be presented in 3 points corresponding to the research
questions of the study. First, the political and organization background, then the
strategic issues of the web 2.0 activities, finally the characters of the communicative
governmental relations with the identified publics will be discussed.
Political circumstances and organizational background
Between the 1st of January and 30th of June 2011, Hungary held the rotating presi-
dency of the Council of the European Union for the first time ever in the history of
EU. The Hungarian government undertook the Presidency role formulated after the
parliamentary elections of April 2010, when the centre-right conservative party alli-
ance (Fidesz and KDNP) won a landslide victory. Having received 52.7% of the
votes and gaining 263 seats out of the 386, the centre-right coalition secured
a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian Parliament. Since the government led by
PM Orbán Viktor took office, the Parliament has passed a series of new laws which
have reshaped the legislative framework of the basic elements of the Hungarian
public law and introduced radical measures to consolidate public finance. Espe-
cially the confiscation of the compulsory private pension system and the extra taxes
on telecommunication companies provoked harsh criticism from EU institutions,
European politicians and international bodies.10 The extremely heated reactions of
the international press and political agents to the new Hungarian media regulation
(which came into force on the 1st of January 2011) surprised even the Hungarian
government’s officials.11 Concerns have been raised about the government’s, led by
Orbán Viktor, capacity to fulfill the task of the Presidency and its commitment to-
wards European values (freedom of press, appreciation the value of a pluralistic
civil society, solidarity, respect the rule of law) were also doubted.12 The Hungarian
government undoubtedly has had to face unfriendly or sometimes even hostile Eu-
ropean publics right before the Presidency term started.
The communication team started to be recruited after the conservative govern-
ment came into office, in June of 2010. Besides the relatively limited time for prepa-
ration, the financial frames were also quite tight; the total budget of the Presidency
was calculated around 80 million which was far below the cost of the previous
Presidencies.13 Despite all the constraints, a triadic architecture of the Presidency
communication was established, sharing the workload amongst the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry’s EU Presidency Communication Department (1), the Department
for Strategic Communication at the State Secretariat for Government Communica-
tions (2) and Hungary’s Permanent Representation in Brussels (3). This approach is
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rather different from the previous Presidencies which usually created a centralized
organizational background for communication.
Dr. Urkuti György, known as well reputed business and EU affairs journalist,
was appointed as the head of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s EU Presidency
Communication Department. The staff (19 media/creative communication experts),
supervised by Dr. Urkuti, managed the media relations and provided the support
for policy communication. The main outcome of their efforts was the official
website of the Presidency.14 The spokesperson dedicated to the Hungarian publics
(Ms. Bakos Piroska, former television journalist) worked also in affiliation with the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry.
In the State Secretariat of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, the
Presidency communication was integrated into the Department of Strategic Com-
munication where it was organized unseparated from the general government com-
munication. Beside his other duties in strategic communication, the Deputy Head
of the Department, (Mr. Böszörményi Nagy Gergely, an experienced marketing and
branding professional) was in charge of communicating the Presidency. He is also
known to having taken part in the introduction of the social media use in the gov-
ernment communication in 2010.15 This means not only the creation and operation
of government Facebook profiles, but extensive attention and immediate reactions
to the dynamics of the communities in social media platforms too. The Department
of Strategic Communication is also engaged in the (re)branding of Hungary and
governance in the context of Presidency (with 5 permanent staff).
The third actor was the Hungary’s Permanent Representation in Brussels which
has two spokespersons during the Presidency: Mr. Polner Gergely who specialized
in matters related to the COREPER-II (political, financial and foreign policy issues),
and Mr. Hajdú Márton who was concerned with issues of COREPER-I (social
and economic issues). The Brussels-based spokespersons were selected by the
multicircled concours at the end of July 2011 and they were ‘borrowed’ from the Eu-
ropean Commission (Hajdú Márton) and European Parliament (Polner Gergely) for
the 6-month-period of the Presidency. The Brussels-based spokespersons were
helped by two assistants and a secretary.
The EU Presidency Communication Department in the Hungarian Foreign Min-
istry (Budapest) and the Brussels-based spokespersons worked in a very close, but
horizontal way of cooperation. This meant regular online meetings, daily email and
phone communications. While the department in the State Secretariat for Govern-
ment Communications of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice operated
in occasional and issue-oriented collaboration with the Foreign Ministry Depart-
ment and the spokesperson to Hungarian publics (Ms. Bakos Piroska).
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Strategic issues: web 2.0 and the key publics (RQa-b)
Even though the written strategy of the presidency communication was not avail-
able to the author, the key elements of the plan were highlighted in the interviews.
All the interviewees were agreed that there was no question about the integration of
Internet, web 2.0 and social media, all were considered necessary tools for effective,
economical, but still attractive and inventive Presidency communication. As a stra-
tegic principle, the activity was divided into two separate parts: relations with profes-
sionals (1) and interactions with the citizens (2).
The communications with professionals (1) targeted the high level officers at EU in-
stitutions, Members of European Parliament, senior government officials from the
Member States, policy consultants, representatives of NGOs/international bodies, the
Hungarian quality media and the international press. This activity mainly covered the
relationship building with the so-called ‘Brussels bubble’. Connections with the groups
of the international networked elite around the EU institutions required the constant
care of maintaining interpersonal and dialogical interactions with adequate and accu-
rate information via multiply channels with flexible communication style.
Thus, the Brussels-based spokespersons enjoyed a great deal of trust and sup-
port from the Foreign Ministry in translating the communication principles to the
day-by-day practice. They were credited to bring and operate new web 2.0 tool
without any strong central control such as the blog of spokespersons (Kovács
& Kováts blog, discussed later). The idea of treat EU bloggers as important public
and providing them same status as journalists of mainstream media had also came
from the Brussels communication team. Even though, bloggers from the commu-
nity of BlogActive.eu and Bloggingportals.eu (the two main social media platform
for blogging EU affairs) actively criticized the new Hungarian media regulations,
the initiative of the spokespersons was appreciated. As a result, several spokesper-
sons-bloggers meetings and in March 2011 bloggers grated press accreditation to
the European Council, first time ever in the history of EU institutions.
Communication with the Hungarian media was organised by the concept of seg-
mentation. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s EU Presidency Communication De-
partment established relations with quality press journalists who had professional
interest in covering the EU Presidency affairs. The non-EU focused Hungarian press
was not targeted by policy issues or general EU information, but rather by the hu-
man-interest stories of the Presidency (for example the gastronomic curiosities of
Presidency meetings or dress codes in Presidency events). Internet and web 2.0
were considered as strategic tools to reach both media segments.
The work of communication with citizens (2) was located in the Department for
Strategic Communication at the State Secretariat for Government Communications
of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. It was designed to be based on
the promotion of events series or activities which were organized under the aegis of
the Presidency but without a direct link to it. Two ‘flagship’ projects were registered
for communicating EU as a general idea (brand) for non-professional audiences.
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One was the campaign of the ‘Rethink/re-button! Magyar is the Mode’ which was in-
troduced in February 2011 as an open competition of fashion and art designers,
a fashion show (was held on 8 May 2011, on Europe day) and an art collection with
the goal of renewing the Hungarian fashion traditions and encouraging designers
to put forward ideas using any element of traditional clothing. The inclusion of the
OurFashion blog, one of the three main media partners of the campaign (beside
Glamour magazine and a commercial television channel of Hungary), signals the
importance of social media in the interest/consumption-based segmentation of
government communication, and the broadening horizon of government relation-
ships. The second campaign, called ‘Te Szedd!’ (You collect!) was introduced as
a promotion for voluntary actions in local communities to collect garbage and to re-
cultivate natural heritages. In this campaign, Facebook and Twitter were applied as
key instruments for raising awareness and mobilisation for joint activities.
The intensive and extended use of the concept of ‘gamification’ or ‘funware’ was
also observed in the government interactions with citizens. The terms refer the frequent
application of game elements and techniques in non-game environment to encourage
well-desires audience actions and generate loyalty or support through involvement
(see: Zichermann & Cunningham, 2011). It typically employs reward mechanisms to
maintain the engagement of the targeted groups. Gamification in the governmental
context is based on the notion that has shifted from monetary rewards (‘pay 1 get 2’) to
ones in virtual currency conveying social accounts (redeeming, gifting, and exchanging
points). The campaigns of the Department for Strategic Communication therefore did
not intend to talk about the achievements of the Presidency or the benefits of Hun-
gary’s EU memberships. These were absolutely not information campaigns, they were
rather aimed to give impetus for the creation or resurrection of communities where
there was positive climate of opinions towards the government and the EU.
All in all, the internet and web 2.0 have become an integral part of the strategic
thinking about government communication in Hungary. Moreover, the internet is no
longer treated as additional and separate issue in communication strategies, the Hun-
garian EU Presidency shows that the increasingly blurred boundaries between offline
and online social relationships has been recognised and taken seriously into account
in managing governmental interactions. Consequently, the general approach has
changed: it is not the case anymore that the offline and/or mass media-centered com-
munication is translated into the online environment, rather the logic of web 2.0 with its
participatory and conversational culture in its fragmented communicative communi-
ties determines the strategic and operative aspects of political communication. It is defi-
nitely an innovation in the practise of government communication in Hungary.
Web 2.0 relations with publics (RQc)
Presidency on WWW. The official website of the Presidency was launched on the
20th of December 2010 and was available at www.eu2011.hu. The design and the ar-
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chitecture were inherited from the Belgian Presidency; some changes were made in
the software to make it compatible with social media platforms. The website was
quadrilingual, all information was available in English, in French, in German and in
Hungarian as well. It was maintained by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s EU
Presidency Communication Department, the content creation was supervised by
officers or partners who had experiences in media or creative communication. Col-
our coding was introduced to distinguish ‘hard news/event’ (policy papers and
meetings) for EU professionals from soft news (arts, science, life style and gastron-
omy) for non-EU professionals or for the general public. According to the statistics
of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s EU Presidency Communication Department,
2.7 million page downloads from eu2011.hu domain were registered over the pe-
riod of the 6-month-long Presidency.
The website was evaluated as the central infrastructure in communicating
with journalists. It was a highly informative platform with hundreds of briefings,
press releases, photos, videos and full policy paper. It contained event calendar,
practicalities for foreign press corps (where to go, where to stay, technicalities of
Press Centres) and even an interactive map with updated traffic information. The
press accreditation process was also fully internet-based. As important web 2.0
tools personalised newsletters, RSS and the SMS alerts could be subscribed for via
the website. Widget code was available too which allowed internet users to estab-
lish link on their own websites to the eu2011.hu pages.
The two ‘flagship’ campaigns of citizen communication had separate websites
(gomboldujra.hu; teszedd.hu) which were designed to promote the events/issue.
The heads of the Presidency communication, however, intended to keep the website
based communication centralised to avoid the production of dozens of microsites in
different domains.
Blogging the Presidency. Three blogs were connected to the Presidency com-
munication. The online diaries of Dr. Urkuti György (Head of the Hungarian For-
eign Ministry’s EU Presidency Communication Department) and Mr. Ódor Bálint
(Deputy State Secretary for European Union Affairs of the Hungarian Foreign Min-
istry) could be reached via the official website. The first entry was published on the
20th December 2010 on the blog of Dr. Urkuti which was followed by 29 entries.
Mr. Ódor’s first post appeared four days prior to the start of the Hungarian Presi-
dency and he posted 19 entries over six months. In the whole life of the blogs 127
comments arrived from pretty much the same group of commentators: nicknames
of ‘linquaB’, ‘basil’ and ‘jocó’ actively commented almost all through the 6 month
period. Generally speaking, the comments were positive and encouraging, apart
from the entries about the new Hungarian media regulation which were posted in
the first phase of the Presidency (23rd December 2010 on Urkuti’s blog and 7th Janu-
ary 2011 on Ódor’s blog). These were the most attractive posts in terms of the num-
ber of comments (in sum 59 comments). Both entries were the surprised reactions to
the heated international criticism of the new media law. While the comments to
Mr. Ódor’s entry were mostly supportive, comments to Dr. Urkuti’s post were
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rather slamming. The debate tried to be labelled as off-topic by the blog ower. Some
comments, however, arrived after the query of the owner of the blog.
The level of interactivity was quite low; the bloggers rarely responded to the
comments what they received. The numbers of blog entries declined as the end of
the Presidency approached. 37 out of 49 entries were published in the first half of
the Presidency (January–March 2011). And the numbers of comments also de-
creased the end of June 2011 approached.
The third web diary connected to the government, was the Kovács&Kováts blog.
It was launched on the 3rd of February 2011 as the semi-independent initiative of the
Brussels-based spokespersons (using the engine of ‘blogspot.com’). Kovács&Kováts
were the alter egos of the spokespersons who were “stumbling around the diplo-
matic world like the odd-couple of Thompson and Thomson in the Tintin comics
and this blog is supposed to denote their weekly adventures while working for the
Hungarian Presidency” as the intro said. With altogether 43 entries, the aim was to
break the tradition that the spokespersons did not speak for themselves. The blog
was to be a personal account of the EU and the Presidency, but with respect to the
mandate they did not talking about, for example the new media regulation.16 By the
early April of 2011 the Kovács&Kováts blog reached 10,000 pageviews as it was
communicated on the entry of 6th April 2011 with very few but usually friendly
or neutral comments from fellow bloggers interested in EU affairs. The low level of
audience activity, in terms of commenting, was discussed several times in the
spokespersons’s entries. Comments, however, suggested that the best way to attract
more comments could have been the use of a provocative, controversial style which
was not aimed by the Kovács&Kováts blog.17 In any case, the numbers of entries
and comments declined over time as it was observed in the case of DR. Urkuti’s and
Mr. Ódor’s blog.
Presidency on social media. The official Facebook profile dedicated to the Presi-
dency started to operate at the end of December 2010 with 1,514 followers.18 Alto-
gether 232 textual and 964 visual entries were uploaded over the Presidency period.
All the contents were available in Hungarian and English as well. By the end
of June, 4,069 followers were registered to the Hungarian version and 2,543 to the
English one. The followers’ activity was measured relatively high in sharing the
contents of the profile (43,800 sharing was estimated), but it was moderate in com-
menting. The most commented entries were the gaming one in which souvenirs of
the Presidency could be won with 25 likes and 58 comments.19 Overtime, the figures
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The spokesperson dedicated to the Hungarian publics had a Facebook account
with 431 followers.
The citizen campaigns (‘Rethink/re-button! Magyar is the Mode’ and ‘You Collect!’)
also had Facebook profiles and appeared on the Youtube and Flickr platforms. They,
however, were operated with the collaboration of non-governmental partners, so it
could be challenging to calculate where the governmental communication ended
and where the communications of other entities started. As a matter of fact, that was
exactly the purpose of the communication officers at the Department for Strategic
Communication at the State Secretariat for Government Communications of the
Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. The aim of the government officers
was only to come out with the issue and present it in a way which was fascinating
enough to grab the attention of the targeted audience and let them contribute or re-
configure the discussion as they wished. The ‘flagship’ campaigns were the excel-
lent examples of how gamification and other involvement techniques reinforced the
feeling of issue ownership in different audience groups.
The use of Twitter can be considered the biggest innovation of the Hungarian EU
Presidency, not only in the context of Hungarian government communication, but
in the history of Presidencies too. Twitter activity was quite fragmented, 6 profiles
were offered for registration. Three were available in English, two in Hungarian
and one in French. The Brussels-based team covered the Presidency issues through
their personal accounts (hajduspox, polnerspox) in English and general accounts
(HU_Presidency/Presidence/Elnökség) were also created to provide short trilin-
gual messages via Twitter. The spokesperson dedicated to the Hungarian publics
tweeted in Hungarian (piroskaspox). The official Twitter services were launched on
the 15th of December 2010.
In terms of the follower number, the most popular Twitter profiles were the
Brussels-based spokespersons’ personal accounts (with altogether 1,457 followers)
and the English language general Presidency profile (1,108 followers). The tweets of
Ms. Bakos Piroska were followed by 175 people. And the French version of the gen-
eral Presidency profile was registered 120 followers. The most active user was
Mr. Polner Gergely who released 693 tweets between the 1st of January and the
30th of June 2011. 335 tweets were counted on Hajdú Márton’s profile and it was 204
on Ms Bakos Piroska’s one.
The general Presidency profiles were a kind of alert service: the tweets usually
provided notification on the latest updates of the official webpage and the upcom-
ing events. This profile targeted the press corps which was covering the Presidency
affairs.
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followers. The likes on the most popular entry was numbered as 1,238 and the most com-
mented post attracted 411 reactions. See: Mihályffy et al (2011). The Facebook profile of
the Hungarian Government Portal (http://hu-hu.facebook.com/kormanyzat) currently has
1195 likes (27.10.2011).
The spokespersons mainly used their profiles to react to the tweets of their fol-
lowers. The pattern of the dialogical interactivity was mainly observed in the Twitter
activity of the Brussels-based spokesperson whose partners in Twitter communica-
tion were dominantly from the Brussels bubble. Thus, the Twitter profiles could be
seen as a platform for publicly opened interpersonal chatting of the community.
This conversation was rather fragmented, since a tweet could not be longer than
140 characters. That obviously did not allow for the exchange of opinions in a sub-
stantive way. Twitter, however, contributed to active participation in the communi-
cation circle of a certain group and maintained relations with members, signalling
the attentions to the group activity and the acceptance of the group rules. The
spokespersons seemed to be aware of the golden rules of tweeting such as keep it
short (less than 120 character), be responsive, feel free to express personal feelings,
know who follows you and who you are following, etc.20 as contributing to the com-
munication flow around the Hungarian EU Presidency via Twitter.
The web 2.0 patterns of the Presidency communication are summarised in the
Table 2 below.
Table 2
Summary of the web 2.0 use in communicating the Hungarian EU Presidency
PUBLICS Professional: journalists, blog-
gers, officers (EU institutions,
MPs, MEPs, Member States’
Gov., international bodies), con-
sultants, activists
Non EU related press
(Hungary): tabloids,
life style magazines,


































As table 2 shows the professionals-targeted communication was armed mostly
with web 2.0 features. In the citizen communication, social media played primary
role for establishing segmented and direct connections with audiences which could
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be evaluated as evidence of the decline of the mass media-centered governmental
communication approach.
Conclusions
The Hungarian EU Presidency was an extraordinary occasion for the ruling govern-
ment to make itself visible at the EU level which means political, diplomatic, man-
agement and communication tasks at the same time, and the results achieved in
these all form a part of the evaluation of the Presidency performance.
The aim of this study was to provide empirical evidence for the evaluation of the
web 2.0 based efforts of the Hungarian government in communicating EU Presi-
dency. The results support the thesis of the presence of Public Relation culture in
government communication having found that the strategic angle of the govern-
ment communication was relationship building with key publics and web 2.0 was
seen as a tool to facilitate the maintenance of the connections. The research findings
suggest that PR 2.0 as a mind-set and web 2.0 as toolkit with its interactive, two-way
and personal nature was fully integrated into the Presidency communication. In
spite of the negative reputation of the centre right Hungarian government, the Pres-
idency communication team managed to create a supportive online environment
through web 2.0 profiles in which the audiences were targeted in a segmented way.
The social media platforms, mainly the spokespersons’ personal Twitter/Face-
book profile and blog entries, depicted real faces around the Presidency. The new
online instruments contributed to the attempt of reconfiguration of the patterns in
communicating EU affairs. The key element of the change was the rejection of the
top-down and command-control style of communication. Instead, clear steps were
observed towards a more cooperative and networked style of government commu-
nication which targeted not only the traditional mass media, but an extended circle
of stakeholders too (bloggers, for example).
In this sense, ‘medium was (one of) the (symbolic) message’ of the Hungarian
government as signalling the possibilities of dialogical and personalised interac-
tions. Concerning the reciprocity, the Presidency communication was successfully
embedded in the cultural and communication context of the ‘Brussels bubble’
which has been considered as the most characteristics community (public) around
the European Union. In this regards, Ihave detected well-designed web 2.0 commu-
nication routes (see Twitter) in the elite’s discussions. The citizen-targeted commu-
nication of the Hungarian EU Presidency highlighted the possible ways how
consumption (see‘Rethink/re-button! Magyar is the Mode’ campaign) and social val-
ues (see ‘Te Szedd!’ garbage collection campaign) could be conceptualized as
fundaments of political interactions. Nevertheless, the Presidency communication
has failed to connect its targeted publics (roughly speaking professionals and citi-
zens) to each other. The government kept its key publics strictly separated which
might be evaluated as huge problem since it maintained the democratic deficit in
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the European political space. Alternative explanation is proposed from the view-
point of Public Relations; the government responded the different needs in various
ways in order to satisfy them all. The non-EU professional publics were perceived
not to be interested in core EU topics, so they were rather targeted by human inter-
ested stories of the Presidency or cultural events linked to EU. The PR culture as
identified in the study also demonstrated the possible ways of integrating emotions
(humour, sense of belonging, etc.) and life styles (fashion, gastronomies, etc.) in
communicating EU affairs.
The research diagnosed that the impacts of web 2.0 can be profound on govern-
ments’ strategic thinking without the promise of revolutionary changes in the struc-
ture of governance. The web 2.0-based government communication did not delegate
consultancy or decision making rights to citizens in the issues of the Presidency. In
this regard, social media use does not imply the absolute denial of the current para-
digm in governance, but it raises questions about the notions of basic concepts of
political communication (such as political community and participation). We have
to revise what institutionalised political communication means today when the
web 2.0 with its real-time, direct and participatory logic further adds to the blurring
institutional borders in all realms of society; and how political communities can be
identified when they are in flux rather than a stable entity. The concept of participa-
tion also needs to be rethought again: for a long time, we have know that participa-
tion is much more than voting, consequently political communication should be
much more than just voter mobilising for the one single day of the election. This
might require paradigmatic renewal at the mezzo-level of political science, in the
theories of political communication.
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The Changing EU Presidency and the Media Agenda
at Home: Coverage of the Danish 2002 and 2012
Presidency Compared
Introduction
“The Danish EU Presidency is two months old. Rarely have the media covered
the EU so intensively. Denmark is the imperative center: Europe’s navel.“
“The Danish media could very well continue their eagerness to cover the EU un-
der the next Presidencies. Or do we have to wait until 2015, or what was the next
time Denmark holds the Presidency again?”
Charlotte Fischer, candidate for member of Parliament (R), Politiken, 2 August 2002
These are two quotes from a discussion piece by then candidate – MP Charlotte
Fischer about Danish media coverage of the 2002 EU Presidency. When Denmark
held the Presidency of the Council of the EU, also called the “EU Presidency”, in the
second half of 2002, Danish newspapers and television covered the EU intensively
(de Vreese, 2005). Coverage often applied a national angle, but compared to other
periods when the EU was largely absent, the intensive coverage was seen as a posi-
tive change. As the opinion piece by Fischer illustrates, the rotating Presidency has
traditionally been a good opportunity to bring the EU closer to home and put the
EU on the national media agenda (Boomgaarden et al., 2010).
Fischer feared that since the media only cover the EU intensively when the coun-
try holds the Presidency, it would take a long time before the EU would receive this
type of coverage again in Denmark. The next Danish Presidency took place in 2012
(not in 2015 as Fischer wrote), in a completely different context. By then Brussels
had become the permanent location of meetings between the heads of state or gov-
ernment of the member states and Herman Van Rompuy was installed as perma-
nent President of the European Council. Compared to other EU actors like the
European Parliament, the role of the presiding government diminished. Given the
different institutional role of the Presidency since the Lisbon Treaty, it is question-
able whether the Presidency still generates the same headlines in the presiding
country.
This chapter discusses the consequences of the changing role of the rotating
Presidency from a communication perspective. Contrasting the 2012 Presidency
with the 2002 Presidency the chapter describes how media debate in the presiding
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country has changed. The following questions are addressed: How visible and
prominent is the Presidency in the media after changes introduced by the Lisbon
Treaty? Which are the new key moments during the Presidency for the media? Did
the 2012 Danish Presidency generate debate in the media about the EU and was the
debate inclusive of the general public?
To address these questions, the chapter proceeds as follows. First, the impor-
tance of media debate about the EU is discussed and three dimensions are pre-
sented along which debate should be assessed: visibility, inclusion and contestation.
This is followed by an overview of previous research on media coverage during
Presidencies. Based on a presentation of the main institutional changes introduced
by the Nice and Lisbon Treaty, the context and characteristics of the 2002 and 2012
Presidencies are briefly introduced followed by an analysis of the visibility of the
EU in the media and debate about the EU. These results are discussed in the light of
the communication strategy and goals of the Danish government during the 2012
Presidency.1
Debate about Europe in national media: three dimensions
‘Permissive consensus’ has long characterized European integration, where deci-
sions were made by elites, without much interest from or debate among the general
population (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). However, over time citizens have be-
come increasingly critical of the EU (Hix, 2008) and no longer silently agree a priori
with growing Europeanization. This became for example clear during the 2005 ref-
erendums in France and the Netherlands, where the public voted against the Euro-
pean Constitution. Simultaneously EU-skeptic parties have been on the rise in
Europe. This more critical stance of the public towards European integration has
underlined the need for public discussion about the EU. Meyer (2005) argues that
‘compensatory Europeanization’ of national public discourse becomes essential as
the EU gets more powerful: national publics need to be well informed about the EU
by the media. However, in practice, public and media debate about the EU has long
been missing, and knowledge and attention for EU politics among the public have
generally been low. The EU acknowledged the existence of such a ‘communication
deficit’ in the White paper on a European Communication Policy (European Com-
mission, 2006), which lays out measures to enhance debate and dialogue about Eu-
rope. Such debate would increase the legitimacy of the European institutions and
policy decisions and would ideally take place at two levels: both at the European
level and at the national level (De Beus, 2010:23).
The mass media play a central role in this alleged communication deficit, since
they are the public’s prime source of information on the EU and a key facilitator of
a public sphere where debate takes place. A truly European public sphere, mirror-
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Christilla Roederer-Rynning for their help and comments.
ing the national public sphere with pan-European media in which voices from dif-
ferent European countries exchange views in an open debate, received limited
empirical support (Machill et al., 2006). In practice debate about the EU is mostly
concentrated within national borders (Brüggeman & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2009;
Koopmans & Stratham, 2010). In the words of De Beus (2010:32) “the European
public sphere is home grown.” Following Schmidt (2006) such debate about the EU
within national borders is a necessity, since the democratic deficit of EU politics is
also present at the national level. The lack of deliberations in the member states
about the effect of Europeanization at home is an important problem and might
have strengthened populist parties (Schmidt, 2006:4).
Given the importance of media debate about Europe at the national level, what
should this debate look like? Koopmans and Stratham (2010:5) mention three key
dimensions to assess whether media coverage of Europe indeed “carries political
debates over Europe to general publics:” visibility, inclusiveness and contestation.
First, for citizens to be aware of politics at the European level requires that the media
make the European Union and its institutions visible. Previous research has shown that
attention for politics at the European level is generally low and only peaks around key
events. Peter and de Vreese (2004:16) therefore compare the EU to the moon: “though of
major influence on the ebb and flow of Europe, it is only cyclically fully visible.”
A second criterion is inclusiveness of publics: the degree to which non-political
actors and in particular the general public has access to and is included in policy de-
cisions. An important indicator here is the extent to which citizens are “included
within public debates about the decision making processes of European multilevel
governance.” (Koopmans & Stratham, 2010:5). In practice EU debate is dominated
by politicians, in particular government actors, while civic society actors and the
general public are mostly absent (Koopmans & Stratham, 2010:291; de Vreese et al.,
2006).
A third key dimension is contestation. To improve the legitimacy of the EU and its
decisions, the actions and proposals need to be subject of thorough discussion. This
has implications for the media which should “not just inform, but also provide
a platform for debate” (Van Noije, 2007:266). According to Koopmans and Stratham
(2010), coverage of the EU that is more visible and accessible to more non-elite
voices would automatically include more conflict and debate. Previous research has
shown that conflict is an important news value and that the EU is covered more in
countries where there is elite debate about the course of the European Union
(Boomgaarden et al. 2013).
The media and the changing Presidency
Previous research has shown that the EU has not featured prominently on the na-
tional media agenda (Boomgaarden et al., 2010). One of the exceptional periods
where Europe generated headlines and made the EU accessible to citizens was
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when the member state held the EU Presidency. However, this might have been af-
fected by changes in the institutional role of the Presidency introduced by the Nice
and Lisbon Treaty.
Several studies have shown that holding the Presidency used to bring the EU
closer to home. Norris (2000) and de Vreese (2003) pointed out that EU coverage
peaked around European Council meetings of the EU’s heads of state or govern-
ment in so-called European Summits, which used to be chaired by the country hold-
ing the Presidency. Peter and de Vreese (2004) studied differences in summit versus
routine periods in television news in Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands and
the United Kingdom. Their study confirmed that the EU was more visible and more
prominently covered during summit periods. Traditionally, these summits used to
take place in the presiding country, which led to considerable coverage in that coun-
try (de Vreese, 2005).
The Nice Treaty introduced a first change in the set-up of the European Presi-
dency. Since 2003 EU summits no longer take place in the presiding country. Instead
Brussels became the permanent location of the EU council meetings between heads
of state or government. Boomgaarden et al. (2010) showed that this had a negative
influence on the visibility of the EU in the presiding country, since Council meetings
in Brussels were covered less than Summits in the Presiding country. For journalists
the fact that the home country holds the Presidency does not make the Brussels
summit as relevant as meetings at home. “If the country holding the Presidency or-
ganizes an EU summit in Brussels, as is the case from 2003 onwards, this does not
cause a significant increase of EU news visibility in that country.” (Boomgaarden et
al., 2010:516).
The study by Boomgaarden et al. analyzed media coverage until 2006. Since then
the role of the EU Presidency has changed considerably due to the implementation
of the Lisbon Treaty (Beach, 2012). Like the Nice Treaty, these changes are likely to
affect the visibility of the EU on the media agenda. Some of the major changes intro-
duced by the Lisbon Treaty were: (1) split of the European Council from the Council
of the EU. Meetings by the heads of state or government are no longer part of the
Presidency; (2) introduction of a permanent President of the European Council,
who leads the summits by the heads of state or government. The first President was
Herman van Rompuy; (3) introduction of a High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who chairs the Council meetings of the Foreign
Affairs ministers. The first Representative was Catherine Ashton; (4) three consecu-
tive Presidencies work together in a Trio Presidency to provide more consistency.
Denmark worked together with Poland and Cyprus; (5) more influence for other ac-
tors than the Presidency, for example an enhanced status of the European Parlia-
ment (Danish Presidency, 2012c; Manners, 2013).
After these changes in the Lisbon Treaty, in addition to the earlier decision to
make Brussels the permanent location for EU summits, the character of the Presi-
dency changed. It is now seen as “more about exercising administrative capacities
than performing political leadership” (Christensen & Nielsen, 2013:84). These
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changes are also likely to affect the possibility of the Presidency to bring the EU
closer to home and dominate the media agenda. The EU summits, which generated
most media attention, are no longer chaired by the presiding country and no longer
take place there. This could lead to lower peaks in media attention. Working to-
gether with two other Presidencies could limit the possibilities to give the Presi-
dency an own distinct profile. The more important role of the Parliament may mean
that the Parliament can influence the media agenda about the Presidency. In addi-
tion, the role of political agenda-setter became less important for the Presidency,
while the role as neutral mediator between different European institutions became
more important (Christensen & Nielsen, 2013). Such a role as honest broker could
make the Presidency less outspoken about its own views, which in turn could limit
media interest.
Nevertheless, holding the Presidency may still be a possibility to generate public
and media attention, although on a lower level than before 2003. The Presidency is
still seen as a chance to “strengthen public support for the EU in the Member States”
(Danish Presidency, 2012c). Consequently, the Danish Government that held the
Presidency in 2012 described the Presidency as a “good opportunity to place focus
on the EU in Denmark” (Danish Presidency, 2012a). To do so the Danish EU Presi-
dency organized information activities and debate events in Denmark during the
2012 Presidency. In addition “openness and transparency” were highlighted as im-
portant values of the Presidency, also in the relations with the press (Danish Presi-
dency, 2012a).
Changing Presidency, changing media debate?
To study the impact of the institutional changes in the Presidency on media debate
in the presiding country, this chapter compares the 2002 and 2012 Danish Presi-
dencies. Media debate will be compared along the three dimensions presented by
Koopmans and Stratham. First, the visibility of the Presidency in the media is stud-
ied, comparing the overall number of articles about the Presidency in 2002 and
2012 and their prominence in the newspaper. The weekly change in media visibility
is compared to see what the new key moments are when the Presidency makes
headlines in the media. To study the other two dimensions, inclusiveness and
contestation, the articles about the Presidency in the opinion section of the newspa-
per are studied. This section of the newspaper includes letters to the editor, opinion
pieces, columns and editorials. The number of opinion pieces during the 2002 and
2012 Presidency are compared as a proxy for contestation on the media agenda. The
letters-to-the-editor section has been described as “one of a few arenas for public
discussion by regular citizens, and can be seen as a key institution of the public
sphere“ (Habermas, 1989 in Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002:69). Although the contributions
by the audience included in the newspapers are selected by the editors, this is one of
the few sites for public deliberation in the newspapers (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002).
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Therefore, this chapter looks at the authors of the opinion pieces and letters-to-
-the-editor as an indicator for the inclusiveness of citizens in the debate. The share
of opinion pieces written by the general audience is compared to the share of opin-
ion pieces written by politicians, the media, experts and representatives of interest
groups.
The 2002 and 2012 Danish Presidencies took place in very different contexts,
which were shaped by the institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
The Danish Presidency 2002 had cumulated in the Copenhagen Summit (12 and
13 December), where negotiations about the Enlargement were closed. In the Euro-
pean Council conclusions, the heads of state or government described the Copenha-
gen Council as “an unprecedented and historical milestone” (European Council
Conclusions in Friis, 2003:49). The 2012 Presidency took place in a completely differ-
ent context. The expansion of the EU to 27 countries, the implementation of the Lis-
bon Treaty combined with the enduring economic crisis, had a strong impact on the
Presidency. Contrary to 2002, Denmark did not chair the summits of the heads of
state or government, which took place in Brussels. The Danish Presidency was part
of a trio of Presidencies together with two countries with different ambitions, expe-
riences and priorities: Poland and Cyprus. According to Manners (2013:74) this new
context “relegated the Danish Presidency to a supportive role in the larger issues of
the time.” The two main tasks of the presiding country were to represent the Coun-
cil when negotiating with the Commission or the European Parliament and to lead
the meetings in the Council of the EU (Danish Presidency, 2012c). These meetings
mainly took place in Brussels and Luxemburg, but in addition a number of informal
meetings were organized in Denmark.
These differences between 2002 and 2012 show that the institutional changes in
the working of the EU institutions changed the character of the Presidency. The po-
litical circumstances and the significance of the outcome of the Presidency were also
different. This will be taken into account when analyzing and discussing the out-
come of the content analysis.
One center-left and one center-right leaning broadsheet newspaper (Politiken
and Jyllands Posten, respectively) are included in the study. Politiken and Jyllands
Posten have often been used in previous studies of EU coverage (de Vreese et al.,
2006). Since broadsheet newspapers generally have a different type of coverage of
the EU than other newspapers (de Vreese et al., 2006), also two tabloid newspapers
were included: EkstraBladet and BT. Newspaper articles were collected through the
Danish newspaper database Infomedia using three sets of keywords.2 In order to es-
tablish a link between the Presidency and media coverage, keywords were chosen
which refer narrowly to the Presidency, rather than to the EU in general (for a simi-
lar approach see Blach-Ørsten, 2012). For the 2002 Presidency the period 1 July 2002
until 2 January 2003 was analyzed, and for the Presidency 2012 the period was 1 Jan-
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2 (“EU presidency”) OR (“EU” AND “presidency”) OR (“Danish” AND “presidency”) in the
headline, subheading or first paragraph.
uary 2012 until 2 July 2012. Where possible the results of the content analysis will be
compared to the findings de Vreese (2005) and Blach-Ørsten (2012) who analyzed
media coverage during several weeks of respectively the 2002 and 2012 Presidency.
Although these studies had a different focus and studied another time frame,
a comparison of the results adds to the validity of the findings of this study.
A less visible and less inclusive Presidency
A comparison of the media coverage of the 2002 and 2012 shows that the attention
for the EU Presidency diminished and showed lower peaks. Figures 1 and 2 show
the number of articles covering the Danish Presidency during the second half of
2002 and the first half of 2012.3 In 2002 191 articles in Politiken and 302 articles in
Jyllands Posten dealt with the Presidency. In 2012 coverage in Jyllands Posten was
considerably lower (104 articles). Coverage in the two tabloids almost halved. The
only exception is Politiken, where almost the same number of articles referred to the
Presidency in 2012 (171) as in 2002. At the same time, the prominence of the Presi-
dency in both broadsheet papers diminished. While in 2002 18 articles appeared on
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Figure 1. Visibility of the Danish EU Presidency in the second half of 2002
in Danish broadsheet and tabloid newspapers
Note: Broadsheet: nr of articles in Politiken and Jyllands Posten; tabloid: number of articles in
EkstraBladet and BT.
3 Since the pattern of visibility was similar in the two broadsheets and in the two tabloid
newspapers these are combined.
the frontpage of Politiken, this was only the case for five articles in 2012. For
Jyllands Posten the number of articles on the frontpage about the Presidency de-
clined from 21 to only one. No frontpage articles in the tabloid newspapers dealt
with the Presidency in 2012.4
The 2002 coverage showed sharp peaks around the meetings of the European
Council in Brussels (24 and 25 October) and the Copenhagen Summit (12 and 13 De-
cember), with over 40 articles in the broadsheet newspapers and attention for the
Presidency on the front-page. Previous studies showed that the EU Presidency re-
ceives more attention when meetings take place in the Presiding country than in
Brussels. This was also the case in 2002, in particular for the tabloid newspapers. Al-
though the peak in media attention in the broadsheets was similar for the Brussels
and Copenhagen meeting, the Copenhagen summit generated more coverage in the
week leading up to the summit. In 2012 the meetings of the European Council (no
longer chaired by Denmark) did no longer generate so much media attention. The
influence of the formal Council meetings on 1–2 March and 28–29 June 2012 on me-
dia coverage of the Presidency can hardly be noticed, as Figure 2 shows. In sum,
while the EU Presidency generated considerable media coverage before the imple-
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Figure 2. Visibility of the Danish EU Presidency in the first half of 2012 in Danish
broadsheets and tabloid newspapers
Note: Broadsheet: nr of articles in Politiken and Jyllands Posten; tabloid: number of articles in
EkstraBladet and BT.
4 Coverage of the 2012 EU Presidency in the main news broadcasts on television and on ra-
dio was also low, with less than two stories per month on average in each broadcast.
mentation of the Nice and Lisbon Treaty with high peaks around the EU summits,
this is no longer the case in 2012.
This raises the question what the new key moments are in which the EU Presi-
dency is prominently covered. Like in 2002, the start of the 2012 Presidency led to re-
flections in the Danish media on the tasks and challenges that awaited the Danish
government. Media attention remained relatively high in broadsheet and tabloid
newspapers during the first three weeks, which included a visit of the commis-
sioners to Denmark and the presentation of the Presidency program by Danish
prime minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt in the European parliament. After this
start, media interest strongly diminished, in particular in the tabloid press, where
coverage did not exceed five articles a week until the last week of the Presidency
(see also Blach-Ørsten, 2012). Coverage in the broadsheet press peaked again in
April when informal meetings of the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Con-
sumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) took place in Horsens.5 In periods where meetings
look place in Brussels, for example at the end of February, there was less attention
(see also Blach-Ørsten, 2012). However this effect seems to be limited to the broad-
sheet newspapers. In the tabloid newspapers, coverage of the EU Presidency was
generally low and was not influenced by location. In April, May and June the Presi-
dency received more coverage in the weeks when the European Parliament met. In
the final weeks of the Presidency, media attention peaked again when the media
looked back at the accomplishments of the Danish government.
In sum, media coverage of the 2012 Presidency was considerably different from
the pre-Lisbon 2002 Presidency, with less attention overall and less sharp peaks in
media. Arguably, the 2002 Presidency was a milestone in the history of the Euro-
pean Union, while the results of the Presidency in 2012 were not as significant.
However, the decline in media attention cannot be attributed only to the different
outcomes of the Presidencies. The fact that these agreements were accomplished in
and by Denmark clearly boosted media coverage in Denmark in 2002 more than in
other countries. de Vreese (2005) has shown that media attention for the Copenha-
gen summit in 2002 was ten times larger in Denmark than in other countries. While
European affairs were covered in 252 Danish television stories around the Copenha-
gen summit of 2002, on Dutch television there were only 25 stories about the EU in
the same period (de Vreese, 2005). As the role of the political agenda-setter has be-
come a less important aspect the Presidency post-Lisbon, it has become more diffi-
cult to generate such media coverage at home.
Institutional changes also affected media attention in other ways. The strength-
ened European Parliament had considerable influence on media attention for the
2012 Presidency. The presentation of the Presidency program by the presiding head
of state in the EP led to broad media coverage and in the last three months of the
Presidency, media attention peaked in the weeks when the EP met. In particular, in
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June, the Parliament was in conflict with the Danish minister of Justice, which lead
to wide coverage. The finding that the coverage of the Presidency is influenced by
the agenda of the Parliament and conflicts between the Parliament and the Council
shows that Danish media coverage of the Presidency clearly reflects the changing
institutional powers in Europe. Secondary analysis of the topics discussed in rela-
tion to the two Presidencies (not shown) revealed that the creation of the new For-
eign Policy coordinator also influenced the Danish media coverage. In 2002 the
Danish minister of foreign affairs who represented the EU in relations with the
United States received considerable coverage. In 2012, EU external affairs were
hardly covered in relation to the Danish Presidency. This supports the conclusion
that the institutional changes in the Presidency affected media interest for the EU
Presidency at home.
We now turn our attention to the other two dimensions of media debate about
the EU: inclusion and contestation. Despite the lower overall visibility than in
2002, the 2012 Presidency did generate the same amount of attention in the debate
section of the newspapers. The Council Presidency was debated in 74 articles dur-
ing the 2002 Presidency. This was almost as much in 2012 (see Table 1).6 Although
the Presidency may have been less newsworthy, Danish editors of the opinion
pages and contributors took the 2012 Presidency as an opportunity for debate
about the EU.
Table 1
Debate about the 2002 and 2012 Presidency on the opinion pages of Jyllands Posten
and Politiken (% of opinion pieces in each category)
2002 2012
Editorial 26 4
Opinion piece/letter by Citizen 23 3
Opinion piece/letter by Politicians 20 29
Opinion piece/letter by Journalist 7 11
Opinion piece/letter by Scholar 4 11
Opinion piece/letter by Interest organizations 5 29





Nevertheless, the actors who contributed to debate in the newspapers changed
considerably from 2002 to 2012. In 2002, more than one fourth of the articles on
opinion pages about the Presidency were editorials, which reflects the broad media
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6 Only the opinion pages of the broadsheet newspapers Politiken and Jyllands Posten are in-
cluded in this part of the analysis, since the tabloid newspapers included considerably less
opinion pieces about the EU Presidency.
attention and the prominence of the topic. In second place, just under one fourth of
the opinion pieces and letters about the Presidency were signed by ordinary citi-
zens, which reflects the high status of the Danish Presidency on the media agenda
and public agenda at the time. In 2012 letters from the general public were strik-
ingly absent of the media debate: only two letters from the public addressing the
Danish Presidency were found on the debate pages. This is far less than the number
of contributions from politicians, journalists and scholars. The largest increase in
debate articles comes from interest organizations. In sum, the Danish Presidency in
2012 generated as much debate on the opinion pages of Danish broadsheets. How-
ever the voice of the general public, which featured prominently in 2002 was largely
absent in 2012.
Discussion: neutral and professional versus confrontational and engaging?
The changing role of the Presidency of the European Union has had its impact on
the media debate generated by the Presidency. In comparison to 2002, the 2012 Dan-
ish Presidency was less visible and less prominently covered. The different out-
comes of the 2002 and 2012 Presidencies arguably had an influence on this, but the
Lisbon Treaty is also an important part of the explanation. Institutional changes in
the role of the Presidency introduced by the Lisbon Treaty clearly left their mark,
such as the fact that the Presidency no longer chaired the meetings of the Council of
heads of state or government. At the same time the parliament became a more
prominent player, and had a strong impact on the media agenda about the Presi-
dency. Although the total number of opinion pieces and letters to the editor equaled
the numbers in 2012, this debate was less inclusive of ordinary citizens. According
to the dimensions set out by Koopmans and Stratham (2010) this should be seen as
a negative development for the ability of the media to contribute to the legitimacy of
the European Union. Less visible and less inclusive coverage moves European poli-
tics further away from inclusive public politics in the direction of elite dominated
debate. For a large part of the Danish audience the 2012 Presidency indeed seems to
have gone by unnoticed. An opinion poll by the Danish public broadcaster showed
that at the end of the 2012 Presidency one third of the voters answered “do not
know” when asked to evaluate how Denmark handled the Presidency. This per-
centage was even higher among young voters and women (DR P1 Radioavisen,
2012). Where the pre-Lisbon Presidency was an opportunity to bring the EU closer
to the citizens of the presiding country, this seems to be less the case now.
In its own evaluation of the Presidency, the Danish Government described itself
as a “’tap water presidency’ without grand gestures” (Danish Presidency, 2012b). In
other evaluations of the presidency, the professionalism and neutrality in the way
the Danish government handled the negotiations were highlighted (see Adler-Nissen,
2012; Gartner, 2012). Would the Danish government have taken a more confronta-
tional approach and been more outspoken about its vision for Europe, this might
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have created more prominent debate about the role of the EU in Denmark and con-
sequently more inclusion of and engagement with the general public. One of the
few moments when the EU Presidency was prominently covered was when the
Danish minster of justice was in conflict with the European Parliament. In other oc-
casions however, the role as chair has seemed to limit the possibilities to be outspo-
ken and generate debate at home. For example, in April 2012 minister of Justice
Morten Bødskov did not want to give journalists insight into the views of the Dan-
ish government on the German-French proposal to reintroduce border controls,
since it was his task to create a compromise among the EU countries (Kongstad
& Elbaek Maressa, 2012). Would the Danish government have been more outspo-
ken, this could have triggered more debate at home about the current role and future
of the EU. However being more outspoken has become more difficult post-Lisbon
since it may compromise the Presidency’s role of honest broker.
This relates to a broader challenge that national and European authorities face in
their communication about the EU and its future. De Beus (2010:14) refers to this
challenge as “the public sphere dilemma.” When authorities facilitate more atten-
tion for and debate about the EU, this will not automatically lead to more public
support, but might lead to poorer commitment and more critical attitudes in the
short run. More media attention for the EU coverage might be provoked by a more
confrontational communication style by the government, but this will often be ac-
companied with more critical citizens, more contestation, and more negativity
(Boomgaarden et al., 2013).
Triggering a more intense debate about the future course of the EU by being
more outspoken might compromise the role of the presiding country in European
Union and may lead to conflict with the other members of the trio presidency. How-
ever, this might be a necessary evil if authorities want to use the platform of the
Presidency to put the EU on the media and public agenda. In the long run this might
be more effective than taking a neutral stand. In the words of Vivien Schmidt
(2006:3), “were national leaders instead to engage their publics in deliberation in
light of the new realities, they well might generate new legitimizing ideas and avoid
the populist extremes, thereby enabling a clearer and ’truer’assessment of the EU’s
impact on national democracy.”
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Introduction
Does the EU presidency offer the potential for the country holding this position to
change its image among the other member states of the European Union? Against
the background of this question, this chapter summarizes the key features of the
German and the Austrian print media news coverage on Poland throughout the
timeframe of the Polish EU presidency term in 2011. Taking a comparative look at
the German and the Austrian media perception of the Polish EU presidency is
thereby guided by two assumptions: (a) the differences and similarities in the
bi-national relations of both countries with Poland may have an impact on the
media perceptions of Poland in the context of the event focused, and (b) the
self-perception of both countries with regard to their own membership in the EU as
a collective entity may also shape the perception of the Polish EU presidency and of
Poland as another member of this collective group. It is especially the second aspect
that may be most relevant when we come to explain the focus (or the lack of the
same) both countries put on Poland and its performance during the Polish EU presi-
dency and the media images and evaluations that result from it.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
Foreign news coverage presents a central platform for international and communica-
tion processes, because international relations issues such as EU-related matters are
essentially second-hand reality to most people. They form a rather abstract and dis-
tant level of relations that people do not have direct access to. Therefore, foreign me-
dia news coverage can significantly shape the knowledge that people have of other
countries and cultures (Hargrove & Stempel, 2002; Wanta et al., 2004). In addition to
that, the exposure to foreign news can have an impact on attitudes and opinions
concerning foreign countries (Semetko et al., 1992).
Thus, for a country the task of image politics, i.e. the ability to be in charge of the
construction and projection of a prestigious or powerful self-image, can be regarded
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as important as a country’s political, economic and military strength and perfor-
mance (Gilboa, 2004). Consequently, countries also strive for internationally higher
visible and positive world images (Kunczik, 2003). As Stêpiñska (2013) has pointed
out, therefore governmental public diplomacy increasingly resembles corporate
public relations strategies or global branding campaigns to attract media attention
and influence other countries’ public opinion – one aim here being to affect foreign
governments, tourism, and corporate investment (Rivenburgh, 2010; Signitzer
& Coombs, 1992).
However, studies (see, for instance, Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Ostgaard, 1965; Shoe-
maker & Cohen, 2006; Staab, 1990; Weber, 2010; Wilke et al., 2012; Wu, 2000) have
shown that everywhere in the world, foreign news coverage concentrates mainly on
events that are geographical or culturally close to a country. Following Stêpiñska
(2013), based on those studies we assume that the news coverage of foreign coun-
tries hosting certain international political events depends on the proximity (or dis-
tance) between observing and observed country, as well as on their cultural,
political or economic relations. The keyword here is the level of bi-national relations
between observing and observed country: We assume that the smaller the geo-
graphical, but also political, economic, and social distance, the more complex is the
picture of the country in the media (i.e., the more topics and events are covered by
the news media).
A second keyword is EU relations and status. We assume that the EU as a trans-
national collective entity is another relevant context factor defining the
reciprocal perceptions of countries within this union, particularly when it comes
to the performance in an official EU position. Here, the status of the (EU) members
in the collective group is regarded as relevant, what status the observed country is
ascribed with, and how the observing country relates to the (EU) group and its
own status in it. For instance, if Austria is unhappy with its own status in the EU,
this may also affect the Austrian perception of Poland and its presidency perfor-
mance.
With regard to intra-EU relations and its impacts on reciprocal media news cov-
erage, numerous media studies have been conducted in the last two decades: Some
of them were devoted to analyze the media coverage of major European events; oth-
ers studied the contribution of the press to a Europeanization of the public sphere
(see, for instance, de Vreese & Semetko, 2004; Maier et al., 2012; or Wilke
& Reinemann, 2007). Many studies on the news coverage of EU affairs generally fo-
cus on the EU as an intergovernmental institution, but largely remain ignorant of
the particular flows of news in between the member states of the EU. Also, most of
those studies focused either on short-duration events or long-term relations be-
tween the EU institutions (Trenz, 2004), only had a national scope (Ekengren 2004;
Quagllia, 2006), or looked at media, public opinion and the process of the EU inte-
gration, while less attention is paid to a single country performance over a certain
time period. For Poland, Stêpiñska (2013) pointed out that studies mainly focus on
the timeframe before Poland’s accession to the EU in 2003. Results showed that Po-
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land had a very low level of media visibility and recognition, but was overall pre-
sented like other EU countries.
Based on the outlined theoretical observations and the state of research, our
study focused on the comparative analysis of the news coverage of the Polish EU
presidency 2011 in two other EU member states, Germany and Austria. We thereby
focused on two central aspects: (a) the differences and similarities in the bi-national
relations of both countries with Poland and the impact of those relations on the me-
dia perceptions of the country in the context of the EU presidency news coverage;
and (b) the self-perception of both countries with regard to their own membership
in the EU and the effects this self-perception on both countries’ perception and eval-
uation of another EU member state.
This chapter will introduce results of the qualitative content analysis of our
study, taking into view news items that reported on Poland in relation to the EU
presidency, in order to identify how visible Poland was in the context of this
news coverage, how complex the country was portrayed in that context, and
how the Polish EU Presidency performance was evaluated.1 We thereby applied
the following research questions to analyze the German and Austrian news cov-
erage:
RQ1: How visible is Poland in the German and Austrian news coverage of the Pol-
ish EU Presidency?
RQ2: How complex is the German and Austrian news coverage of Poland in the
context of EU Presidency-related articles?
RQ3: How are Poland and the Polish performance as holder of the EU Presi-
dency evaluated in the German and Austrian news coverage of the EU
Presidency?
This paper will outline the major findings on those three questions, and will
come up with a brief contextualization and interpretation of the results against the
background of the national self-perception of both Germany and Austria as EU
members, as well as both countries’ bi-national relation with Poland.
Data sample and methodology
Following the two theoretical aspects pointed out before, it is assumed that we have
to consider two influences as important when we analyze the news attention and
qualitative perception that other EU countries apply to Poland in the timeframe of
its EU Presidency: (1) bi-national relations between Poland and the perspective ob-
serving country, and (2) the status and relations of the observing country with the
EU. Looking at Germany and Austria, we expected the news coverage to differ to
some extent (but not completely) for the following reasons:
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1 For a summary of the quantitative aspects of the news coverage and the overall news cover-
age on Poland in general – see Wöhlert (2013a, 2013b) and Stêpiñska (2013).
Regarding (1) the bi-national relations, both countries are geographically close
to Poland, have close economic ties, and a long history of bi-national political rela-
tions with the country. Germany has a special and not always conflict-free relation-
ship to its neighboring country Poland.2 As Gatzke (2010) agues, the German
perception of Poland can be described with to two crucial terms that form two ends
of a continuum: admiration and rejection. With regard to EU and international rela-
tions, both countries faced conflicts over support for the 2003 Iraq War (Poland was
pro-war, Germany against the military intervention), as well as in the debate over
the EU constitution and the weight of EU country votes (Gatzke, 2010; Ociepka et
al., 2008; Szarota, 2010). Austria and Poland also share a history of relation,3 and due
to the shared experience of having been a victim of German Nazi occupation, Po-
land was long perceived as an ally, and after 1945 the relationship of Communist
Poland to the neutral Austria was better than to most other Western states in Eu-
rope. This close relationship has remained until today. Austria also has a large com-
munity of Polish immigrants, most of whom came to Austria in the course of the
internal political conflicts in Poland and the worsening economic conditions in the
1980s (Potkanski, 2011).
Regarding (2) the relationship with the EU, Germany, on the one hand, is one of
the founding members of the EU, and also one of the “EU-heavyweights” regarding
its population size and its political standing. Furthermore, the country has a rather
supportive position towards its own EU membership as well as to EU-related mat-
ters. This position was slightly shaken more recently by the EU financial crisis, but
remains more positive still than in many other EU countries (Risse-Kappen, 2010).
Austria, on the other hand, entered the EU only in 1995. It is also one of the
“EU-lightweights” regarding its population size but also its political status. Also,
since its accession the country has developed a rather ambivalent and skeptical po-
sition towards its own EU membership and EU-related matters, which may also re-
flect in the Austrian news coverage on the Poland EU presidency (Brantner, 2009;
Vitouch & Mayer, 2004).
Comparing the two countries also allows us to see whether or not those two con-
text factors lead to differing perceptions of Poland’s EU presidency performance,
and whether Poland’s public relations efforts to perform great and change the own
country’s image in the context of the presidency term are thwarted by (bi)-national
or EU-related sentiments.
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2 Ranging from the military attack by Nazi Germany in the Second World War, to the subse-
quent violent displacement of Germans from the Polish territories, the policy of détente after
the breakdown of the Eastern European Communist regimes, the recent conflicts over com-
pensation claims of German displaced people (2nd World War), and the 2005 election cam-
paign of the later Polish President Lech Kaczyñski in 2005, which fueled anti-German
resentments in Poland (Asmuss & Koch, 2009)
3 Ranging from military conflicts on the periphery of both the Holy Roman Empire and the
Habsburg Monarchy in the 15th century, the military cooperation during the threat by the Ot-
toman Empire, the defeat of the Ottomans outside of Vienna by Polish king John III Sobieski
in 1683 (Leitsch & Trawkowski, 1993, 1997).
German and Austrian media samples
The results presented here stem from a quantitative and qualitative content analysis
of Germany and Austrian print media that were analyzed over a timeframe of
7 months, between 15 June 2011 and 15 January 2012, focusing on the core periods
[1] 15 June – 31 July 2011, [2] 01 September – 15 October 2011, and [3] 01 December
2011 – 15 January 2012. The German sample included two daily quality newspapers
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung), the daily tabloid newspaper
(Bild), and the weekly news magazine (Der Spiegel). For the Austrian country case,
the sample also included two daily quality newspapers (Die Presse, Der Standard),
the daily tabloid newspaper (Kronenzeitung), and the weekly news magazine (Profil).
The analyzed media for each country are nationally available and have the largest
distribution rates (Hans-Bredow-Institut für Medienforschung, 2009).
All articles were searched4 and acquired from online databases and were saved
as digital files (PDF format). We used the digital archives of the FAZ and SZ, the gen-
eral digital archives Press Display and wiso Presse (accessible via the Austrian Na-
tional Library), and the Mikrofilmarchiv in Dortmund for the tabloid Bild. For each
newspaper/weekly magazine and analyzed publication day, the whole newspaper
edition was searched and all journalistic materials were included. If a newspaper
had Sunday editions, those were also included in the analysis. We did not include
“local” news articles in the sample, if those local sections vary between the local edi-
tions of newspapers. We only included articles in the qualitative content analysis
when the reference to the Polish EU presidency was explicitly made, to allow for
comparability of the two country samples.
Methodology of the qualitative content analysis
To specify the news perception of Poland in EU presidency-related content, based
on the overall research questions and theoretical assumptions, we defined three
structuring dimensions that aim to identify and categorize relevant information in
the news articles (following Mayring, 2003:82–83). As Nawratil and Schönhagen
(2008:339–346) point out, this allows for a systematic structuring and summarizing
of the material based on predefined criteria. Derived from the theoretical consider-
ations and the guiding research questions defined earlier, the three analytical di-
mensions were subsequently operationalized into three core structuring categories
for the qualitative content analysis we carried out for the news articles. For each cat-
egory a set of deductive analytical questions was used to identify the relevant con-
tent in the news texts (see Table 1).
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4 To identify relevant articles and based on the project instructions, we used the search
keywords “Polen”, “Polens”, “Pole”, “Polin”, “Polinnen”, “polnisch”, “polnische”, “pol-
nischer,” “polnisches”, “polnischem”, and “polnischen”.
Table 1
Structuring categories and analytical questions
for the qualitative content analysis
Category 1: VISIBILITY
Definition: This category aims at identifying the overall visibility of both EU presidency
and Poland in the analyzed samples, to lead to a better understanding of the actual impor-
tance of Poland in the news coverage.
Analytical questions:
1. Is the EU presidency and/or Poland a central or minor topic of the news article?
2. How is the overall appearance of the news article, i.e. what size does the article have, and
does it also include visual elements?
Category 2: COMPLEXITY
Definition: This category aims at defining the complexity of views on Poland in the context
of EU presidency-related content as provided in the two analyzed samples, in order to de-
fine the qualitative relevance and visibility of Poland in the news coverage.
Analytical questions:
1. What Polish actors present their views or comment on EU presidency-related topics in
the news coverage?
(i.e., how many opportunities were given to Polish actors to present Polish standpoints in
the context of the news coverage on the EU presidency and on what specific aspects)
2. What non-Polish actors present views or comment on EU presidency-related topics in the
news coverage?
(i.e., how many opportunities were given to non-Polish actors to present their views on
the discussed topics and/or the Polish presidency performance)
3. What additional statements on Poland or Polish actors are provided in the respective
articles?
(i.e., how much attention is paid to Poland and Polish actors beyond EU presi-
dency-related topics, and what facets are focused)
Category 3: EVALUATION
Definition: This category aims at defining how Poland is perceived and evaluated during
its presidency term, either in its performance as holder of the EU presidency or beyond that.
Analytical questions:
1. How do Polish actors quoted in the news coverage evaluate the Polish EU presidency
performance?
2. How do non-Polish actors quoted in the news coverage (or the news media themselves)
evaluate the Polish EU presidency performance, and do those “external” non-Polish eval-
uations differ from the “internal” Polish ones?
3. How is Poland evaluated beyond its EU presidency performance?
As Mayring (2003:92–95) defines it, Category 1 presents a scaling structuring
(skalierende Strukturierung) that defines scale points for the dimension visibility, ac-
cording to which the news articles were sub-classified. Categories 2 and 3 allowed
for a content structuring (inhaltliche Strukturierung) that extracted certain parts of
the overall news content and summarized it focusing on our outlined research ques-
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tion. By structuring the content of the articles based on those deductive categories
we were, on the one hand, able to reduce the complexity of the diverse articles to the
key questions we wanted to answer in this study. On the other hand, the method al-
lowed better comparison of the two country samples.5
Visibility of Poland in the German and Austrian news coverage
of the EU-Presidency
Altogether, we identified 795 newspaper articles in the analyzed Austrian print me-
dia for the focused on time frame, and 1,353 news items in the German print media.
As Table 2 outlines, additional references to the EU presidency were only identified
in 74 of the German and 57 of the Austrian articles. Distinguishing between the time
periods before, during and after the Polish EU presidency term, we saw that the
share of the overall publication output did not change significantly with the begin-
ning of the presidency term on July 1, 2011. Rather the opposite effect was observed:
In both countries, the share was highest in the pre-presidency period.6
Table 2
German and Austrian data samples
Number of articles Percentages7
German print media sample 1,353 (74*) 100 (5.5)
Austrian print media sample 795 (57*) 100 (7.2)
* Articles with References to Poland AND EU Presidency.
Thus overall, the news attention towards Poland in the context of the EU presi-
dency function has not significantly increased with the country’s takeover of the po-
sition. Also, the results indicate that both countries’ overall media perspective on
Poland was not centrally shaped by this role; over 90 percent of articles did not re-
late to it when taking Poland into view. Furthermore, in both Germany and Austria,
we also identified longer phases (e.g., in December 2011) with almost no news cov-
erage on the EU presidency when Poland was taken into view. However, a simple
counting of articles does not fully tell us whether or not the German or Austrian
news coverage actually focused on EU presidency and Poland in particular when
both terms appeared in a news item. To define this visibility, we need to look at the
articles’ content a bit closer.
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5 The analysis was carried by two coders. To test the intercoder reliability, we let both of
them analyze 10 articles based on the outlined analytical questions as a pre-test of the analy-
sis. We used the Holsti Reliability formula and measured a Holsti’s coefficient of 0.886. We
repeated the test after completion of the analysis and measured a congruence of 0.843.
6 For a more detailed analysis of quantitative aspect, see Wöhlert (2013a, 2013b).
7 Percentages refer to the share of the overall sample.
Is the EU Presidency and/or Poland a central or minor topic of the news articles?
To better define the actual visibility of Poland in the German and Austrian news
coverage related to the EU presidency also allows us to gain a better idea of whether
or not Poland actually received more attention due to the EU presidency term, or
whether it remained a side-kick actor in the news content referring to the EU presi-
dency. Articles in the Germany and Austrian news coverage could be distinguished
into four levels of relevance.
Table 3
Relevance of Poland and EU Presidency in news articles








1 Poland and EU presidency 16 3 13 0
2 Presidency 4 1 0 3
3 Poland 16 4 10 2
4 none 38 2 36 0
Austrian print media
1 Poland and EU presidency 13 2 11 0
2 Presidency 8 1 2 5
3 Poland 14 3 11 0
4 none 21 2 19 0
* Number of articles.
(1) Both the EU presidency and Poland are a central focus of the article. In
those articles, the central focus was put on Poland in its role as presidency holder.
Altogether, we find only 13 articles in the Austrian sample and 16 in the German
one that have this major focus, most of those being published in the time frame dur-
ing the Polish EU presidency term, while after the end of the term, none of those ar-
ticles was identified.
(2) The EU presidency is a central focus of the article, but Poland is only a mi-
nor focus. In those articles only the presidency itself received major attention, while
Poland remained only a side note. Other issues (or other countries of the EU such as
France, Greece or Germany) superposed the presidency news coverage, and Poland
was only mentioned as the current holder of the presidency. For the strategic ambi-
tion of gaining more attention from international media throughout the presidency
term, those articles would indicate that Poland was not successful in its attempt to
perform and sell itself in this position. However, only few articles in both country
samples fall into this set, the majority of which appeared after the end of the presi-
dency term. In those articles, Poland was indeed only a side note, since the presi-
154 Romy Wöhlert
dency topic was now connected to the next country of the rotation principle
(Denmark).
(3) The EU presidency is a minor focus of the article, but Poland is the major
focus. Those articles suggest that an increased attention is indeed granted to Po-
land, but other topics are more important in that context, while the EU presidency
may just be the trigger for the attention paid towards on Poland. Opposite to that, it
could mean also that Poland did not succeed to move beyond the topic that is fo-
cused on, despite being the holder of the EU presidency. In both country samples,
those articles were medium-frequent; most of them we identified during the presi-
dency term.
(4) Both the EU presidency and Poland are only a minor focus in the article.
Articles of this set revealed to have only a minor focus on both Poland and the EU
presidency, and instead focused on other topics, referring to both mentioned as-
pects only in a side-line. This was the case in a large number of articles of the Ger-
man and the Austrian sample, most of which were in addition found in the
timeframe during the Polish EU presidency. It supports the overall observation al-
ready made by Wöhlert (2013a, 2013b) that the Polish EU presidency was not a topic
of interest for the German and Austrian news coverage, and that Poland’s views
and actions were – at least to a significant extent – not visible in the German and
Austrian perception.
How is the overall appearance of the news articles?
But did the articles actually “catch the reader’s eye,” due to their size or because
they included one or more visual images (e.g., pictures, graphs) that may catch the
attention of readers and would make Poland as content of the article more visible?
Table 4a lists the categorization of all articles with regard to their size, while Table 4b











German print media 12* 43 14 5
Austrian print media** 9 28 14 4
* Number of articles.
** For 2 articles size not identifiable due to database problems.
The majority of the German and Austrian articles only filled about a quarter of
the respective newspaper page or less, but we also found a number of bigger arti-
cles, filling half a page or even more space. However, one has to note here, that arti-
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cles that could be considered as most relevant for our research interest – those that
put a central focus on Poland, the EU presidency, or even both aspects – were less
frequent and smaller in size. The medium and larger-sized articles often did not
have a central focus on Poland and/or the EU presidency, and often only briefly
mentioned the topic/country in a side note. Given that notion, the appearance of





















14* 2 8 0 50
Austrian
print media**
7 2 13 0 21
* Number of articles.
** For 13 articles information on visual images was not provided by the used databases.
The visibility of Poland also is not additionally supported by visual “eye-catch-
ers” in the respective articles. As Table 4b shows, a large number of articles in both
country samples did not include any visual images (in the German sample almost
75%), or only images that had no references to Poland.
Complexity of German and Austrian news coverage on Poland
in EU Presidency-related articles
To gain more insights into the way in which Poland was perceived in the analyzed
German and Austrian articles, in a second step we identified the complexity of the
Polish image in the context EU presidency-related news material, by answering
three questions:
What Polish voices on EU Presidency-related topics are presented in the news
coverage?
Our analysis showed that the variety of Polish actors that were provided space in the
German and Austrian news coverage to give statements on EU presidency-related
topics indicated that those voices were limited to the political level. Also, most of
those statements were identified in the timeframe during the Polish presidency
term and were made by Polish politicians (Table 5).
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Table 5
Polish voices on the EU Presidency in German and Austrian print media
German print media
Political actors Polish Prime minister Donald Tusk; Polish President Bronis³aw
Komorowski; Polish Minister for European Affairs Miko³aj Dowgie-
lewicz; Polish diplomats n.n.; Polish Minister of Finances Jacek Ros-
towski; Polish Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Marek
Sawicki; Polish Minister of Economy; Waldemar Pawlak; Polish oppo-
sition leader Jaros³aw Kaczyñski
Civil society actors Polish news media
Austrian print media
Political actors Polish Prime minister Donald Tusk; EU Secretary Adam Jasser; Polish
President Bronis³aw Komorowski; Polish Parliamentarian n.n.; Polish
Senate; Likas Abgarowicz; Polish Minister of Justice Krzysztof Kwiat-
kowski; Polish host of meeting Miko³aj Dowgielewicz; Spokesman Pol-
ish EU Presidency; former Polish President Aleksander Kwaœniewski
Civil society actors N.N. expert, Director Polish Institute for International Affairs, Marcin
Zaborowski; Private person with Polish origin (Letter to the editor)
Most often quoted was the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, not only be-
cause he gave the introductory speech on the Polish presidency term, which was
discussed in the news coverage, but also because in formal meetings on the EU
level, he was one of the main representatives of Poland as the holder of the EU
presidency. In the German media, Tusk was accompanied more frequently by
other Polish political officials than in the Austrian media, leading to a more com-
plex political spectrum of voices being noticed in the German perception. To a mi-
nor extent, both German and Austrian perspectives also included voices from
Polish civil society. In Germany, this included mainly the reporting media itself
stating views on Polish-related matters, while in Austria also other civil society ac-
tors were quoted.
The topic most often commented on by Polish actors in both the German and
Austrian sample was the European economic and financial crisis. This is obvious
since Poland fulfilled the role of an official spokesperson for EU matters during its
presidency term, and it was mainly in that context that Polish officials were quoted
(during EU meetings or after EU agreements etc.). Other EU-related topics Polish
actors commented on in both samples were EU foreign relations (among EU mem-
ber states), the EU enlargement topic (focusing in German media mainly of the ne-
gotiations of Ukraine, in Austrian those of Croatia), the general current situation
and state of the EU, the EU budget cohesion fond, the (future) Polish membership in
the Eurozone, Polish-German cooperation on EU matters (in the German media), or
the (foreign) EU policy of Austria (in Austrian media). Also addressed was the Pol-
ish definition of Europe, a topic that came up because Tusk significantly focused on
it in his inauguration speech. In both samples, most of those statements were identi-
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fied in the timeframe during the EU presidency, and we overall noticed a slightly
increased complexity of Polish voices during the presidency term, even though the
voices presented often came from re-occurring actors and not a broad range of dif-
ferent actors. Thus, from our observation we may conclude that the EU presidency
did lead to a slightly more complex perception of Poland in the German and Aus-
trian media appearance.
What non-Polish voices on EU Presidency-related topics are presented in the news
coverage?
In both country samples we also found non-Polish voices in the analyzed articles
(Table 6).
Table 6
Non-Polish voices addressing the Polish EU-Presidency performance
German print media
Political actors Former president Richard von Weizsäcker, Dalai Lama; Politicians in
Brussels n.n.
Civil society actors German and international news media; private person (letter to the
editor); and South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu
Austrian print media
Political actors EU parliamentarians
Civil society actors German Environmentalist group, political expert/observer, private
person (letter to the editor); Austrian news media themselves
However, we noticed that altogether the Polish role as EU president is not a central
focus in many articles. Therefore, only few quotes were identified in those articles
that commented on the Polish performance, while most statements we identified
addressed other EU-related topics (see section 5.1.), and here most prominently the
ongoing negotiations (e.g., bi-national meetings, EU summits etc.) in order to solve
the Eurocrisis. In the context of this news coverage, Poland was mostly a side-kick
to the actual debates, and most prominently EU “heavyweights” such as Germany,
France and Great Britain, or countries affected by the crisis, like Greece or Spain,
were commented on. Comments on the Polish performance mainly came from the
reporting news media themselves.
When we compare the variety of non-Polish actors providing views with those
of Polish actors, we see that the presentation was rather balanced. In both areas po-
litical actors were most often quoted, which is not surprising, because EU presi-
dency-related topics are usually located on a political level, and thus presented and
observed by actors from the political sphere. All in all, Polish voices were as com-
plex as the non-Polish, and thus successfully made it into the news content, where
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Polish (political) actors presented their views on the EU presidency position and
its tasks.
What additional statements on Poland or Polish actors are given in the news coverage
of EU Presidency-related topics?
The third question aimed at identifying how much attention was paid to Poland
beyond the topic “EU presidency” and what facets were taken into view here. For
both German and Austrian print media, our analysis revealed that indeed also
other aspects were reported on with regard to Poland in the context of EU presi-
dency-related articles. A major additional focus in both country samples was put
on Polish national peculiarities. Here, statements related to or gave insights into
the political situation in Poland (especially referring to the Polish national Parlia-
mentary elections that took place in September 2011), the Polish communist past,
the Polish economic situation, or Polish environment politics. Additionally, Po-
land was also perceived with regard to its international/bi-national relations, e.g.
with Germany (in the German media), with Austria (in the Austrian media), or
with non-EU neighboring countries (especially Ukraine, observing the Polish po-
sitions in EU-negotiations with the country; a topic mainly focused on in German
news media).
Thus, beyond the EU presidency and related topics, we found a broader and
slightly more complex observation of Poland in the context of some of the articles in
both country samples. The overall image and perception of Poland was not solely
one-dimensional, i.e. focusing only on the EU political level, but also, Polish voices
on EU topics and beyond were found in the German and Austrian news coverage.
Throughout the presidency term, both the German and Austrian perception of Po-
land was complex, even though this complexity did not necessarily increase with
the beginning of the presidency term. Also, the strong focus on Polish national is-
sues during the presidency may have been caused by the national Parliamentary
elections that took place in Poland in September 2011. Thus, our observations
should be compared with other timeframes to decide whether the identified com-
plexity is an effect of the EU presidency position or not.
Evaluation of Polish EU Presidency and Poland in EU Presidency-related
articles
Last but not least, in order to identify whether or not the Polish EU Presidency term
helped the country to present itself successfully as a competent and important EU
actor on the European political arena, we took a closer look at the way in which both
German and Austrian print media evaluated the country, in general and with re-
gard to its performance as holder of the EU Presidency. The identification of this me-
dia evaluation allows for a conclusion on whether or not the country’s ambitions to
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use the presidency term to enhance the own national image in the EU were success-
ful. Here, again three questions were analyzed:
How do Polish actors in the news coverage evaluate the Polish EU Presidency
performance?
The integration of the Polish perspective in the overall news coverage indicates
whether German and Austrian media offer its readers a broad spectrum of eval-
uations on that question, thereby including also the position of the EU presi-
dency holder. This self-observation becomes interesting when we compare it in
the next section with the external evaluations provided by non-Polish voices.
With this comparison we can reveal, whether Poland may be perceived as a “re-
alistic observer of EU politics” or whether its own perspective deviates signifi-
cantly from that of the other EU members, indicating that the country might not
have reached the level of political skills needed to observe and implement EU
politics successfully.
In the German news coverage, the quoted Polish actors evaluated the own EU
presidency term predominantly neutral or positive, especially in the beginning of
the term. Poland defined itself as pro-European, and the major ambitions pointed
out frequently by Polish actors were to unify the EU again in light of the disputes
over the Eurocrisis and to secure the political stability of the union. Poland offered
itself to be the spearhead for leading the EU through this crisis during its presidency
term. Another central topic was the European relation with Ukraine.8 Overall, the
Polish self-presentation in the news coverage was ambitious and very engaged in
European issues.
Also in the Austrian news coverage, quoted Polish actors evaluated the own
EU Presidency term predominantly neutral or as a success. A number of the given
quotes referred to the function and the actual “power frame” that the position of-
fers for its respective holder. As in the German news coverage, in the beginning of
the term, Polish actors were committed to and enthusiastic about the presidency,
but we also found statements expressing slight hesitance and humbleness with re-
gard to the tasks that the country will face. Voices also argued that Poland knows
that it will not be able to “change the world” in the six months of its presidency
term. During the term, quoted Polish voices stayed enthusiastic but also slightly
more realistic and pragmatic with regard to the position, doubting that the own
set goals are all achievable. Polish views and concluding evaluations towards
the Polish presidency term were not identified in the German and Austrian news
coverage.
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8 The country struggled with internal political turmoil over the arrest and law suits against
the politician Timoschenko at that time, which was highly criticized by the EU; here Poland
saw itself as an inter-mediator between both sides.
How do non-Polish actors in the news coverage evaluate the Polish EU Presidency
performance?
Non-Polish voices in the German news coverage were slightly more critical in their
evaluation of the Polish EU presidency performance than in the Austrian news cov-
erage, which reflected a more neutral and distant perception. Altogether, voices in
both country samples were predominantly identified during the presidency term,
mainly in the beginning, in German print media also towards the end of the presi-
dency term.
In both country samples, in the beginning of its term, Poland was perceived as
ambitious and self-confident in its position, and was praised in particular for its
self-acclaimed goal to use its presidency term to re-unite the union in view of the
Eurocrisis and the political as well as economic disputes that have arisen from this
crisis. Based on the inauguration speech of Polish Prime Minister Tusk, which was
very well received, Poland was also positively perceived for its self-acclaimed
“commitment to Europe” and for its diplomatic and pragmatic approach as current
holder of the EU presidency, especially in times of political and economic turmoil
causes by the Eurocrisis. In both country samples, Poland was portrayed as being
un-agitated and realistic in its evaluation of its own capacities to carry out the set
tasks and achieve the own goals. However, it was also mentioned that the country
faces difficult tasks, and that despite being self-confident, Poland is a rather power-
less and insignificant political player in the EU arena.
This view was increasingly adapted throughout the presidency term. In the Aus-
trian newspapers, voices more frequently pointed out that Poland faces a difficult
tasks (especially because of the Eurocrisis). It was increasingly doubted that the
country would be able to achieve all its goals set to achieve in its own presidency
term. In the German sample, this perspective was also adapted, even though voices
and views presented here also pointed out that the country acts rather tactically
based on its own interests that are not always compatible with EU interests (or even
more so, with interests of the “major EU players” such as Germany, France, or UK).
The major EU topics referred to here were EU environment politics (here a dispute
was seen between the German and the Polish position), or the EU negotiations over
the Stability and Growth Pact. Concluding evaluations towards the end the Polish
presidency term were that Poland is a rather powerless EU member state and its im-
pacts were less successful than planned. Starting out with high ambitions for its
own term, Poland remained unsuccessful to achieve most of its own set goals (like
other countries before).
Thus, one major topic addressed by non-Polish voices was whether or not the
presidency position in general has any impact. It was frequently mentioned in the
quotes, that countries (not just Poland) may have good intentions, ambitions and an
overall good approach, but that those goals and objectives are rarely fulfilled, espe-
cially not when the respective country does not have a high power status among EU
member states. Also, other high-ranking issues (especially the Eurocrisis) over-
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shadowed the Polish presidency term significantly and were in both countries’
news coverage also seen as the major “stumbling block” for the country’s successful
performance. Here, Poland was positively evaluated for not striving for overambi-
tious goals but remaining pragmatic.
Altogether, the Polish and non-Polish voices in both German and Austrian news
perspectives did not contradict each other, but the Polish voices we traced in the
news coverage implicitly support the evaluation that was given of the Polish presi-
dency performance by non-Polish voices. It was more the power and potential in-
fluence of the position itself that was blamed for the failure of the Polish ambitions
and goals for its presidency term.
How is Poland evaluated beyond its EU Presidency performance?
Beyond the country’s performance as holder of the EU Presidency, articles in both
German and Austrian print media also voiced additional evaluations of Poland,
hereby addressing different issues or thematic areas: With regard to the Polish eco-
nomic situation, it was pointed out in several articles that Poland has a strong, dy-
namic and growing economy, and should be taken as a role model for other EU
countries, especially in view of the current Eurocrisis (e.g., for the way it dealt with
its own threat of state bankruptcy in 1989). Voices stated that the country almost
meets the Maastrich criteria for Euro and has benefitted from EU subventions.
However, in the German context it was also pointed out in two articles, that this sta-
bility was also achieved because if the help of the EU (here referring to the Stability
and Growth Pact again).
With regard to the Polish political situation, both German and Austrian press in-
cluded voiced positively emphasizing that the country had overcome its internal
turmoil caused by pro- and anti-EU political forces (Lech Kaczyñski era) and now
had a solid pro-EU government under Tusk, which was also seen as a political im-
provement towards a now more realistic, diplomatic and efficient foreign and EU
policy. Several voices pointed out that the country was now a stable democracy
(compared to its Communist past), and Poland was referred to as a spearhead in
fighting communist dictatorship. Also highlighted were the positive relations Po-
land has now established with Germany (mainly in German but also in Austrian
news coverage), and that Poland serves as an important inter-mediator between the
EU and non-EU countries in Eastern Europe such as Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus.
On a critical note, in both country samples a number of statements critically
commented on the Polish environment politics. Here, it was argued that the country
is quarrelsome and blocks EU and international agreements for the improved use of
environmental-friendly energy sources and the shutdown of nuclear power plants.
Especially in the German sample this was criticized by quoted actors, because Ger-
many holds contrary positions to the Polish policy (e.g., supporting the long-term
strategy of an EU-wide shutdown of nuclear power plants in favor of other regener-
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ative energy sources). Here, actors critically remarked that the Polish national inter-
ests might not be compatible with the country’s acclaimed effort as EU presidency
holder to unite the EU.
Altogether, those perceptions did not fully differ from the evaluations of the Pol-
ish EU presidency performance, and they were also not contradictory. Neverthe-
less, we did find critical voices here, as well. This was especially the case in the
German news coverage, which overall was slightly more critical than the Austrian
one.
The Polish EU Presidency in the German and Austrian news coverage
– a summary
Our analysis showed that the overall perspectives on Poland and its performance as
holder of the EU presidency were rather similar in both German and Austrian press
news coverage. First and foremost, in both countries, the publication output on the
EU presidency of Poland was rather small. Both aspects were also predominantly
not the central focus in news articles. Often, news items rather reported about
events or actions carried out in the scope of this position. Thus, Poland was only mi-
nor visible in EU presidency-related articles in both country samples during the
term. Also, neither the bi-national relations of both Germany and Austria with Po-
land nor both countries’ relation with the EU did significantly increase or decrease
the visibility of Poland in the German and Austrian news coverage, despite the fact
that during that 6-month period Poland hosted a number of EU events and meet-
ings (that were reported on but not by also taking into a closer view the host of those
events).
The 6-month period of the presidency did also not lead to a significant increase
in the complexity and composition of the Austrian and German news coverage of
Poland in EU presidency-related contexts; even though our analysis did show that
the perception of the country was not one-dimensional. Both countries’ print media
not only quoted a variety of Polish actors and their views on EU politics and issues,
but also included additional information on Polish issues (e.g., Polish politics, econ-
omy, or foreign relations) and Polish views beyond EU presidency-related topics.
This observation supports the preliminary theoretical assumptions that bi-national
historical, economic, political, or cultural relations, as well as cultural or geographic
proximity are also crucial factors that influence newsworthiness. That both German
and Austrian print media show interest in additional features about Poland in the
context of EU presidency-related content may be due to the fact, that both countries
have close economic ties with Poland, a close geographical proximity to the country,
or a close social proximity (i.e., cultural transfer, number of Polish immigrants).
What did change throughout the presidency term, however, was the evaluation
of Poland. Here, based on our theoretical assumptions we would argue that this is
also caused the German and Austrian relations with the EU and the fact that all
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three countries – Germany, Austria and Poland – are members of the same “EU
family.” Especially the Eurocrisis here marks a special threat to this collective en-
tity, because of the financial problems, the political disputes and the economic de-
pendencies that were caused with it. Those issues threatened and still threaten the
cohesion of the “EU family,” and in the analyzed news coverage, this major issue
(for all three countries) overshadowed the perspective on Poland in the context of
its EU presidency.
Nevertheless, our study showed that the evaluations of Poland in EU presi-
dency-related content were rather neutral or even positive. Only few articles in-
cluded explicitly negative or ambivalent evaluations. Thus, altogether the overall
perception of Poland was not one-sided, and thus its overall performance was not
perceived as a complete failure. However, despite those more complex or even posi-
tive views, the presidency did not lead to an increased relevance of and interest for
Poland and Polish issues in the German or Austrian media perception. All in all, the
Polish performance was portrayed as not achieving many of the self-set goals, but
the fault for this failure was not primarily seen to lie with the country itself, but with
external issues such as the Eurocrisis.
In addition to that, the own relationship with and political standing in the EU
had a significant influence on the news context in which the perception of Poland
was embedded in both German and Austrian press: In Germany, the overall news
coverage was centered around the own obligations and performances on the Euro-
pean stage. Articles reported much stronger about the own alignments, negotia-
tions and positions, that of other crucial EU players such as France and Great
Britain, or of countries strongly affected by the Eurocrisis. This clearly interfered
with and also overshadowed the Polish presidency news coverage and the percep-
tion of the same in German print media. In Austria, the Eurocrisis has further in-
creased the Austrian skepticism with regard to EU matters, and this skepticism also
reflected in the news coverage throughout the timeframe of the Polish EU presi-
dency term. This focus pushed Poland as the presidency holder out of the limelight,
while Austrian media (and political debates) focused on EU-related topics in rela-
tion to Austria and to countries that led the negotiations over bailout plans etc. (e.g.,
Germany, or France).
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Reporting on the Polish Presidency of the EU Council
Introduction
Although international institutions and transnational governments have unmistak-
ably played a prominent role in the global and local politics of recent years, Euro-
pean Union politics and governance have been and are still perceived by its citizens
as remote and abstract (Blumler, 1983; Cini & Borragán, 2013). News coverage of
EU-related events and topics in the media, suggested by recent studies as providing
the most important link between politics and citizens (Entman & Bennett, 2001),
could play a key role in the representation of the European Union and the further in-
tegration of its central government and its member states.
Acknowledging the importance of these dynamics, cross-national and longitu-
dinal comparative research on the media coverage of EU-related news has gained
an increasing interest and momentum, but are still rare. The findings of these analy-
ses indicate that news coverage of EU affairs is cyclical, peaking around key events
(de Vreese et al., 2001; Norris, 2000). Trenz (2004), for one, argues that a European
mediated public sphere has emerged. While Leroy and Siune (1994) suggest a ten-
dency to domesticate EU-related news and hence make it more relevant and ap-
pealing to local audiences, Peter, Semetko & de Vreese (2003) conclude that this is
not the case. They argue that these different findings may be the result of the fact
that the study by Leroy and Siune (1994) analyzed news during a key event, while
they focused on news coverage during a routine period. As the visibility of EU
news has increased overall (Boomgaarden et al., 2012), there is little consensus on
the status of European integration. Peter and de Vreese (2004:3) thus conclude that
“[…] the Europeanization of television news coverage is more an illusion than
reality.”
Regardless of its outcome, the body of scholarly work on the news coverage of
EU affairs is generally focused on the EU as an intergovernmental institution. While
it does provide a clear view on the coverage of EU-related events in its respective
member states, it largely remains ignorant of the particular flows of news in be-
tween the member states of the EU. The latter is the main concern of the quantitative
content analysis that we will present in this book chapter. In order to contextualize
and deepen the findings from the quantitative study, the chapter further draws on
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a brief qualitative analysis. Here, the focus lies on the represented image of Poland
and the Presidency of the EU council in Belgian print media.
Media coverage of the Polish EU Presidency in Flanders
The following study provides insight into the media coverage of the Polish EU Pres-
idency in the region of Flanders, the Dutch-speaking Northern part of the EU
founding member Belgium.
For the quantitative content analysis, our scope is narrowed to three Flemish me-
dia sources: the broadsheet De Standaard, the popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws
and the weekly magazine Knack. The denotation of “popular newspaper” is not to
be equated with the concept of a “tabloid”: while Het Laatste Nieuws does provide
more coverage of topics related to sports and human interest, it still operates within
the margins of “midmarket” dailies by providing news reporting of political and
socio-economic subjects and by appealing to a broad spectrum of the different social
categories within the newspaper audience (De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2007). We col-
lected the data by using the Mediargus database, an online search tool for archived
newspaper articles, enabling us to search for references relevant in the context of
this study. We used the keywords Polen, Pool, Pools and Poolse. These are the Dutch
translations of the search terms Poland, Pole, Polish (male conjugation), and Polish
(female conjugation). We restricted the scope of our search to three six week peri-
ods: these three six week periods covered data respectively from June 15, 2011 to
July 31, 2011; from September 1, 2011 to October 15, 2011; and from December 1, 2011
to January 15, 2012. We gathered 735 news articles in total after inspection and dele-
tion of duplicates. After the collection of the data, we followed up with a quantita-
tive statistical analysis of the news articles by applying standard SPSS statistical
tools. We have coded the news items based on an aggregated codebook, containing
sixteen variables, which had been distributed to the research teams that partici-
pated in the comparative study.
To complement the quantitative study, we have conducted a qualitative analysis
of a larger sample of news articles. We have opted for an inductive or ‘conventional’
qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) with articles as our basic units
of analysis. After the initial coding stage, the data were compared and further ana-
lyzed in several cycles. Taken the specific Flemish context into account, three dis-
tinct thematic categories emerged from the data: politics, culture and stereotypes.
With regard to the corpus for the qualitative research, we have expanded the initial
sample in terms of observed media and time period. Next to De Standaard, Het
Laatste Nieuws and Knack, we selected articles on the Polish Presidency that were
published in two other Flemish newspapers (the up-market De Morgen, and the
popular newspaper Het Nieuwsblad) while expanding the time frame to a six-month
period of 15 June 2011 till 17 January 2012. In total 28 articles explicitly dealt with the
EU Presidency of Poland. In accordance with the findings from the quantitative re-
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search, the quality newspapers published most articles, that is ten each. Our sample
consisted of traditional news articles as well as of some columns and more personal
accounts by journalists who for instance went on a ‘road trip’ through Poland as
part of a feature on the EU Presidency.
Results of the quantitative content analysis
News media and size of the news item
Let us first turn to a brief discussion of the origin and size of the coded news articles
(n=735). Out of the 735 articles, 479 articles or 65% of the data set originated from the
popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws, while 205 articles or 27.9% of the items were
published in the broadsheet De Standaard. Only 51 news items or 6.9% were gath-
ered from Knack. These numbers are easily explained by pointing out that, in con-
trast to De Standaard and Het Laatste Nieuws, Knack is a magazine published on
a weekly basis which severely limits its ability to report news at the same frequency
as the selected newspapers. Furthermore, we would like to address attention to the
anecdotal observation that only one of all 735 coded articles appeared on the front
page of one of the selected sources (i.e. De Standaard).
Table 1













De Standaard 205 618.5317 566.67349 39.57819 540.4969 696.5665 52.00 3006.00
Het Laatste
Nieuws
479 304.7349 250.76391 11.45770 282.2212 327.2485 .00 2883.00
Knack 51 1049,4314 909.97176 127.42153 793.4977 1305.3651 35.00 3265.00
Total 735 443.9293 482.94778 17.81380 408.9572 478.9013 .00 3265.00
Table 2
One-way ANOVA for size of news articles
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 34228569.440 2 17114284.720 91.464 .000
Within Groups 136968528.881 732 187115.477
Total 171197098.321 734
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Table 3
Posthoc Scheffe test for size of news articles













Het Laatste Nieuws 313.79684* 36.10258 .000 225.2457 402.3480
Knack –430.89967* 67.68818 .000 –596.9228 –264.8765
Het Laatste
Nieuws
De Standaard –313.79684* 36.10258 .000 –402.3480 –225.2457
Knack –744.69651* 63.71474 .000 –900.9737 –588.4193
Knack De Standaard 430.89967* 67.68818 .000 264.8765 596.9228
Het Laatste Nieuws 744.69651* 63.71474 .000 588.4193 900.9737
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Using the size of the news articles as an indicator for the extensiveness of the
news reporting, we are able to discern whether or not Knack is able to compensate
for its limited frequency of coverage by providing a more in-depth analysis. The
means of news article size for Het Laatste Nieuws (m=305), De Standaard (m=619) and
Knack (m=1049) were analyzed using ANOVA (p<.05) and results of the analysis
showed a significant difference between groups (F(2)=91,464 and p=.00). A posthoc
Scheffe test (p<.05) was then performed to evaluate all possible pair-wise compari-
sons among means, showing significant results between all three news sources’
means (p=.00). In summary, data suggest that Knack significantly provides a more
in-depth analysis, compensating for its limited coverage. However, due to a great
difference in variance, an inaccuracy of the observed results have to be taken into
consideration.
The EU-Presidency relevance
Second, we analyzed the relevancy of the news coverage of the EU-Presidency of
Poland. The results of our analysis showed a severely low frequency of news items
related to the EU-Presidency of Poland: no less than twelve or 1.6% of all articles
were coded as relevant. To contextualize, this low number corresponds to the re-
search findings of a Flemish study performed by Joye (2010) which indicated that
only 0.98% of all foreign and international news concerned Poland over the period
1986 till 2006, illustrating the dominant Eurocentric focus of Flemish newspapers.
Of these twelve relevant articles, only one item was published by Het Laatste Nieuws,
while Knack and De Standaard respectively covered four and seven news items.
Moreover, of these twelve articles six were coded as published within the first sev-
enteen days of the first six week period (i.e. between June 15, 2011 and July 1, 2011).
The timeframe coincides with the anticipation prior to the Polish EU-Presidency ef-
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fectuating on July 1, 2011. This observation could be interpreted as an illustration of
the tendency of Western news media to focus on big news stories when covering
foreign news (Hafez, 2007) and it illustrates the cyclical nature of news coverage on
EU-related events (de Vreese et al., 2001; Norris, 2000). However, due to the very
low frequency of relevant news items, it should be taken into consideration that this
measurement may as well be incidental. Furthermore, in those items coded as rele-
vant to the EU-presidency, Poland’s main role was mentioned mostly as an EU
member. The distribution for the size of the articles within the selected relevant
news items was analyzed and showed that five out of twelve of these articles did
not surpass the limit of 500 words per article.
Genre
After our investigation of relevancy, we broaden our scope back to the entire corpus
of 735 articles. Concerning genre, the data set showed that 492 or 66.9% of all items
were coded as news articles, while 20.8% and 5.4% were coded respectively as
reportages and interviews. These shares are similar for Het Laatste Nieuws and De
Standaard, while a smaller amount of news articles in favor of a greater focus on in-
terviews can be observed for Knack.
Table 4







Guest contribution 13 1.8
Interview 40 5.4
Letter to editor 7 1.0
Other 8 1.1
Total 735 100.0
Visual elements and relevance of visual elements to Poland
Furthermore, all news articles were analyzed for the presence of visual elements in
the coverage. Out of all articles, 378 or 51.4% contained a picture, while 321 articles
or 43.7% did not carry any visual elements at all. Only 62 or 8.4% of all news items
contained visual elements that are relevant to our object of inquiry, the Polish
EU-Presidency.
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Author of news and author of opinion
The next variable for which the news articles were coded, is the author of the item.
For this variable, a distinction was made between author of news and author of
opinion. News articles previously coded as news and reportages for the genre vari-
able were categorized as ‘news material’ and analyzed via the ‘author of news’ vari-
able, whereas the items coded as all other genres – except for the genre ‘other’
– were categorized as ‘not news material’ and analyzed using the ‘author of opin-
ion’ variable. The analysis of this latter category showed that the different authors
of opinion were somewhat equally distributed across the news items, the exception
being national experts who accounted for 35.4% of the articles categorized as ‘not
news material’. For those articles classified as ‘news material’, the results were re-
markably different: 95% of all news items had staff members identified as the au-
thors of news, which is a logical consequence of the distribution across the variable
for source of information. The latter proved to be problematic as 591 or 80.4% of the
coded items did not mention its original source, preferring to cite the full name or
initials of the news item contributor. Moreover, in 5% of the cases no source at all
was mentioned.
Dominant topic area
All items were coded to discern exactly one dominant topic throughout the news ar-
ticle; the most recurring ones being sports (38.8%), justice and crime (15.5%), and
culture (12.4%). When comparing the distribution of dominant topics across the se-
lected news sources, results showed that Het Laatste Nieuws accounted for 82.5% of
all sports articles and for 78.1% of all justice and crime articles. These results corre-
spond with Het Laatste Nieuws’ profile as a popular newspaper in particular and the
increasing tendency of tabloidization in general (De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2007).
For the dominant topic of culture, most articles were gathered from De Standaard:
this broadsheet newspaper accounted for 40 or 44% of the articles, while Knack and
Het Laatste Nieuws accounted for 25.3% and 30.8%, respectively. When narrowing
our scope to the dominant topics recurring in the news articles related to the Polish
EU-Presidency, we observe that six out of twelve articles have recourse to culture
and four out of twelve items have to do with international politics. This is an inter-
esting observation, as it demonstrates that even when news articles are considered
relevant to the EU-Presidency of Poland, they are not necessarily political in nature
but rather cultural (cf. infra).
Domestication and dateline
We coded and analyzed the data for dateline and domestication, two variables
closely related to one another. The most frequently recurring dateline was Belgium,
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which was mentioned in 453 news articles or 61.6% of the sample. A noticeable gap
was observed between this and the next dateline; namely Poland, which accounted
for 14% of the news items. Focusing on the domestication variable, we are able to
discern that 628 or 85.4% of all news articles made an explicit reference to national
or domestic issues and persons. This finding is consistent with previous studies on
foreign and international news reporting in Flemish media (cf. Joye, 2010) which
have all identified the broad concept of proximity as a key news value that deter-
mines the selection process and the amount of attention that is devoted to the event.
Table 5
Descriptives for domestication of news articles
Strategies Frequency Percent
Explicit reference to nationals 628 85.4
Explicit reference to impact 5 0.7
Reference to nationals and visual elements 3 0.4
No 99 13.5
Total 735 100.0
Main role of and attitude towards Poland
Finally, a short word on the role of and the attitude towards Poland in the analyzed
news items. Only in eight out of 735 items or 1.1% was Poland mentioned as an EU
member. Furthermore, Poland was only cited as the host of an EU-related meeting
in two news articles. Nearly every news item, accounting for 98.4%, was coded as
‘other’ regarding attitude toward Poland. This does not imply a neutral attitude,
but rather a complete absence of any subjectivity in news reporting on Poland or its
EU Presidency.
In the next section of the paper, we will present findings of the qualitative con-
tent analysis and focus on the three distinct thematic categories that emerged from
the data: politics, culture and stereotypes.
Findings of the qualitative content analysis
Politics and the Polish Presidency
Although one would logically expect that political themes and issues are the domi-
nant perspective in the news coverage of the EU Presidency, this was clearly not the
case. Only thirteen articles had a clear and sole political interest, just as many as the
culturally oriented articles. In addition and in terms of the country’s reputation, the
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politically oriented articles did not sketch a very positive image of Poland. There
were a number of reasons for this. First of all, Poland did not start off that well in
July 2011 with the country being the only one to prevent the unanimous endorse-
ment by the 27 European Union countries of a strategy document that would
strengthen the EU’s climate change policy. Later on, several articles in the Flemish
news media referred to this action and some journalists defined it as “a misstep” or
“a lack of solidarity”. Secondly, the same situation of an isolated Poland against the
rest of the EU occurred again in September 2011 when Poland invited the USA Min-
ister of Finance, Timothy Geithner, to attend an informal meeting on the Eurozone.
Other European ministers were quoted as being “not amused” with this surprise
visit, resulting in some sharp-tongued reactions. One Flemish journalist euphemis-
tically described the incident as follows: “Host country Poland has not left the best
impression with this solo act.” Moreover, the good relationship between Warsaw
and Washington was explicitly mentioned on other occasions as well, with some in-
sinuations on the influence of the USA over Poland and, henceforth, implicitly por-
traying Poland as a USA ‘puppet’ rather than as an independent and strong
political actor. A third element popped up in December 2011 as part of the enduring
Euro-crisis. Flemish journalists perceived an apparent emergence of an anti-Euro-
pean sentiment among the countries of the ‘New Europe’ (the former So-
viet-countries), including Poland who has decided to postpone the introduction of
the Euro to 2015. One article titled: “New Europe falls out of love with the Euro!”
Except for the latter issue, what is however noteworthy with these incidents is that
their relevance is always downplayed or minimized by repeatedly stating that “It is
Poland’s first time as president of the Union,” thus stressing the country’s inexperi-
ence as a valid explanation and simultaneously eliciting a sense of empathy or for-
giveness. So while the actual events and their coverage casted a rather negative
light over the chairing country, there was also a significant discursive counter prac-
tice in Flemish news media that reduced the impact of the political incidents on the
country’s image and reputation.
Another remarkable observation concerns the absence of Poland – as the EU’s
chairing country – in Europe’s key political discussions at the time, most notably the
debate on the financial crisis. The above mentioned incidents are substantially high-
lighted by the Flemish press, but when moving beyond that, Poland was only men-
tioned once in the coverage of political meetings. In line with this, there was almost
no attention for the other goals and objectives that Poland announced at the begin-
ning of its Presidency, except for the discussions on the budget of the EU. The topics
of defense and an opening up towards the East were (briefly) mentioned in news re-
ports at the start of the Presidency in July, however, they failed to attract much fol-
low-up news. In terms of attention devoted to the political activities and initiatives
of Poland, the data identify a clear bias towards the more sensational and negative.
In conclusion for the political dimension of the Presidency, the overall evalua-
tion of Poland’s Presidency was not very positive. At the start of the Presidency, one
Flemish journalist openly wondered whether Poland would be able to have an im-
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pact on the political level. He seriously doubted it, but immediately added that Po-
land’s opportunities to make an impact and potentially adjust its image were not to
be found at the political level, but rather at the cultural. Given the above discussed
political ‘track record’ of Poland as the EU’s chairing country and our findings with
regard to the cultural dimension (cf. infra), our data certainly confirm this.
If not political, then a cultural Presidency?
The qualitative content analysis exposed a dominant cultural frame in the Flemish
news reporting on the Polish Presidency. One journalist called it “Poland’s true flag-
ship,” underlining the cultural legacy and richness as the country’s natural asset or
strength while others identified the focus on culture as part of a clever – yet expen-
sive – marketing plan with the purpose of branding Poland as “a modern nation
with a rich culture and as the creative hub between East and West.” Spearheading
this campaign of more than 400 events in merely six months was the ‘I, Culture’ pro-
gram that featured several expositions in different world cities, including Brussels,
Paris, London and New York. The Flemish newspapers and weekly mainly focused
on the exposition in Brussels but different articles gave a very elaborated outline of
the diversity of Polish culture: music (e.g. with composers such as Frederic Chopin
– although all articles began with stating that there is more than just Chopin –, Karol
Szymanowski and Krzysztof Penderecki); literature (e.g. Czes³aw Mi³osz and
Adam Zagajewski); theatre (e.g. Stanis³aw Lem and Krzysztof Warlikowski); cin-
ema (e.g. Roman Polañski); and fine arts (e.g. Henryk Sta¿ewski). The general eval-
uation of the cultural component of Poland’s Presidency was very positive as
Flemish journalists used characteristics such as “high quality”, “rich”, “world class”,
“willful and rebellious”, “top of the bill composer”, “international allure”, “innovators”, …
thus stressing the country’s high-quality cultural capital.
It was interesting to notice that quite a few newspaper articles linked the cultural
efforts and qualities of Poland to its particular (political) history and the prevailing
stereotypes about the country (cf. infra). Art and culture were portrayed as a re-
sponse and a form of resistance to these deeply embedded clichés as well as to polit-
ical, religious and conservative forces from the past and the present. The ‘I, Culture’
project for instance was aimed at improving the relationship between the EU and
the former Soviet countries. Other cultural projects were part of a broader campaign
to improve Poland’s overall image (cf. infra). A related side-effect of these cultural
efforts was the profiling of Poland as a tourist destination. Several articles promoted
cities such as Warsaw and Cracow as trendy, nearby and budget-friendly locations
for shopping, sightseeing and – of course – culture.
In short, the Presidency was basically seen as the lever to accomplish the above,
a unique opportunity to showcase cultural Poland to the rest of Europe and the
world. One final example of this successful strategy was the fact that only one
website was mentioned in all the Flemish news coverage of the EU Presidency, that
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is www.poolsecultuur.eu (translation: www.polishculture.eu). As one journalist
stated: “Poland decisively seized the opportunity of the EU Presidency with both
hands to make its culture more known across the globe.” On a long term and with
the selection of Wroc³aw as one of the European capitals of culture in 2016, not a bad
strategic choice to make.
Stereotypes: the persistent perception of Poland in Belgium/Flanders
A final category of news articles dealt with some comments and opinions by Flem-
ish journalists who have traveled through Poland and presented an “insider’s
look”. These articles mainly tackled the prevailing stereotypes and clichés that Bel-
gians hold true about Poland and Polish people. From the three categories that we
have discerned, this is the one that explains most about the nature and roots of the
dominant image of Poland in Belgium. This is achieved through some inward ori-
ented news articles, thriving on (personal) experiences of the journalists and on
standard media representations of Poland as well as on historical accounts and ob-
jective facts.
Let us first turn to the issue of stereotypes. Drawing on different articles, the fol-
lowing stereotypes about Polish people clearly featured the most in the Flemish
news media: cheap labor force (cleaning ladies, construction workers, …), conser-
vative, very religious and vodka minded people. One article, however, referred to
some far more negative elements of the overall Polish image; internet brides, car
scams, mafia, prostitution and widespread corruption. These were all explicitly
mentioned in a minority of articles. Implicitly, almost all other articles also referred
to some standard ‘mental’ images in relation to Poland. These discursive frames
were present in a more latent way, but they directed the reader to three additional
elements of Poland’s image or identity abroad – as perceived and reconstructed by
the journalists of course. The first one deals with the holocaust, the second World
War and the ambiguous position of Polish people towards Jews during these
events. This is mainly represented through the image of Auschwitz. Second, the
“gray” communist period, the Solidarnoœæ movement and the subsequent transi-
tion to democracy and free market, leading to a new norm of commercialism and
‘bourgeoisie’ was a very dominant narrative. Third, some journalists refer to lead-
ing historical personalities within Polish society: Frederic Chopin and Karol
Wojty³a are frequently mentioned. The latter of course links up with the stereotype
of Poland as a very religious country. Also in the context of culture, a lot of Flemish
journalists overtly referred to these three (historical) elements of Polish identity as
the artistic fuel and inspiration for many works of art. In general, Poland is often ar-
ticulated as a nostalgic country (“têsknota”) that is characterized by a deep duality
as manifested by its glorious yet also troubled history. Or in the words of one jour-
nalist: “Poland has once been called God’s playground as well as the devil’s dance
floor.”
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Two news reports clearly indicate that the Polish government is very aware of
these stereotypes and perceptions of its identity abroad as the articles report on the
appointment of a Flemish ‘spin doctor’, Thomas Vanhauwaert, by the Polish em-
bassy in Belgium. His main task is “to clean up the image of Poland.” Vanhauwaert
was quoted saying that “the EU Presidency is a unique opportunity to attract atten-
tion to the country” and he suggested that the best way to improve the image is to
promote the rich Polish culture. Echoing our second thematic category, Poland’s
culture is obviously set forth as the best way to take care of the negative perceptions.
Afinal note concerns the newspapers. Given the more sensational and human inter-
est nature of the stereotypes, it was no surprise that almost all articles by popular news-
papers focused on these aspects of the Polish image during the Presidency. The quality
press also devoted some attention to these stereotypes, but their approach was very dif-
ferent. They did not just focus on the prevailing stereotypes, but they qualified and
contextualized them by drawing attention to the roots of these clichés.
Conclusions
The aforementioned results of the quantitative and qualitative content analysis en-
able us to get a clearer picture of the news flow on the Polish EU Presidency from
Poland to Belgium as well as of Poland’s image or reputation as perceived and con-
structed by Flemish news media journalists.
Most importantly, we have observed that the analyzed news sample has devoted
little attention to the Polish EU Presidency. Moreover, the coverage on this topic is
concentrated around the Polish EU Presidency coming to effect. News items rele-
vant to the EU Presidency of Poland were limited in size and did not provide a fo-
cused analysis, favoring objective news reporting with absence of a discernible
attitude towards Poland. Remarkably, articles relevant to the Presidency were not
necessarily political of nature: in half of the cases the dominant topic of the news
items was culture. The qualitative content analysis also pointed towards a signifi-
cant and even defining discursive role of Poland’s rich culture in Flemish news cov-
erage of the Presidency. Taking into consideration the entire sample set of articles,
the topics of sports, culture, and justice and crime dominate the news output. This
may be explained by the origin of the sampled news articles: two thirds of all arti-
cles originate from the popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws, which has been
shown to favor coverage of these news genres. Our analysis further serves as a con-
temporary illustration of the often cited dynamics of domestication of foreign news
(Gurevitch et al., 1991).
Drawing on the findings from both the quantitative and qualitative content analy-
sis, the chapter essentially argues that Poland did not succeed in positioning itself as
a major political actor within the European context. Flemish news media did not por-
tray Poland in a position to define the major directions of the EU policies, despite
taken up the Presidency of the council. This may be related to the then severe financial
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crisis and the situation of Greece which required other organizations and countries to
step up and take the lead. The Flemish news journalists also heavily focused on the
missteps on political level. By contrast, Poland was very successful in promoting and
improving its cultural and touristic image. In other words, the representation of Po-
land’s presidency was largely ‘depoliticized’ in Flemish news media. Instead, it was
mainly represented as a key opportunity to showcase the rich cultural history and as-
sets of contemporary Poland. In the end, the PR did take over from the presidency.
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“This is Poland calling!”: Representations
of the Polish EU Presidency in the Greek Media
The purpose of the chapter is to explore and analyze the news coverage of the first
EU Council’s Polish Presidency in the Greek media as well as the role of the Greek
media in the Greek citizens’ information process about issues regarding the Polish
Presidency and the promotion of European matters. It was the first time for Poland
to take up the responsibilities of the EU Presidency, since the country was the largest
of the new member states that entered EU during the 2004 enlargement. Although
the holding of the Presidency came at a difficult time and one full of challenges for
Europe, it was a unique opportunity for Poland to make the most of it and exploit
the advantages that derived from its advanced position in the EU.
Through a comparative media quantitative and qualitative content analysis, the
paper aims to highlight the representations of the Polish EU Presidency in Greek
media, in an attempt to give circumstantial answers to the crucial questions that
arise: (1) How did the Polish EU Council Presidency attract the Greek media’ atten-
tion? (2) What are the Greek media’s criteria of selection of EU-related events taken
place in a foreign European country and are of great importance? (3) How may
news items regarding the Polish EU Council Presidency appeared on Greek TV,
newspapers and online media? (4) How frequently did the term “Poland”, “Polish
EU Council Presidency” and “Polish” appear in Greek news items? (5) What was
Greek media’s attitude towards the foreign country? (6) How did the Greek media
present the Polish EU Council Presidency? As a host of numerous meetings and
events or as an actor-in charge to define the major directions of the EU policy?
The methodological approach used is the comparative media quantitative and
qualitative content analysis, which employs both a theoretical background and an
empirical research. The paper is divided to two parts; the theoretical and the re-
search part. The first provides a theoretical framework regarding the media cover-
age of the news about the EU and important events in member states in the light of
the terms “foreign news value”, “agenda setting in national media” and “domesti-
cation of foreign news”. The second part is dedicated to the empirical research and
the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the news items gathered.
EU news coverage: theoretical perspective
The study of media coverage of a European event, such as the EU Council Presi-
dency, is of particular importance since media are the most important source for Eu-
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ropeans to get their information about the EU. European citizens should want to
and be able to gain as much knowledge about the EU as possible in order to be
aware of what happens in “the common European home” and affects their lives and
future. Therefore, high visibility of EU news in the media is desirable considering
media are very important source of information for the public (Mughan & Gunther,
2000:3; Norris, 2000; Prior, 2005:579).
In order to examine the foreign media coverage of Poland and the Polish EU
Council Presidency, the chapter employs the concepts of EU media coverage, media
agenda, foreign news value, domestication of foreign news and sources of informa-
tion about foreign events.
In relation to EU news coverage, most of the studies converge that the coverage
of EU issues in the news flow is in general very low (Machill et al., 2006) except from
important events such as the EU Council Presidency European elections, referenda
on various EU issues or the introduction of Euro into a country (Peter, 2003:6; Peter
& de Vreese, 2004:5; Semetko et al., 2000). Some studies about EU news coverage
deal only with the frequency of EU news, while others with the importance (Bruter,
2004; de Vreese & Semetko, 2001) or prominence given by media (Peter et al., 2003,
2004; Peter & de Vreese, 2004). When EU is covered in the news is mostly with neu-
tral (Peter et al., 2003) or negative tone (de Vreese et al., 2006; de Vreese & Semetko,
2003). The news about Europe also differ in their “European nature” which is the ex-
tent to which the EU is covered as a pure European issue or in terms of “domestica-
tion of news” which implies the connection to national issues and actors, with the
second type prevailing (Semetko et al., 2000; Trenz, 2004).
The theoretical frame for the analysis is also related to the concept of news value, the
determined role of which is undisputed in making news. News value is one of the core
issues that have erased fertile debates in journalism research. Galtung and Ruge intro-
duced in 1965 the first list of news values which was meant to be the most commonly
cited list (1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). Galtung and Ruge determined twelve criteria
(8 “culture-free” and 4 “culture-bond”) which intended to give answer to the key ques-
tion: why the news media in a given country might choose to cover some international
events and not others. These criteria were “frequency, amplitude, unambiguousness,
meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, elite-nation
concentration, elite-people concentration, personification, and negativity”.
In contradiction to Galtung and Ruge, other theorists and professionals prefer to
simplify the conceptualization of the complicate subject of news value by highlight-
ing its essential elements. Walter Lippmann, who was regarded as the founding fa-
ther of the sociology of news, focusing on the process of news gathering, stressed
the clarity of news. Lippmann suggested in early twenty century that the process of
news gathering was “a search for the objective clear signal which signifies an event”
(McQuail, 2003). News, in this sense, does not mechanically mirror reality but it re-
ports an aspect of the event that has obtruded itself.
According to Fuller (1996), there are four agreed distinguishing elements of
news: timeliness, community interest, significance, and clarity. These elements un-
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derline the influences of audience community on the making of news. “Timeliness”
suggests that what is considered to be “news” is supposed to be new. The concept of
newness refers not only to the time when the event happens but to the newness of
the event as perceived by the community as well. Therefore, both a recent event and
a recently discovered fact could become news. “Community interest” takes account
of “the pull of basic human curiosity” (Fuller, 1996). “Significance” or “importance”
(McKane, 2006) is usually evaluated on the basis of the “foreseeable consequences”
of the event (Fuller, 1996). Both the elements of “interest” and “significance” are
subjected to the perceptions, and thus bias, of the audiences. “Clarity” implies that
news should be comprehensible. This is apparent given the fact that “the central
purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with accurate and reliable information
they need to function in a free society” (Potter, 2006).
The “domestication of foreign news” is a key factor that influences the media’s
“agenda setting”. As Clausen (2003) points out, the term “domestication” is un-
derstood as a process of framing: recognizing, defining, selecting and organizing
information as news for audiences and actors in a certain national context. Domesti-
cation refers to a process of making information fit in a frame of reference for audi-
ences within nation state boundaries. In other words, domestication refers to
processes of making information comprehensible to national audiences (Clausen,
2003). Moreover, valuation is another means of construction in news reporting. It is
not rare the phenomenon that editors and journalists mix personal valuation with
news reports, although objectivity is stressed in every journalism theory. Valuation
can be identified over the spectrum from overt to covert valuations: Neutral, posi-
tive, negative etc. (Loffelholz & Weaver, 2008).
The main focus of this study is the coverage of EU important events (in this case
the Polish EU Council Presidency) in Greek media and the theoretical framework,
which was presented above, plays a decisive role in the analysis and interpretation
of the research findings that follow. Our intention was to set the basic theoretical ele-
ments, as covered by literature, upon which the empirical research is based.
The news coverage of the Polish EU Council Presidency in four Greek
mass media and the European Commission Newsletter
The case study profile
In order to investigate the news coverage of the first EU Council’s Polish Presidency
in the Greek media, it should have been necessary to explore the Greek media land-
scape as a whole. Taken-for-granted that this was impossible to be included in the
limits of a specific survey, we chose to present a case study regarding 4 of the
most popular media in Greece and the newsletter of European Commission’s Rep-
resentation in Greece. The 4 media investigated were the following: (1) State (pub-
lic) Television Station NET (Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation), (2) online media:
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www.ert.gr (Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation), (3) the weekly newspaper
“To Vima” (English title “The Tribune”), and (4) the online newspaper (daily)
www.tovima.gr.
The criteria, upon which the selection of the 4 media and the EU Newsletter
was made, were the nationwide cover of the aforementioned media, their high cir-
culation readership, the viewership, audience ratings in combination to their “ori-
gin” (state owned stations), as well as the “co-existence” of their “traditional”
profile along with their online profile. Before moving on to the empirical research, it
would be useful to present the basic characteristics of the mass media that were ana-
lyzed as well as their ranking in the audience’s preferences in order to justify our
selection.
NET is one of the 3 state television stations of the Hellenic Broadcasting Cooper-
ation (ERT S.A.).1 NET has mainly an informative orientation and holds the respon-
sibility of transmitting news and broadcasts the prime time evening news bulletin.
According to Nielsen Audience Measurement Greece, for the period from June 2011
to January 2012, NET was ranked among the lasts places of people’s choices.2
Ert.gr is the portal of ERT S.A. which has continuous news flow and live stream-
ing.3 Moving on to the print media field, the newspaper “To Vima” is a Sunday
newspaper (weekly circulation). It used to have a daily circulation as well but the fi-
nancial crisis, that has affected the Greek media since 2010, led to the interruption of
its daily circulation. According to the Greek Newspaper Circulation Nationwide
Bulletin, during the period from June 2011 until January 2012, the newspaper “To
Vima” was ranked in the second place of peoples’ viewership.4 The newspaper also
has an electronic edition “www.tovima.gr”. “Tovima.gr” is ranked 40 in Greece to
the Alexa traffic rankings.5 Lastly, the European Commission’s Newsletter is pub-
lished every week and it consists of Press Releases regarding actions, measures,
legislative works, activities of the Parliament, the Commission and the Council,
182 Katerina Serafe im
1 On June 11th 2013, the Greek government announced its decision for the closure of ERT
with the rationale that it was part of the attempt to cut down the public spending and meet
the terms of the bailout deal. The new Greek Public Television (the interim Greek public
broadcast service- EDT) emitted its signal just after 8:30am on Wednesday July 10th.
2 http://www.agbnielsen.com/whereweare/dynPage.asplang=local&id=248&country=Greece.
3 Compared with the overall internet population, its audience tends to be between the ages
of 35 and 45; it also appeals more to highly educated, childless men browsing from home.
About 27% of visits to the site are bounces (one page view only), and visitors to the site spend
approximately 34 seconds on each page view and a total of three minutes on the site each day.
Search engines refer approximately 16% of visits to Ert.gr (Alexa, 2012).
4 http://www.marketingweek.gr/?pid=9&arID=42235&la=1.
5 http://www.alexa.com/search?q=tovima.gr&r=home_home&p=bigtop. Compared with
internet averages, this site’s audience tends to be between the ages of 25 and 55; they are also
disproportionately childless, highly educated men. Approximately 82% of its visitors are in
Greece, where it has attained a traffic rank of 32. Approximately 42% of visits to Tovima.gr
are bounces (one page view only), and its visitors view 3.4 unique pages each day on average.
Based on internet averages, tovima.gr is visited more frequently by males who are in the age
range 35–44, have no children and are college educated (Alexa, 2012).
statements and activities of the Commissioners. It is the official representative of the
European Commission in Greece and its newsletter just presents events and state-
ments of the EU officials.
Journalistic materials (news items, reportage, editorials, column, news commen-
tary, press review, comments, reports, interviews and others) were collected during
the period from June 15, 2011 until January 30, 2012. The data were selected by using
the keywords “Poland and EU Council Presidency”, “Polish EU Presidency”, “Po-
land”, “Polish” and were coded using as a methodological tool a coding guide for
analyzing the research findings. The basic tools used in the survey to evaluate the
representation of the Polish EU Presidency in Greek media are the following: (1) the
amount of news flow regarding Poland as well as the frequency of news coverage
of the country during the period of the Presidency; (2) the dominant frames and per-
spectives used in news materials; (3) the sources of information presented in the me-
dia (journalist, foreign correspondent, news agencies, national news organizations,
other media); (4) the news items’ relevance to Poland; (5) the major actors involved;
(6) the opinions that are expressed in articles, comments and analyses; (7) the
sources of comments and analyses; and (8) the Greek media’s attitude towards Po-
land.
Findings
NET (Greek State TV)
During the six-month sampling period, the state television station broadcast only
8 news items referring to Poland. Among them, only 1 was dedicated directly to the
EU Polish Presidency, presenting the beginning of the 6-month holding of the EU
Council Presidency, as well as the aims and priorities of the country. This was the
only detailed reportage to the undertaking of the rotating EU helm, with special ref-
erences to the fact that Poland is a post-communist country and since its accession,
the economy has seen rapid growth being the only EU country not to have experi-
enced a recession in the last 20 years. Noteworthy is the duration of the reportage,
the details, the comments of the anchorwoman and the reportage from the TV sta-
tion’s correspondent from Poland, giving the pulse of the news. Noteworthy as well
is the station’s attitude towards Poland, giving emphasis on the fact that, although
the said EU member state is a former communist country, the rapid economic
growth and the attempts of the country to prove to the EU that it can succeed in its
new role to overcome the economic crisis in the European Union. So, the attitude to-
wards the Polish Presidency is positive with some negative hints about the “com-
munist past” of the country.
Five of the rest of the news items referred to Poland just as the venue country and
host of the EU Summits, EcoFin and Eurogroup Summits, the formal meeting be-
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tween the Greek Prime Minister G. Papandreou and the President of the European
Council H. Van Rompay, giving more emphasis to the EU summit in October 26,
2011, which was crucial for the future of the Greek financial crisis. All of the above
news items were seen under the spectrum of the Greek financial crisis and the refer-
ence to Poland was only as a local definition and with neutral attitude. Even in the
last news item, about the beginning of the Danish EU Council presidency, the only
reference was to the rotating presidency and to the fact that the successor of the EU
presidency is again a country out of the Eurozone. Finally, one reportage was dedi-
cated to the Polish elections (October) in the middle of presidency as disorientation
from the purpose of presidency.
As we can see in Figure 1, the majority of NET’s news coverage about EU events
(58%) was not relevant to Poland.
The state television paid the minimum attention directly to the Polish EU Coun-
cil Presidency and focused on other topics, not related to the Presidency but in the
framework of the financial crisis that is plaguing Greece, dedicating more time to
the European procedures for exiting the crisis. The financial situation in Greece mo-
nopolized NET’s interest and that is the reason the dominant topic was economy
(Figure 2).
Even the news items that were related to Poland were about sports and referred
to the hosting of the European Football Cap of 2012. All the news items related to
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Figure 2. NET’s news coverage dominant topic
Poland were characterized by references to nationals (Greece) and impact on the
country. In general the attitude towards Poland was neutral, with a small reliance to




In order to evaluate the journalistic material posted on www.ert.gr, we have to take
under consideration that the above portal belongs to the Hellenic Broadcasting Cor-
poration, as well as NET, and as a result the portal post almost the same news items
as the television station broadcasts. The difference is that the portal posts news de-
riving from the Athens News Agency- Macedonian Press Agency (Greek national
news agency), while NET broadcasts reportages done by the station’s journalists. In
relation to that, it is important to say that the portal, although it has staff with exper-
tise in international news, the main source of information is the national news
agency.
During the sampling period, www.ert.gr posted only 12 news items, in the same
notion as NET did and with the same topics. As a portal with news streaming, ert.gr
should have wider and more detailed news coverage about the Polish EU Council
Presidency, with special references regarding the aims, priorities and actions of the
Polish Presidency itself. News items and reportages regarding the Polish Presi-
dency were posted on the front web page as part of the article and continued with
a link in new “window”.
The portal paid little attention to the Polish EU Presidency (see Figure 4), focus-
ing more to Poland as host of events and venue (mainly for the EURO 2012 and for
the EU summits as well). The majority of the news items posted were under the cat-
egory of “sports”, with main subject the football matches and the players taking
part in the championship. Indicative of the minor importance the portal gave to the
Polish EU Council Presidency is the fact that neither one of the news items about















Figure 3. NET’s attitude towards Poland
Poland was full displayed on the front web page. On the contrary, part of the arti-
cles was displayed in the front page accompanied by a link leading to a separate
“window”.
The portal’s dominant topic was economy and the issue of the Greek financial
crisis dominated all the news items, even those referring to the Presidency. In terms
of the domestication of news, every news item about the Polish Presidency had ex-
plicit reference to nationals and to impact on Greece, emphasizing on the actions of
the Greek politicians on the sidelines of the EU summits. The attitude towards Po-
land was neutral, in general, with slight reliance to stereotypes of Poland as an
ex-communist country. There were also references to the controversies between the
Polish government and the EU about the participation of Poland in the Eurozone
summits.
TOVIMA.GR
The news portal www.tovima.gr belongs to the same media organization with the
newspaper “To Vima” and has succeeded in filling the gap in every-day news cov-
erage that has occurred due to the recess of the newspaper’s daily printed edition.
As a result, the journalists, correspondents and authors of opinions, which are en-
gaged in news coverage, work both for the printed weekly edition and for the daily
online edition as well. So the major actors involved as well as the frames and per-
spectives presented reflect the same opinions as in the newspaper “To Vima”.
For the sampling period from June 2011 until January 2012, 364 news items with
reference to Poland were posted. Only 10 of them were directly related to the Polish
EU Council Presidency (see Figure 4). The rest referred to Poland in terms of com-
menting on historical facts, cultural and major sports events (i.e. EURO 2012), inter-
views of distinguished personalities (prime ministers, politicians, authors, athletes,
scientists etc.), book and film reviews, technological achievements, agricultural pro-
ductivity, financial investments, tourism, immigration, criminality etc. So, the most
frequent use of the term “Poland” in the texts (both in news items referring directly
or not to the Polish Presidency) was the one emphasizing the role of Poland as a new
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Figure 4. Greek online media’s news items’ relevance to Poland
EU country, host of a meeting, organizer of an event or as a venue of the meet-
ing-event. In many of the news items, “Poland” was explicitly mentioned in the texts
as a post communist country implicitly suggesting some characteristics with negative
notion or as a “former” Eastern European country with European orientation and
perspectives. In general, the portal’s attitude towards Poland was mainly neutral, but
there were explicit hints with a negative notion about the role of the country.
The 10 news items referred directly to the Polish EU Presidency dealt mainly
with issues the EU Council and the Euro area Summits, the future of Europe and the
Europe, the European financial and identity crisis. A few of them were displayed on
the front web page, with a link to a new page. In the framework of the foreign news
domestication strategy, their publication was usually followed by other news items,
mainly reportages, about the Greek politicians’ actions on the sidelines of the EU
summits hosted in Poland. Towards the direction of making explicit reference to na-
tional and to impact on Greece, the Polish Presidency “inspired” authors to publish
their opinions and analyses about the future of Europe and the role of the “big”
member-states in the financial crisis. As “Tovima.gr” is a news portal with continu-
ous news flow, many of the news items of the sampling period received comments
originated from readers.
In the body of the press releases, the basic frame used is the role of Poland as EU
member holding the Presidency for the first time, without any further extensions.
Moreover, there are references to nationals and to the impact on Greece. The atti-
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Figure 6. Attitude towards Poland
tude towards Poland is neutral, free from any stereotypes and skepticism. The note-
worthy thing is that as the newsletter is the official informative bulletin of the
European Commission in Greece, it should have included more press releases re-
lated directly to the achievements of the Polish presidency and it should have in-
cluded more events and topics related to that subject.
European Commission’s Representation in Greece
It is worth mentioning that the news items regarding the holding of the EU Council
Presidency form Poland were only 3. There was detailed reference to the Polish
Presidency only once, on June 30, 2011, announcing the Press Conference organized
by the Polish Embassy in Athens followed by an extended text analyzing the scope
and the aims and priorities set by Poland. One of the frames used to describe the im-
pact of Polish Presidency on Greece were a press release about cultural events in the
Polish Embassy in Athens regarding the “Eastern Partnership”, Central Europe and
the Balkans, in the framework of the closing of the Polish Presidency, with the pres-
ence of the Ambassador Michael Klinger. In this press release there is cultural orien-
tation to the nation with no further encoding symbols or interpretations, just
a neutral presentation of the event.
As the newsletter has a different structure and does not use common news for-
mats as the other media investigated in this study (no journalistic structure), the
dominant topics vary according to the EU timeliness and informative policy. The
source of information is always the same, the European Commission, and the genre
of the news items is always the same, press release, with no opinions included or
major actors involved.
Newspaper “To Vima”
During the period from June 15, 2011 to January 30, 2012 there are 56 journalistic
pieces referring to Poland, 13 with direct relevance to the Polish Presidency and 44
with no direct relevance to the country (see Figure 7).













Figure 7. Newspaper “To Vima”, News items’ relevance to Poland
We find the term “Poland” as a country of origin in articles and opinions which dis-
cuss literature, art, famous writers, cultural events; as a host country in news items about
the EURO 2012 Football Championship; as a venue for the EU, EcoFin and Eurone Sum-
mits. The use of the term “Poland” has the meaning of the local definition.
Nevertheless, there are articles and opinions regarding Poland as an ex-commu-
nist and Eastern European country, that belongs to the partners and allies of Russia,
under a neutral perspective from the newspaper, with some small reliance to stereo-
types about the country, but with clear references to nationals and to the impact on
Greece. There is also a reportage analyzing the solutions proposed for the exit of
Greece from the financial crisis, with special reference to the development of the
Greek touristic sector, as a financial “relief” for Greece and with relevance to Po-
land. Moreover, there are articles (very few) referring directly to the Polish Presi-
dency under a very positive perspective and attitude (see Figure 8).
It’s worth mentioning that the newspaper published interviews from foreign ex-
perts, analyzing the role of Poland as a new EU member and a post communist
country, in an effort to expunge the stereotypes surrounding it. Additionally, the
newspaper gives emphasis on Poland’s priority to help the EU in its efforts to man-
age the debt crisis threatening Greece and the Eurozone. Within the framework of
political orientation, great importance is given to the “Eastern Partnership” be-
tween Poland and other Eastern European countries dealing with the issue of the
European identity crisis, seen under a positive perspective and attitude.
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Figure 9. Dominant topic of newspaper “To Vima”
Economy and issues related to the Greek financial crisis dominated the newspa-
per’s front pages, some of them strongly related to the events that took place in the
EU summits in Poland, leaving far behind issues regarding internal politics.
Conclusions
The survey reaches the conclusion that the coverage of the Polish EU Council Presi-
dency in Greek media was not satisfactory and proportional to the range and signif-
icance of such an European issue. The six months of the Polish Presidency of the
European Council, although it may have been the most difficult period in the his-
tory of the project due to the Eurozone crisis, did not appear much in the news cov-
erage in the Greek media investigated.
The coverage of EU issues in the news flow in Greek media – regardless the di-
rect reference to the accomplishments of the Polish Presidency was in general high
due to the fact that all these issues included explicit reference to nationals and to the
impact on the country as they were strongly connected to the severe financial crisis
in Greece. So, the element of the domestication of foreign news, along with the ele-
ments of foreign news values and valuation attitude towards Poland, affected the
Greek media’s criteria of selection of events taken place in the EU to become news
items and play a key role in the Greek media agenda setting. Due to the fact that the
Polish Presidency coincided with the climax of the financial crisis in Greece, the
Greek media focused their attention to the coverage of EU news directly connected
to that subject and its impact in the European Union and the Eurozone. Noteworthy
is the fact that the Greek media covered with details only the official opening and
the expiry of the Polish Presidency of the EU Council. Afterwards, the informative
focus has shifted to the financial crisis.
Given the research findings, the news coverage of the Polish EU Council Presi-
dency was not similar in printed edition, online edition and television. The newspa-
per “To Vima” and its online edition and portal, “Tovima.gr”, were found to have
the major proportion of EU news and news about Poland. Although public televi-
sion is supposed to have a high coverage on EU news, due its informative mission in
favor of the public, in the said study it was proved to have broadcast a small amount
of news referring to the Polish Presidency. The same is obvious and on the Greek
state television portal, “ert.gr”, which is supposed to post EU more detailed news
items and more frequently, as it has a continuous news flow. On the contrary, ert.gr
posted very few news items about the Polish Presidency and all the others with ref-
erence to Poland had nothing to do with the Presidency itself. Along with the small
amount of news items, we observed a sparse frequency in broadcasting news about
the Polish Presidency.
As far as the news items’ reference to Poland is concerned, the majority of them
was not related directly to the Polish Presidency and was under the sections “Econ-
omy”, “Politics” and “Opinions” and “Sports” (mainly related to the hosting of the
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European Foot ball Championship EURO 2012). So the events that attracted the
Greek media’s attention had no relation to the Presidency and the picture that the
Greek audience drew was Poland as a host/venue of important events, with conno-
tation to Poland.
In relation to the sources of information, the newspaper “To Vima” is supposed
to have correspondents and staff specialized in foreign news, but in many cases the
newspaper uses the Athens News Agency – Macedonian Press Agency (national
news agency) without mentioning that source of information. Moreover, although
the public television’s portal is supposed to have staff expertise in the area of inter-
national news, the main source of information is the Athens News Agency – Mace-
donian Press Agency (national news agency). The national news agency is used by
all media investigated, except from the European Commission’s Representation in
Greece. As a result, the reporting language is almost similar in the news items of dif-
ferent media organizations and this leads to similar comments and interpretations
of the news items’ meanings.
In terms of the domestication of foreign news, the strategy used in order to make
the events of the EU Polish Presidency relevant for the Greek audience, was to make
explicit reference to Greece and to the impact on the country. Along with the afore-
mentioned strategies goes the Geek media’s tendency to focus mainly on politicians
and other national actors when they covered news regarding European matters.
When attention was paid to the news about the Polish EU Council Presidency, it is
usually in connection with national political leaders, parties or national issues,
while the rest of the EU issues are often pushed aside. So the domestication strategy
of the Greek news organizations confirmed one of the main parameters of the
agenda-setting process: Which aspects of an issue are covered in the news, and the
relative emphasis on these various aspects of an issue makes a considerable differ-
ence in how people view that issue.
The comparative research brought to the surface the low visibility of Poland in
news coverage in Greece, which was accompanied by a generally neutral attitude
that enhanced the low recognition of the former by the latter. So, the general attitude
towards Poland was neutral and in some cases positive emphasizing on the fact that
it was an opportunity for Poland to change the notion of the post-communist coun-
try. It was a positive framework into which they presented Poland as a new EU
member and as a new notion in the “European family”. There were some hints
about the country’s ex-communist “past”, indicative of some media’s skepticism,
but the general notion was not negative. Many of the news items, except form opin-
ions and commentaries, reflected the journalists’ skepticism about the role of Po-
land holding the Presidency. Other news items tried to remove stereotypes that
have been implanted in the Greek public opinion perceptions. The most frequent
use of the term “Poland” in the texts (both in news items referring directly or not to
the Polish Presidency) was the one emphasizing the role of Poland as a new EU
country, host of a meeting, organizer of an event or as a venue of the meeting-event.
In many of the news items, “Poland” was explicitly mentioned in the texts as a post
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communist country implicitly suggesting some characteristics with negative notion
or as a “former” Eastern European country with European orientation and perspec-
tives. Let’s not forget that according to each country’s political culture, the national
media use related frames and perspectives while reporting foreign events.
To sum up, the Greek media paid not as much attention as they should in the Pol-
ish EU Council Presidency, as the Polish EU Council Presidency coincided with the
climax of the severe financial crisis in Greece. Undoubtedly, that fact played a signif-
icant role in the construction of the Greek media agenda-setting and in the informa-
tion process as well. As a result, the Greek media focused their attention to the
coverage of the Greek economic crisis and its impact in the European Union and the
Eurozone. In other words, the Greek media got engaged in a perpetual effort to in-
form Greek audience with all the current developments on the crucial subject of the
future of Greece in the European Union and to fulfill their mission as gatekeepers in
the information process. And that lead us to the final remark that the Greek public
opinion did not obtain a complete picture of the Polish Presidency key achieve-
ments. Furthermore, that low visibility and recognition of Poland in Greece led to
low expectations towards the country that was in the helm of the EU Council and
had the unique opportunity to exploit the advantages that derived from its ad-
vanced position in the EU. The agenda setting practices of the media organizations
in Greece influenced the perceptions the Greek public opinion has on Poland and on
the valuation of the Polish Presidency. So, the neutral reporting of Poland or the
highlighting of an issue regarding the Polish Presidency more than another, contrib-
uted to the formation of neutral perception towards the country. In conclusion, as
far as Greece is concerned, the Polish EU Council Presidency did not succeed in at-
tracting the Greek media’s attention as an actor-in-charge of the European Council
and as the title implies, “the call” from Poland was not sufficiently “forwarded” to
Greece.
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The Romanian Press and European Issues:
A Content Profile
Introduction
In his analysis of the journalistic activity, Stephen Reese (1997:423) claimed the exis-
tence of a true paradigm of journalism: journalism is an activity of collecting empiri-
cal information, in which various activities have developed. In the absence of clear
theoretical frameworks, journalists rely heavily on routine procedures as a “strate-
gic ritual” which helps them to cope with the pressure of the dead-line. The routine is
very important because it involves threats of the paradigm. With the increasing
professionalization attributes, the features paradigm were accentuated. In this way,
the paradigm of journalism can be seen as a model that governs the collection of in-
formation, revealed through practical journalism and centered on the evaluation
criteria of the journalistic potential an on the ways of their transmission to the pub-
lic. Seen as an ideology, the paradigm of news is thus marked by numerous contra-
dictions: between the values derived from the existing diversity of the viewpoints
in an editorial board and the values of the objectivity in the practice of data collec-
tion. In this context, the news can be analyzed from several perspectives: (1) a pro-
fessional size (rules, procedures and professional values); (2) an organizational
dimension (the news as a chain of production which must be organized so as to de-
liver and sell more products on a highly competitive market); (3) a social dimension
(news are perceived as carrying an ideology). The three levels of news analysis dis-
tinguish between “actors” who produce news (the journalists and the organization)
and the “results” of this process (content, news messages and their meanings)
(Reese, 1997:420–437).
The study therefore tried to validate (or invalidate) in an empirical way the fol-
lowing research situation: How can the existing organizational and professional variables
in the field of professional journalists explain the covering level of the EU processes and
events in the online and print Romanian media? For this purpose, a content analysis was
conducted on a sample of articles published in newspapers and online Romanian
media between June 2011 and August 2012. Professional and organizational vari-
ables have been quantified, based on the typology proposed by Pan and Kosicki
(1993:55–76), for each material analyzed, namely the typology of actors and the at-
tributes of the narrative news proposed by them.
195
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The selection of the information
Why do journalists choose certain words, certain people, certain actions of a virtu-
ally infinite universe of information and meanings? What are the mechanisms that
occur in devices called media which highlight some facts and ignore others? Is there
a logical selection and rationalization in this process? Answers are provided by psy-
cho-sociological, economic and cultural theories (Golding, 1974; Schudson, 1978;
Mouillaud & Tetu, 1989; Van Cuilenburg et al, 1998; Allan, 1999; Sorlin, 2002). After
Van Cuilenburg (Cuilenburg et al, 1991:184–192), the individual dimension of the
analysis corresponds to the “micro-level”, the organizational dimension to a “mid-
dle level” and the social dimension is reflected in a “macro-level”. The individual
analysis of the selection behavior has a strong subjective dimension, supporting the
idea of the high degree of randomness in the choice of happenings with media
value.
The idea is supported by a number of researchers. Some of the most relevant re-
search in this regard are the gate-keeping studies, highlighting the most subjective as-
pects of how the happenings selection. Kurt Lewin argued that any information that
reaches to the public passes “through many gates” guarded by groups and decision
makers which “close” or “open” according to their rules. In his opinion, the first
level of the access to the media zone belongs to the reporters and correspondents,
and the last “chance” of the information to gain access to public accents is the “edi-
tor” who has the final say on messages to/from the media (Lewin & Schudson,
1997:8).
Within the same context, D. M. White identified four categories of reasons seem-
ingly “frivolous” of the rejection of news (White, 1949 in Berkowitz, 1997:70–71):
(1) the news had been selected by another agency, (2) lack of space, lack of process-
ing time, (3) the belief of the editor that the news was not interesting to the public,
(4) the news was incomplete. The author thus shows that the selection of news was
a process based primarily on value judgments, on personal experience and arbi-
trary attitudes. He also shows that the reasons underlying the selection of news
have a large dose of ambiguity, and the public learned about certain facts just be-
cause the journalist himself decided on the selection of the news that should become
public.
Other authors show that not always the individual factors affecting the news de-
pend on journalists. In this respect, Maletzke identifies two categories of factors influ-
encing the individual selecting of the information (Van Cuilenburg, 1991:181–182):
(1) “dependent” factors (personal preferences of the journalist, his own value sys-
tem, the image of himself as a journalist and the profession of journalism, education,
gender, how to understand the audience); (2) “independent” factors (profile of the
institution, the economic status of the organization, the system of technical stan-
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dards for the collection and dissemination of news, the social, political and legal en-
vironment in which the organization operates).
The level of organizational analysis of the selection mechanism shows that me-
dia production is a collective act that happens in an organizational structure. Many
analyzes have that the economic understanding of the process of creating news is
a more realistic way to explain the professional culture (Fishman, 1980; Mathien,
1992; Bantz, 1997; Shoemaker, 1997; Schudson, 2003). The economic understanding
of the production activity goes beyond the paradigm of the individual factors as
a basis for the selection behavior. According to the theory of news as “ organiza-
tional merchandise”, the bureaucratic organization plays a more important role
than the individual, considering the news as goods (Schudson, 1997:14).
Also, according to organization theorists, it doesn’t matter who journalists are
and where they come from, because they will inevitably be “seized” by the organi-
zational culture (values and practices) that will make them employees able to pro-
duce texts appropriate to the organizational requirements. The organizational
explanations of the selection of the information relate the professional behaviors re-
late to the economical logic, underlining the characteristic of “merchandise” of the
news and the importance of the bureaucratic criteria in choosing happenings.
Therefore, from an economical perspective, journalists are marked by the need for
continuous flow of information, which justifies the major influences of the organi-
zational culture in “labeling” facts and building selection sets on information.
Most studies have emphasized the general idea that the organizational elements
determine directly the journalistic decisions (Bantz, 1997; Fishman, 1980). The eco-
nomical values of the media content as “merchandise” are to be found in the profes-
sional culture, as Mark Fishman (1980:146–150) said, at the level of some important
work categories such as: (1) dead-line sites (product should be delivered in time for
the client to trigger stereotypes consumption); (2) areas dedicated to the content (re-
gardless of the amount of “reality”, spaces that must be filled and will be filled re-
main constant); (3) the need for planned events (press conferences, round tables,
seminars, and so on, types of convenient events for journalists and effective for the
organization). M. Fishman (1980) considers journalists subordinated to the institu-
tional logic, supporting their conformity to the idealization and conventions of the
institution for which they work. He also places journalists in another convenient
convergence, including the “producers” of planned information who influences
paradoxically on the journalistic work, based on the organizational requirements.
External factors that affect professional routine
P. Shoemaker and St. Reese speak of the seven categories of factors “extramedia”
that structure the media routine (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996:184–219): (1) the location
of the media organization is related to “retail market”, which is marked, in turn, by
factors such as economy, culture, social and physical settlement; (2) the interest
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groups trying to influence the content of messages, providing journalists “guide
lines” through lobbying and public relations campaigns; (3) the target audience: ad-
vertising sales and media organizations provide a profile of the audience for which
journalists write; (4) the government has a demonstrated tendency to interfere with
the work of the media; (5) the competition, especially global competition, plays an
important role in the regulation of the content; (6) the institutional links: most often,
the media are related to financial institutions and depend on the resources of other
institutions part of the corporation to which they belong; (7) the technology has con-
tributed to media revolutions.
Extramedia factors influence these media activity in many ways: (1) sources which
understand exactly the work of the practices routine are the most likely to enter the me-
dia space; (2) news writing is influenced by economical or political power of the source;
(3) advertising clients have a direct influence on the number of pages of the editorial
content; (4) the audience interest easily determines a mimetic behavior of news produc-
ers, harmonizing public messages; (5) community characteristics influence messages.
The ideological dimension of news: the media and the public agenda
The news production is influenced by organizational variables and professional vari-
ables (professional norms, individual and professional values). Whether individually
or as part of a group, professional values adapted to the requirements of society and
ideology can be found in the institutional, occupational and cultural practices compos-
ing the media. The media content no longer appears as an ‘isolated’, but as a deeply so-
cial product, organizationally determined. Occupational routines relate to broader
ideological needs. The media is a body of work relevant for understanding the nature
and the importance of content effects on people and society (knowing the media, con-
tent, its effects on the audience can be predicted). Maxwell McCombs (2004) widely
considered the problematic role of the media in creating public interest topics. Accord-
ing to his analysis, the most important aspect of the role of public agenda of the media
is to influence public opinion, and his argument is based on several elements. First,
the themes that capture people attention are known through newspapers, not
through personal experience. Secondly, the news function as a signal, a central element
of this theory, alerting people on the latest developments in the near or more distant
environment. Third, journalistic content, resulting from specific rules of selection and
packaging, directs public attention and influence the perceptions of individuals.
Sources
The journalist finds himself between the organization and the information, adopting
a number of strategies to establish, maintain and develop his sources of information.
Remy Rieffel was talking about a true “swing” of power in this regard, arguing that
journalists develop in a long term a true “network” (Rieffel, 1994:62). Most studies
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that have attempted to outline professional imagery on sources are numerous and
show a consistent relationship between journalists and sources over time in different
spaces. Theoretically, the relationship with sources “support” a series of standardiza-
tion, from source categories to ethical rules of networking with sources, constituting
an important element of the journalists’ “routine” system. Case studies, especially
American ones, indicate a common sense approach to journalists’ sources, which
shows evidence of a common professional framework in this area of professional
practice. The uniformity of reporting to sources may be a result of an extraordinary
importance that has this aspect of practice as a whole. Beyond the meanings of mes-
sages, the content routine is very clear: the information assumes various forms and
formats, which are based on certain principles of reporting, prioritization, selec-
tion, drafting. Mostly, they are determined by the exigencies of perception. The jour-
nalistic “story” is largely the result of a series of routine procedures. How reality can
not always be subject to those rules, that explains some forms of distortion of reality.
The media event
The way organizations define events also emphasizes the importance of organiza-
tional planning ideas. According to Lester and Molotoch, there is an obvious lack of
spontaneity of the media effort to watch the world around, suggesting that “reality”
is nothing but a kind of conceptual “labor” (journalists, organizations and sources)
through which events are created. In this process, with so many “reconstructive” in-
terventions, objectivity is out of the question, as news appear as reflections of social
and individual actors, taken by journalists and then subjected through organiza-
tional filters (Molotoch & Lester, 1997:200–205). Event criteria or “tags” that journal-
ists use to define events are no other than conventions meant to put in order
a supersaturated informational reality. Leo W. Jeffres (1986:106–108) reminded of
two sets of conventions, both sets having functional roles. The first set is about ob-
jective rules of the professional culture: the timeliness and proximity of the event,
bringing the overall progress events, disasters, prominence of the personalities in-
volved, the potential for conflict, the dramatic potential of the event, the consequences
it involves, the human interest. The secondary set of conventions include: frequency
and intensity, ambiguity, ability to signify, consonance, unpredictability, elitist dimen-
sion applied to nations, personalization factors, negative nature of the story.
The study
The hypotheses
In developing working hypotheses, a research question is taken into consideration:
“How can the existing organizational and professional variables in the field of pro-
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fessional journalists explain the covering level of the EU processes and events in the
online and print Romanian media?”.
We were primarily concerned to identify relevant articles and news coverage in
Romanian newspapers and online media of the Polish Presidency of the EU in the
period June 2011–July 2012. We expected that dominant themes related to Poland to
be covered in a significant way by Romanian offline and online media, particularly
regarding their informational dimension. We proposed the following hypothesis:
H1. There is a higher probability that the Romanian media coverage of the Polish
Presidency of the EU be realized in informative articles and news stories, opinion
articles on the subject being published in a much lower number in the analyzed pe-
riod of time.
In our opinion, for the analyzed period of time, the types of information regard-
ing Poland, presented by the Romanian media (newspapers and online) will be very
different. On the one hand, both countries (Poland and Romania) are new members
of the European Union and, hence, the informations about the evolution of the politi-
cal system and economical and social areas in Poland is likely to be of interest to jour-
nalists and the public in Romania. On the other hand, the Polish Presidency has
covered a year, a time when both countries were likely to have to face socio-economic
challenges due to the global recession. Considering both aspects previously men-
tioned, the study examines the existing proportion between purely informational as-
pects and elements derived from the opinion of journalists, as they were identified in
the news and articles published in Romanian newspapers and online media.
As literature recognizes (Rieffel, 1994:62), when an article or a news appears in
the media, only the journalist’s idea to make a material or reflection or to report
a material exists before the information provided by sources. After the idea, sources
“are” virtually materials producers, they grove the approach angle, they stress or
not a certain information, driving it erratically in public or simply sending “test bal-
loons” through journalists. Given the role of the “map” of the sources in the produc-
tion of articles and news and its relation to the journalists’ professional imaginary,
we have proposed the second research hypothesis: H2. There is a higher probability
that the sources used in the Polish EU Presidency coverage be international news
agencies, national sources having a lower weight in the news and/or articles in the
Romanian media.
The literature (Molotoch & Lester, 1997:200–205) distinguishes between three
categories of events presented by the media: (1) routine events; (2) accidents;
(3) scandals. Molotoch and Lester show that the existence of three types of events is
an indicator of the centrality of the organizational planning in the activities of media
organizations. Also, the inclusion of an event in a certain class endorses organiza-
tions regarding the events codification made by journalists. Starting here, we had as
the third research hypothesis the following statement: H3. There is a higher proba-
bility that the events on the Polish EU Presidency be routine events, accidents and
scandals regarding Poland being types of events to be covered to a lesser extent in
the Romanian newspapers and online media.
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Referring to the work of journalism, Leo W. Jeffres (Jeffres, 1986:106–108) differ-
entiated between objective standards of professional culture on the one hand, and
elements derived from the very specific events presented by the media. We consid-
ered that we can identify professional and organizational variables that are func-
tional in Romanian media at the level of the second set of criteria theorized by Leo
W. Jeffres (idem). Specifically, in our opinion, the Polish presidency of the European
Union should be submitted by Romanian journalists by focusing on the elitist di-
mension applied to Poland’s role in the European context (by enhancing the quality
of Poland’s EU presidency in the period of time under review), on the ability of giv-
ing meaning to the new role of Poland (in Romania the public was familiar with
both Polish and the the EU socio-economical and political issues, which has a clear
relevance for the Romanian audience) and on the positive consonance (any event re-
garding Poland during the Polish Presidency of the EU will be in accordance with
the positive expectations about this country).
From this, we continued with the following research hypotheses: H4. In the ana-
lyzed period of time, there is a higher probability that the image of Poland in the Ro-
manian media be positive, neutral presentations being published in a smaller
number of items during this period. H5. There is a higher probability that the cover-
age of Poland as a full member of the European Union be raised in the articles and
news published in Romanian newspapers and online media. H6. There is a higher
probability that the topics covered in the articles published by the Romanian media,
referring to Poland’s foreign policy activity, issues related to the economy, domestic
politics, culture or sport, be covered to a lesser extent in the period under review.
Dataset and methodology
To meet the requirements of the “methodological triangulation” and validity of the
data we used as the main method of data collection the quantitative content analy-
sis. The analyzed sample included a selection of newspapers and online media from
Romania. Media in Romania were elected accordingly to market shares as they
were registered off-line and on-line (The Romanian Office of Traffic Audit). We
chose 9 Romanian media: six newspapers – “Adevarul” (The Truth), “Jurnalul Na-
tional” (The National Journal), “Romania Libera” (The Free Romania), “Libertatea”
(The Freedom), “Click”– three general sites– Ziare.com, Hotnews and EurActiv – and
a weekly magazine – “Revista 22” (22 Review). The analyzed period included twelve
months covering the period June 2011–August 2012. In the sample all items relating
to Poland were included. The final sample result had a volume of 2715 articles, that
is 1668 articles published in newspapers and 1047 more articles presented online.
Regarding the distribution of articles according to the considered media, the
sample was structured as follows: “Romania Libera” (Free Romania) – 410 articles,
“Jurnalul National” (National Journal) – 288 articles, “Libertatea” (The Freedom)
– 34 articles; “Adevarul” (The Truth) – 834 articles; “Click – 25 articles; Hotnews
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– 571 articles; Ziare.com – 398 articles; EurActiv – 78 articles; Revista “22” (22 Re-
view) – 77 articles. To test the inter-coders reliability for the entire study sample, we
chose Cohen’s Kappa index – (k). The values of k for the variables of the sample of
articles published in newspapers ranged between 0.442 and 0.3117. The values of
k for the variables of the sample of articles published in online media ranged be-
tween 0.467 and 0.387. For the analysis of data we use both descriptive statistics (fre-
quencies) and inferential statistics (logistic regressions).
Findings and analysis
The EU Presidency was presented by 16% of all articles published in newspapers re-
ferred to Poland and by 36% in the sample of articles published on the same issue in
the Romanian online media. From the perspective of the type of writings, news sto-
ries covering the Polish Presidency of the EU accounted 18% for newspapers and
39% for the online media, the editorials amounted to 29% for newspapers and 33%
for the online media, and comments published on this topic in the sample repre-
sented 42% of newspaper articles and 24% of online media. After reading this pri-
mary data set, it is obvious that the first research hypothesis was not empirically
validated – namely, the Romanian media coverage of the Polish Presidency of the
EU was achieved to a greater extent in articles and news of opinion (editorials and
comments), press material such information being in a smaller number for the en-
tire sample considered.
The statistical modeling not only gives us some explanation of this situation, but
also allows us to identify some differences between newspapers and online media.
Thus, the model for newspapers has been from the beginning a strong one, the news
published on the front page explaining with a probability of 15% the coverage of the
Polish EU Presidency. Also, a photo attached to an article grew by 21% the probabil-
ity that this news is about the Polish Presidency. Regarding the dominant themes,
the most explanatory power was recorded for subjects related to sports coverage
(34%) and international political life (26%). For the online media, an iterative proce-
dure was required, the differences between the two models indicating a lack of ex-
planatory contribution to the position of the news on Polish Presidency on the first
page of the website or to the attachment of a picture next to the article.
However, publishing a photo with the article explained 10% of the coverage in
online media of the Polish EU Presidency. And this time “sport” was the dominant
theme and the variable with the greatest explanatory power (18%), followed by the
“economical life” – there is a 13% probability that the news published on the subject
explain coverage in the Romanian online media of the Polish EU Presidency. The
role of the journalist is evident in the case of the statistical model on the news pub-
lished in newspapers (there is a 18% probability that a journalist from the editorial
board sign a story about the Polish Presidency of the EU), but there is a total lack of
explanatory contribution in the online media (the journalist from the editorial board
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signing news about Polish presidency downs, in fact, the strength of the whole
model).
The analysis of the coverage of the Polish Presidency of the EU in the Romanian
media from the perspective of the quoted sources indicate a predominance of do-
mestic over international sources. Thus, 13% of articles published in newspapers
quoted Romanian national news agencies (compared to only 7% of them having
quoting international news agencies), while 48% of the articles published on this
topic in the Romanian online media quoted national news agencies (compared to
only 30% of the sample online media that quoted international agencies). Statistics
indicate thus the invalidation of the second working hypothesis – the sources used
to cover the Polish EU Presidency were primarily national news agencies, interna-
tional agencies were quoted in a lesser degree for the subject. Consequently, the
developed statistical models had different behavior – specifically, they were statisti-
cally robust and consistent as explanatory power for newspapers and relatively un-
even and dispersant for the online media. We could still see a number of similarities
in the explanatory factors for newspapers and online media.
For the quotation of the international news agencies the fact that the journalist is
a member of the editorial news office explained significantly (6% for newspapers
and 10% for online media) the coverage of the Polish EU Presidency in the articles.
From the perspective of national news agencies quotation, the journalist belonging
to the editorial staff will increase by 8% – newspapers – and by 10% – online media
– the probability of an article referring to the Polish Presidency of the EU. In the
same explanatory direction acted the themes related to the international politics.
More precisely, it is more probably with 20% that newspaper articles approaching
international politics quote international news agencies.
However, the probability that online media articles having topics of interna-
tional politics quoting these news agencies refer to the coverage of the Polish Presi-
dency of the EU is 8%. The explanatory contribution of the theme “international
politics” in explaining variations in articles and news on this Polish EU presidency
quoting national news agencies remain high for newspapers – 15% – but weak
– only 5% – for online media.
The third research hypothesis (“There is a higher probability that the events on
the Polish EU Presidency be routine events, accidents and scandals regarding Po-
land being types of events that will be covered to a lesser extent in the Romanian
newspapers and online media”) has been confirmed by empirical data set – both in
the newspapers and online media in Romania. Thus, 2% of the articles and stories
that presented the Polish Presidency of the EU in the papers covered topics related
to scandals and criminal justice while only 1.5% of articles published in online me-
dia presented these topics and only 1.5% of articles and news published in the on-
line media have covered the topic of accidents and disasters.
Beyond descriptive statistics, logistic regression models developed showed both
similarity of the explanatory factors for newspapers and online media and their ro-
bust suitability to data. The most significant contributions to the likelihood that cov-
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erage the Polish EU Presidency to achieve through routine events came from the
variables derived from the particular topics covered by these articles and news. Pre-
sentation of international political organizations activity resulted in an increase of
37% in the Polish EU Presidency relevant covering in articles published in newspa-
pers and one of 44% for this cover in online media.
Coverage of individual politicians activity as a particular theme explained in
a relevant proportion of 16% the Polish Presidency relevance in the papers and in
a proportion of 21% in its coverage of the online media. The particular theme of
“diplomatic negotiations” increased by 17% the Polish Presidency topic coverage in
the Romanian newspapers and by 22% in the media items online. The coverage of
budget issues explained in the proportion of 14% the variation in the relevance of
the Polish EU Presidency in the articles in newspapers and in the proportion of 16%
this variation for news and articles in the online media. The last common explana-
tory variable – covering specific issues of the economic crisis – explained in the pro-
portion of 20% the variation in newspaper articles dedicated to the Polish EU
Presidency and in the proportion of 11% the variation in the presentation of this
presidency in Romanian online media.
Poland was positively presented in 23% of Romanian newspapers articles and
news covering the country’s EU presidency (but 69% of press material contained in
this sample presenting it in a neutral way), while 36% of articles published in news-
papers and online media on the same subject had a positive perspective (compared
to 40% of the online sample that presented in a neutral way the Polish EU Presi-
dency held during the year under review). It is thus evident that, at the pure statis-
tics descriptive level, the fourth research hypothesis has not been validated by
empirical data. The presentation of Poland in Romanian media was mostly neutral
in articles covering EU presidency, positive presentations being published in
a smaller number of items in the analyzed period. The explanation for this result lies
in the different statistical behavior of the variables included in the explanatory
models developed. There was a of 15% for the online media (and of only 5% for
newspapers) that the publication of news relate positively to the Polish Presidency
of the EU.
Meanwhile, quoting international news agencies as sources of articles increased
by 14% the probability that the presentation of the Polish Presidency in the papers
be positive. Quoting the same international news agencies explained 18% of the
variation in the presentation of the Polish EU presidency in the online media. In the
case of opinion articles, explanatory models indicate a similar contribution as a sta-
tistical strength concerning the question of international news agencies for a posi-
tive coverage of the Polish Presidency – 14% for newspapers and 20% for online
media items.
Beyond these similarities the differences within patterns of logistic regression
models indicate a number of differences in the positive coverage of Polish Presi-
dency of the EU in Romanian newspapers and online media. The explicit reference
to national has a low explanatory value for the newspapers (only 7%), but contrib-
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utes strongly – by 39% – to the variation of positive news about the Polish EU Presi-
dency in the media. Simultaneously, as an alternative model, the explicit reference
to the impact of the news on the country explains a 46% increase in positive news
newspaper published about the Polish Presidency of the EU (the explanatory in-
take of the variable in the online media is much lower – of only 5%). And this dif-
ference between variables is maintained in the case of opinion articles depending
on the nature of media: newspapers vs. online. Explicit reference to the national
has a high explanatory value for positive coverage of the Polish Presidency of the
EU in opinion articles published in online media (36%) and a minimum value re-
lated to review articles published in newspapers (only 6% of the total variation in
this set of articles).
In contrast, explicit reference to the impact on the country explained 46% posi-
tive increase of opinion articles on Polish Presidency published in newspapers (the
similar model built for the online media is not statistically adequate). A journalist
being member of an editorial news board is a strong constant variable for newspa-
pers, but its contribution is unstable in explanatory statistical models developed for
the online media. For positive news published by newspapers, the membership of
the journalist explains by 17% the variable proportion of positive coverage of the
presentation of the Polish Presidency, the percentage was only 7% for online media.
For opinion articles, logistic regression models indicate however a “strip” of the ex-
planatory intake, which is relatively similar for both online media and newspapers.
The journalist being member of the editorial board explains in a proportion of 13%
the positive increase of opinion articles published in newspapers covering the Pol-
ish Presidency, but the percentage is 18.8% for the same type of media articles pub-
lished on-line.
A high percentage (86%) of the articles on the EU Polish Presidency referred to
Poland as a full member of the Union (and only 5% of the sample material pub-
lished in the newspaper referred to Poland as a new EU member). And in the case of
63% of the sample of articles published in online media during 2011–2012, Poland
was associated with the quality of a full EU member countries (only 12% of articles
published on-line associated Polish Presidency as a “host a meeting”). Descriptive
statistics confirmed, this time, the fifth research hypothesis, it is obvious that the
coverage of Poland as a full member of the European Union was clear in the articles
and news published in Romanian newspapers and online media in the period June
2011–July in 2012.
Beyond this primary reading, logistic regression models indicated the existence
of both e similarities and variations between online media and Romanian newspa-
pers. The fact that the author is a member of the editorial journalistic staff explained
in the proportion of 16% the increase of opinion articles for Poland as a full member
of the EU and EU President country, published by newspaper and explained 40% of
the increase in the number of opinion articles with same references (full EU mem-
bership and EU president) of online media. There was a 17% probability that
a newspaper article quoting international news agencies refer to Poland as Presi-
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dent of the EU and member state and the explanatory contribution of quoting inter-
national news agencies at the model developed for the online media was of 29%.
For the explanatory models derived from the fifth hypothesis, differences be-
tween newspapers and online media were, however, significant. The fact that the
analyzed material was informative (“news”) explained the variation in reference to
Poland as a full member of the EU with only 16% for online media, the explanatory
contribution of the editorial informative input being of only 7% for articles pub-
lished in newspapers referring to the Polish Presidency of the EU. Coverage by
opinion articles in newspapers explained a proportion of 89% of variation reference
to Poland as a full member of the EU, compared to a contribution of the same ex-
planatory input of the same editorial type (“opinion article”) of only 7% for the on-
line media.
The analysis of logistic regression models built with a different set of explana-
tory variables (the dominant themes in articles and news plus explicit reference
to the impact on national or country) revealed another set of differences between
online media and newspapers. Thus, all models made for sample articles on the
quality of a full EU member Poland published in online media were statistically un-
stable. For newspapers, on the contrary, the explanatory contribution of topics re-
lated to international politics explained in a proportion of 19.8% an increase in
references to Poland as a full member of the EU and, in the coverage of the economic
issues, explained in a rate of 15.9% the references to Poland (as President of the EU
and, simultaneously, a full member of the Union).
Regarding the sixth research hypothesis (“There is a higher probability that the
topics covered in the articles published by the Romanian media, referring to Po-
land’s foreign policy activity, issues related to the economy, domestic politics, cul-
ture or sport, be covered to a lesser extent in the period under review”), that was
affected by the initial data analysis. Only 38% of the total of the Romanian newspa-
pers which covered the Polish EU Presidency had the international politics as domi-
nant theme, while only 28% of the sample articles published in the Romanian online
media have covered the topic of international political relations of Poland as Presi-
dent of the Union. Going beyond the purely descriptive level, the inferential analy-
sis further revealed, this time, some similarities and especially differences between
the Polish Presidency of the EU coverage in the Romanian newspapers and online
media. There was a 12% probability that the news published in newspapers on the
Polish EU Presidency refer to international life and this probability was close in
value (12%) for the news published on-line on the same theme. Quoting an interna-
tional news agency explains an increase of 23% in the number of newspapers arti-
cles on international life, while using international news agencies as a source
explained 16% of the increase in the number of articles online on the same topic. Si-
multaneously, there was a 13% probability that an article making explicit reference
to the impact on the economic life and on the country explain variation in Romanian
newspaper coverage of Polish Presidency, the explanatory value of the same type of
material being relatively close for online media (11%).
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The most significant differences between logistic regression models were those
that included variables related to the role and place of journalists in the newsroom.
Thus, in the case of newspapers, the probability that the Polish Presidency coverage
in newspapers with topics related to international politics would have increased by
only 9% if the journalist had been a member of the editorial board. In contrast to this
situation, if the journalist had been a member of the editorial online media board,
there was a 16% probability that the Polish Presidency be covered in news on inter-
national politics. The relationship between covering economic topics and the jour-
nalist’s status also varied significantly between newspapers and online media.
Specifically, for the newspapers, the fact that a journalist who is a member of the edi-
torial board issued an opinion article explained 8% of the increase in coverage of
economic issues. If an online media journalist belongs to the editorial board, that ex-
plain 10.7% of the coverage increase of this topic through published articles.
Conclusions
According to the literature, the paradigm of journalism can be seen as a model that
governs the collection of information, manifested in practical journalism and fo-
cused on the evaluation criteria of journalistic potential and on the ways of their
transmission to the public. The cornerstone of this model is objectivity (Reese,
1997:424). The role of the media in this process is to make visible the limits of each
definition of reality (Gitlin, 1980:253–254; Reese, 1997), the media reproducing
a consistent ideology. As bearers of truth, journalists naturally oppose manipula-
tion by sources or by their managers, which is quite likely to happen within the
framework of their professional, having sufficient means available to achieve this
thing. Accepting as a rule that the journalism is free form values, the media sup-
ports and emphasizes values, ideological frameworks and rules set by the domi-
nant elites. The process of drafting news serves well to hegemonic principles as
generally editing decisions are made by the editors, who are supposed to be more
experienced and have a broader view of the world; they also have extensive con-
tacts with officials and elite sources, which influences them in the formation of the
“vision” of the world (Reese, 1997:420–437). In terms of specific theories of sociology
of journalism (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), this study showed, therefore, to identify
professional and organizational variables that explain the magnitude of Romanian
media coverage in a specific process – more specifically, how the media in Romania
presented the Polish EU Presidency.
The analysis of empirical data validated the third and fifth case study hypothe-
sis. In this way, at the level of the entire sample of articles analyzed, covering the
Polish EU Presidency in Romanian newspapers and online media was achieved
mainly by providing routine events and, simultaneously, a frequent reference to the
quality of the country’s full membership in the European Union. The invalidation of
the majority of the research hypotheses initially proposed led us to try to identify
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professional and organizational explanatory factors for coverage in Romanian
newspapers and online media of the EU presidency. The explanatory models devel-
oped thus showed greater robustness of data on the sample of newspaper articles
published in comparison to materials published online.
However, the same logistic regression models showed different influences real-
ized by professional and organizational variables in the specific case of Romanian
newspaper journalism and online media. To cover the specific subject of the Polish
EU presidency in Romanian newspapers, it mattered that the author was a member
of the editorial board (and not an external collaborator) and that he/she was quot-
ing national and international news agencies when wrote a story about interna-
tional politics or economics. Written news was published on the front page of the
newspaper accompanied by a photo and, along with reference to the Polish Presi-
dency of the EU, it included an explicit reference to the impact that the event or in-
ternational political or economic process has on Romania. Schematically, these
factors can be represented as in the diagram below.
In the specific case of Romanian online media coverage of the Polish EU Presi-
dency, it mattered that the author was a member of the editorial board (and not an
external collaborator) and that he/she was only quoting national news agencies
when written a story or an article about economics or sport. Press material included
208 Valentina Marinescu, Mãdãl ina Bãlãºescu
Explicit reference to the
impact on the country











Routine media events related to
international politics
Media events related to
economy Econimic
News photo published on
the front page about Poland
EU as a full member
Quote international news agencies
Quote national news agencies
Organizational culture
and professional routines Sources Event criteria
Ideological dimension
Figure 1. The possible model of the influences of professional and organizational
variables on newspaper coverage of the Polish EU Presidency
an explicit reference to the impact of economic or sporting event or process has on
the people of Romania. Schematically, these factors can be represented as in the dia-
gram below. In our opinion, the results may contribute to understanding how me-
dia covers European transnational processes, for example the Polish Presidency of
the EU in 2011–2012.
Limitations of this study are of interest for future research. The analysis focused
on a sample of articles published in the Romanian media (newspapers and on-line),
the results can not be generalized to the level of a larger geographic and cultural
area. Further research could test whether the results and empirical-theoretical mod-
els proposed can be found for a larger sample and/or if a sample should be in-
cluded in the articles and news published in several European countries.
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Polish Printed Media Coverage and Evaluation
of the Polish Presidency in the EU Council Presidency
Introduction
Poland held its first presidency of the European Union Council in the second half of
2011. This was the fourth presidency held by a new EU member, after Slovenia, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary. Alongside its political significance, the presidency
offered an opportunity to show Poland in the best light, to present the image of a re-
liable, competent and trustworthy political partner (Fia³kowska, 2011:2; Stêpiñska,
2009; Kolczyñski, 2013). Experts are generally convinced that a successful presi-
dency depends on a state’s thorough preparation for holding this function and the
efficient implementation of the priorities the state has identified. In the context of
the Polish presidency, the researchers additionally emphasized that its shape and
character should directly refer to Poland’s strategic presence in the EU (Albrycht
& Wêæ, 2011; Barcz, 2011; Czachór & Tomaszyk, 2010; Fuksiewicz & Szczepanik,
2010; Gromadzki, 2010; Grosse, 2007; £ada, 2011; Riedel, 2010). This calls for an ex-
ceptionally active attitude of a member state, whether in political activities or in
generating new initiatives that are significant for the entire Union (Grosse, 2011:3–4).
Political interests of the state must not be neglected, either. Balancing universal in-
terests (i.e. the interest of the entire EU) with the individual interests of a member
state holding the presidency is a considerable challenge. The reconciliation of these
interests is conducive to succeeding in terms of both international and domestic
politics and image.
Furthermore, a successful presidency of the European Union Council is to
a large extent related to the image of the presidency generated by both, domestic
and foreign media. The Czechs learned a bitter lesson in this respect in the first half
of 2009 (Kaczyñski, 2009; Kral, Bartovic & Rihackova, 2009). The critical remarks on
the Czech presidency voiced by other EU member states were frequently reported
in the media. A number of articles, opinions and discussions tended to focus on
Czech lapses and failures, rather than on a review and assessment of the priorities
assumed by the Czech presidency. It should be remarked, however, that the Czech
presidency was exercised under relatively difficult external conditions, related
to the global economic crisis and internal problems stemming from the Euro-
skepticism of Czech President Vaclav Klaus and a government crisis, that brought
about the collapse of Mirek Topolanek’s government in the very middle of the
Czech presidency (Secler, 2009:95).
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The concerns about the Polish presidency were related to the parliamentary elec-
tions, due to be held in Poland in 2011, during the Polish presidency. Poland was
warned not to follow the Czech scenario of potential problems with the appoint-
ment of a new government, or the Danish scenario, where the government col-
lapsed during the presidency. Since the paralamentary election campaign reached
the final stage soon after Poland took a lead in the EU Council, political and journal-
istic comments emphasized that Donald Tusk’s government would take advantage
of the presidency during the competition with its political rivals. At the same time,
political opposition could use any mistakes and problems related to the presidency
as the arguments against the government. Despite of these concerns, parliamentary
elections were quickly called and the new authorities elected (in fact, Poles elected
the same administration for a second term) successfully presided over the EU.
Previous papers in this part of the volume included findings of the quantitative
and qualitative content analysis of the selected printed and online media outside
Poland. Two final papers will be devoted to the content of the Polish media. This pa-
per aims in presenting the findings of the quantitative analysis of the content of se-
lected Polish print media regarding the assessment of the Polish presidency; the
following one is focused on a discourse analysis. Both of them attempt to provide
a better understanding of relations between media organizations and political ac-
tors during the term of the first Polish EU presidency.
Theoretical background and literature review
Media coverage of the EU Council presidency can be studied within either an inter-
national or domestic context. By comparing data collected in the country holding
the position with data from other countries one may recognize some universal pat-
terns of reporting, as well as differences in levels of attention and frames used by
journalists and commentators.
In the international context studies on the media coverage of the EU-related
events and topics usually focus on providing information about a country to a for-
eign (or international) audience. Most of the scholarship attempts to provide an-
swers to two main questions: to what extent media may shape attitudes and
opinions concerning foreign countries (media effects), and which countries and
events are actually covered by the foreign media (news value).
Since most people do not have personal knowledge of foreign events, the agenda
setting effect of foreign news will loom stronger than that of domestic counterparts
(Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver & Willnat 1992; Hargrove & Stempel, 2002; Wanta, Golan
& Lee, 2004). Therefore, the question of criteria used by the media to select either
a country or a foreign event has been a subject of research for a long time, from clas-
sic works of Kayser (1953), Galtung and Ruge (1965), Gerbner and Marvanyi (1977),
or Sreberny – Mohammadi (1984) to more recent works of Chang & Lee (1992), Wu
(1998, 2000), or Cohen et al. (2013). The main conclusion drawn from these studies is
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that the amount of news coverage depends on the proximity (or distance) between
the countries and on their ethnographic, political, or economic relations. Hence, one
may expect that European countries will be covered prominently in Europe, while
the actual amount of news coverage will depend on the attributes and roles played
by the country within the region.
On the other hand, since newsworthy events may focus media attention on the
country, organizing or hosting such an event is one of the strategies of the media man-
agement (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Rivenburgh, 2010). However, as Manheim (1994)
suggests, for the countries with a very low or a very high level of visibility and negative
image valance, hosting an international media event may not be the best option. But,
the cumulative events, such as the EU presidency, provide an opportunity for a gradual
image enhancement. During the six-month period of the presidency the government
attempts to attract foreign media attention, not only as a host of numerous meetings
and events, but also as an actor-in charge to at least call for some actions and solutions
to the problems the EU is facing at that time. In fact, all the government’s behaviours:
decisions, actions, initiatives, or events may be perceived as particular signals sent to an
international public opinion in order to influence the state’s image (Stêpiñska, 2009).
In a domestic context, studying the media coverage of the EU presidency may
provide an opportunity not only to learn which events were reported by journalists
for domestic audience, but also to recognize political actors’ and media attitude to-
wards the EU institutions. In many European countries, including Poland, the pro-,
or anti-EU attitude is a significant component of the political parties’ identities and an
element of diversification strategy used by political actors especially during the elec-
tion campaigns (Stêpiñska, 2004; 2005). Furthermore, Polish media system shares
with other Eastern Central European countries a high level of political parallelism
and an external pluralism. Consequently, media organizations mirror the political sit-
uation of the country and journalism tend to be strongly marked by political partisan-
ship (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). This tendency is even more intense during any election
campaign when the media plays a role of forum of a political debate.
Indeed, in Poland journalism may be described as politically-driven, opinion-
ated, and advocay – oriented. R. Herbut (2002:110) suggests that in this part of Eu-
rope one may recognize political parties’ strategic orientation towards ‘colonization
of public administration by rulling parties’ that leads to politization of the media. In
such a system “media suffers from a lack of impartiality, objectivity and fairness”
(Wyka, 2008:64). There is no balance in editorial viewpoint and one of the main
functions of the media is political mobilization.
Since the Central European press market has been mostly completely
priviatized the main control of the rulling parties is concentrated on the public ra-
dio and television (Dobek-Ostrowska & G³owacki, 2008:13). However, even on the
press market, one may find a significant number of politically-oriented newspa-
pers. Journalists working for some of these newspapers are deeply involved in poli-
tics (as comentators and publicists presenting their own opinions). K. Jakubowicz
(1999:24) described this style of journalism as combining “a didactic journalistic
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norm, leadership and guardianship/stewardship roles vis-á-vis the audience,
a special form of the social responsibility paradigm, a critical/dialectic role in soci-
ety, assigning to the audience mostly the roles of pupils, citizens, partisans and fol-
lowers” (in: Wyka, 2009:58).
A study
The study concentrates on the relation between political bias of selected Polish daily
newspapers and weekly magazines and their evaluation of Poland’s presidency in
the European Union Council.1 Due to the explorative nature of the study, a quantita-
tive content analysis addressed following research questions:
RQ1: How did the Polish media portray and evaluate the Polish EU presidency?
The articles published by the press were examined in terms of the assessments
of the Polish presidency formulated by their authors or by the contributors to the
selected daily newspapers and weekly magazines. Four categories of evaluation
were identified in the codebook in order to examine whether the assessments and
opinions are free from bias or irony towards the Polish government and other enti-
ties or individuals actively involved in the Polish presidency. Namely, these were
following categories: (1) positive; (2) negative; (3) both positive and negative; or (4)
neutral.
RQ2: To what extent did a political orientation of a media organization affect the coverage
and evaluation of the Polish EU presidency?
Since all the major events related to the Presidency were organized by the gov-
ernment of Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform] and Polskie Stronnictwo Lu-
dowe [Polish People’s Party] and its agents, we may assume that journalists from
the anti-governmental media organizations could criticize the political parties in
power by providing negative evaluation of their performance during the EU Presi-
dency period. Thus, we propose a hypothesis (H1) that the coverage will be biased
and affected by the political angle of the news organization.
The data come from the research project devoted to study the role of media
events in creating a state’s image.2 The key word used to select the items for a study
was presidency (of the EU Council). The timeframe encompassed 18 weeks, namely
periods of June 15–July 30, 2011; September 1–October 31, 2011; and December 1,
2011–January 15, 2012. The analysis concerned four daily newspapers and three
weekly magazines with following characteristics:
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1 Additional issues for analysis identified in the code book included: journalistic genres, pre-
sentation of material, information sources, authors of opinions, topics, and roles (labels).
More about the study in Stêpiñska (2012, 2013a, 2013b)
2 Research project: Prezydencja polska w Radzie Unii Europejskiej i Euro 2012: rola wydarzeñ
medialnych w kszta³towaniu wizerunku pañstwa [The Polish EU Presidency and Euro2012: the
role of media events in creating a state’s image] sponsored by the Polish National Science
Center, grant no. N N116 614440.
a) Gazeta Wyborcza – a nationwide socio-political news daily, owned by the Agora
S.A. media concern. Gazeta Wyborcza is among the leaders of daily press in Po-
land. Since its origin, Adam Michnik has been its editor-in-chief. According to
the 2011 data, average circulation amounts to 433,000 issues with sales at a level
of 286,000 issues.
b) Rzeczpospolita – a nationwide news daily of a socio-political, economic and legal
profile. It defines itself as “the only conservative-liberal journal in Poland.” The
daily has enjoyed a strong market position for many years. It is among the leaders
of dailies in Poland, although it has recently noted a sales drop. Average circula-
tion exceeds 146,000 issues with sales oscillating around 85,000 issues sold on av-
erage (statistics from the first half of 2012). In 2011 average circulation amounted
to 188,000 with average sales at 106,000 issues.
c) Nasz Dziennik – a nationwide Catholic-nationalistic daily published by the
Spes sp. z o.o. – a limited liability company. The daily was initiated in Janu-
ary 1998 by Rev. Tadeusz Rydzyk, the founder of the ultra-Catholic Radio
Maryja. The newspaper’s circulation is not monitored by the Association for
Control of Press Distribution (ZKDP) which accounts for the lack of precise
statistics as to sales. The information provided by the editor, however, indi-
cates that average circulation is at a level of 150,000 issues with sales of
100,000 issues.
d) Fakt – a nationwide daily tabloid, published since 2003 by Axel Springer Polska,
a part of the Axel Springer AG media concern. Fakt is the leader among the daily
press in Poland. Statistics from March 2011 indicate that average circulation ex-
ceeded 544,000 issues with average sales of 499,000.
e) Polityka – a nationwide socio-political opinion-forming weekly with a long tradi-
tion: it has been present on the Polish market since 1957. The weekly is published
by the Polityka sp. z o.o. – a limited liability company (formerly – by the
Polityka Spó³dzielnia Pracy cooperative). Polityka is among the leaders of opin-
ion-forming weeklies in Poland. Average sales oscillate around a level of 130,000
issues. In 2011, average circulation was at a level of 188,000 issues with sales at
a level of 133,000.
f) Wprost – a nationwide socio-political opinion-forming weekly published in War-
saw by Platforma Mediowa Point Group. According to the Institute of Media
Monitoring, in 2012 Wprost had the highest citation index among other weeklies,
and one of the highest citation indices among the media in general in Poland.
Average circulation in 2011 amounted to 182,000 issues with sales at a level of
112,000.
g) Uwa¿am Rze. Inaczej pisane – a nationwide politico-economic opinion-forming
weekly published by Presspublica since 2011. The weekly is written in coopera-
tion with the Rzeczpospolita daily. In June 2011 it came to the lead among opin-
ion-forming weeklies (being second only to the Catholic Goœæ Niedzielny). Average
circulation at that time was 329,000 issues with sales of 140,000.
The following pages constitute the core of the paper as they present findings of
the study. First a content of the daily newspapers is analyzed, followed by a content
of the weekly magazines. The next part attempts to compare the assessment of the
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Polish presidency in the selected dailies and weeklies. The paper is concluded by
a summary of the issues outlined in the topic of the paper.
Findings
The daily newspapers
Taking into consideration the political bias of selected newspapers one could expect
significant differences in their assesments of whether a given event or initiative
should be deemed to be a success or failure of the Polish presidency. The dailies,
however, did not demonstrate a strong emotional attitude to the cabinet that held
the presidency, thus exhibiting defined political sympathies. It was a neutral assess-
ment that prevailed in Gazeta Wyborcza (67%) and a tabloid Fakt (57%). The propor-
tion of neutral assessments was lower by over a dozen in Rzeczpospolita (48%), while
in Nasz Dziennik they accounted for 46% of printed material (see Graph 1).
Not surprisingly, in a conservative and anti-governmntal daily newspaper Nasz
Dziennik one third of opinions on the Polish presidency was negative (see Table 1).
Speaking of the Polish presidency, the newspaper primarily criticized Prime Minis-
ter Donald Tusk and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rados³aw Sikorski, accusing them
of incompetence in ruling, submissiveness towards the heads and leaders of Euro-
pean Union states, lack of defense of Polish national interests. The titles of numer-
ous items were indicative of the clearly negative tone of assessments and opinions,
for instance: Sikorski a sprawa polska [Sikorski versus the Polish cause], Polsk¹
suwerennoœæ oddam tanio [Polish sovereignty for sale – cheap], Jak najdalej od polskoœci











Graph 1. The daily newspapers – neutral assessments
[As far from Polishness as possible], Polityczny makija¿ Platformy [PO’s political
make-up], Dawniej Moskwa, dziœ Bruksela [Moscow yesterday, Brussels today],
Z pamiêtnika Donalda cudotwórcy [From the diary of Donald the miracle-worker].
The highest percentage of negative opinions could be found, however, in Fakt
(36%), while positive assessments of the Polish presidency accounted in this news-
paper for fewer than 7% of all items. Fakt, although being a tabloid seems to be in-
volved in a political debate by inviting politicians to share their comments and
opinions (Piontek & Hordecki, 2009). At the same time, most of the items on politics is
strongly critical (not only of the government, but the entire political clas) and biased.
In fact, many of the articles include some elements of populism and demagogy.
On the other hand, the highest proportion of positive assessments was recorded
for Rzeczpospolita (34%). Nevertheless, this newspaper published also a relatively
high proportion (13%) of critical (negative) assessments and opinions of Polish
presidency. The other high quality dail newspaper – Gazeta Wyborcza published
a smaller number of positive assessments than Rzeczpospolita, namely 23%, and
a very small number of negative assessments (3%). Although Gazeta Wyborcza was
more enthusiastic about the presidency, on numerous occasions treating it as an op-
portunity for Poland in Europe, in terms of politics as well as image, it seems to stay
more neutral while reporting the event.
The codebook included also a category of both positive and negative evaluation in
order to recognize items combining critique with some elements of approval for Po-
land’s performance during the EU presidency. This attitude might be perceived as
an attempt to present a balanced, but not neutral, picture. Interestingly, this type of
comment was rather rarely used by authors of opinions publishing in daily newspa-
pers. The highest percentage of such items were found in Nasz Dziennik (12%), while
Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita published only 7% and 6% of this kind of items,
respectively. It is worth mentiong that Fakt featured the most clear assessments in
that matter, as the category of both positive and negative never occurred. It seems
that journalists rather attempted to avoid any comments or represented a clear (pos-
itive or negative) attitude towards activities of the Polish government and any other
institution involved into activities related to the EU Council presidency (see Table 1).
Table 1










Positive 23 33 7 9
Negative 3 13 36 33
Both positive and negative 7 6 0 12
Neutral 67 48 57 46
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
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The quality weekly magazines
M. Nieæ (2010:14–16) defines quality magazines as publications presenting the
standpoints and opinions of individuals, groups, political parties and other social
groups that influence public opinion and shape attitudes and beliefs. Quality maga-
zines are addressed at people who are interested in various aspects of socio-political
and economic affairs. Such magazines differ from newspapers and tabloids as they
publish longer and more extensive items that are conducive to in-depth consider-
ations. Depending on the features of the media systems, weekly magazine may ei-
ther represent one political angle or attempt to draw a broader picture of the events
and issues by providing more than one perspective. In media systems with a high
level of political parallelism one may expect rather the former option, than a latter.
Positive assessments of the Polish presidency prevailed in two out of the three
magazines under the study. They accounted for 46% of all assessments in Wprost,
and for 34% in Polityka. The third magazine examined, Uwa¿am Rze, diverged signif-
icantly from the above two in terms of the positive assessment of the presidency. Its
positive assessment amounted to only 5% of all opinions. Negative opinions pre-
vailed in this magazine. The results of the studies indicate that there were as many
as 54% of them (see Graph 2 and Table 2). Therefore, it can be surmised that the ma-
jority of both the journalists and contributors to this weekly could be associated
with the right side of the political stage and critics of Donald Tusk’s administration.
The pessimistic attitude of the magazine towards the Polish EU presidency could al-
ready be sensed several weeks prior to its official beginning. Marek Magierowski in
his article Ratuj siê, kto mo¿e [Run for your life] observed that the Polish presidency
would fall in a period of political stagnation in Europe (Magierowski, 2011).
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Graph 2. Quality weekly magazines – positive and negative assessments
The number of negative opinions published in Polityka was the same as that of
positive ones in Uwa¿am Rze. The sample examined evidenced that the negative
opinions on the Polish presidency published in Wprost accounted for slightly over
11% of all the examined texts in this magazine. The number of both positive and
negative assessments was comparable in all the opinion-forming magazines ana-
lyzed, oscillating around 5–7%.
As far as neutral assessments are concerned, it should be emphasized that
Polityka published the largest proportion of them, accounting for 52%, in compari-
son to 35% of neutral assessments identified by the study in the samples examined
in Wprost and Uwa¿am Rze. Although the number of neutral opinions is comparable,
the three magazines show significant differences in other categories of the sample
examined. Positive assessments prevailed in Wprost, while negative comments ac-
counted for only a few percent there. The proportion was opposite in Uwa¿am Rze.
Table 2








Positive 46 34 5
Negative 11 5 54
Both positive and negative 8 8 6
Neutral 35 53 35
TOTAL 100 100 100
Daily newspapers and weekly magazines: a comparison
It is worth mentioning that positive opinions on the presidency were more frequent
– in total – in the weeklies (29%) than in the dailies (18%). At the same time, the dis-
proportion between the dailies and weeklies was insignificant as far as negative
opinions are concerned (21% and 24% respectively). However, one should consider
the differences in frequency of publishing each medium and a total number of items
published in the period of the study (altogether 612 items publihed in daily newspa-
pers and 101 in weekly magazines).
Neutral opinions prevailed in daily newspapers counted together: in as many as
54% items journalists or other commentators avoided any evaluation of the Polish
EU presidency. Weekly magazines altogether published 41% of such articles. How-
ever, differences between media organizactions were quite considerable, ranging
from 35% in the weekly magazine Wprost to 67% in the daily high quality newspa-
per Gazeta Wyborcza (see Graph 3 and Graph 4).
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In particular, the study revealed significant differences between content of daily
newspaper Rzeczpospolita and weekly magazine Uwa¿am Rze – two titles sharing the
same publisher. Although both media organizations used to belong to the same
owner and hired the same group of publicists at that time, positive opinions in
Rzeczpospolita accounted for as many as 33%, while there were only 5% of them in
Uwa¿am Rze. A similar disproportion is reflected in case of negative opinions with
13% in Rzeczpospolita and 54% in Uwa¿am Rze (see Graph 5). It is worth mentioning
that in a 18-week period Rzeczpospolita published 246 items expressing any evaluation
or opinion, while Uwa¿am rze 37 items. It means that only 2 out of 37 items in Uwa¿am
rze included some elements of approval for Poland’s (or, in fact, Polish government’s)
performance. At the same time as many as 20 items were profoundly critical.






positive assessment negative assessment
dailies
weeklies









Graph 4. The daily newspapers and weekly magazines – neutral attitude
Interestingly, in both of these media organizations almost the same group of
journalists and commentators covered and commented on the Polish presidency in
the first months of the term. It seems that journalists perceived their role differently
depending on a type of media outlet they were publishing in at that time. While in
Rzeczpospolita they were focused on providing more complex picture of govern-
ment’s activities, in Uwa¿am rze they expressed their criticism openly. In late 2011,
when more radical right-wing journalists and commentator left Rzeczpospolita and
started working exclusively for Uwa¿am rze. Not surprisingly, their comments be-
came even more directly targeted against the government and its performance.
While studying items including opinions, comments and reviews, we decided to
check who had an opportunity to present their points of view. Interestingly, as find-
ings collected in Table 4 show, journalists and reporters were authors of almost half
of the opinion items published in Gazeta Wyborcza (44%) and Rzeczpospolita (43%). In
all weekly magazines the numbers were even higher: 83% in Polityka, 67% in
Uwa¿am rze, and 52% in Wprost. Media organizations invited external sources of
opinion less frequently.
Although the topic required a deep knowledge on both domestic and foreign
politics, as well as on international relations and the EU policy, experts’ opinions
were in some media presented even less frequently than politicians’ opinions. For
example, in Gazeta Wyborcza 31% of the opinion items included comments ex-
pressed by either a national or foreign politician, while only half of this number
(16%) presented experts’ opinions. Similar tendency one may observe in Rzecz-
pospolita, although in that case national experts were interviewed (or invited to
write their own text) more frequently, namely in 21% of the items. Rzeczpospolita,
Nasz Dziennik, Fakt and all weekly magazines hardly ever or never published items
with a comment of any foreign expert.






positive opinions negative opinions
Rzeczpospolita
Uwa¿am Rze
Graph 5. Rzeczpospolita and Uwa¿am Rze – positive and negative opinions
At the same time, national politicians were often invited by some of the media
organizations to present their opinions. In Fakt one third of all authors of opinions
were national politicians (and neither foreign politicians, nor foreign experts), in
Nasz Dziennik and Gazeta Wyborcza more than 20%, while Polityka and Wprost did
not publish any text presenting exclusively opinions of any Polish politician. As ex-
pected, Nasz Dziennik published mostly right-wing politicians. The opinions of
left-wing politicians, or those from the current administration, were not presented
in this newspaper.
It is worth mentioning that foreign authors’ (politicians’ and experts’) opinions
were presented significantly less frequently than national ones. For example, in
Nasz Dziennik, where 29% of the opinions were expressed by national experts, only
1% of the comments’ authors were foreign experts. Even in high quality daily news-
papers such as Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita foreign experts were authors of
as few as 4% and 2% of the opinion items, respectively.
Table 3
Author of opinion
Media Author of opinion Frequency (%)
1 2 3
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1 2 3








Wprost journalist, reporter 52
national expert 43
other 5







In this paper we proposed a hypothesis that media coverage would be politically bi-
ased and we would be able to recognize this bias while studying the way newspa-
pers evaluated the Poland’s performance during the presidency. The hypothesis
was confirmed. Indeed, the newspapers with an anti-government orientation pro-
vided more negative evaluation of the presidency. Namely, in Uwa¿am rze more
than half of the items expressed negative evaluation and in Nasz Dziennik one third
of all materials included some critique of the government and its performance. It is
worth mentioning that also Fakt was highly critical, but in this case the tabloid pro-
file of the newspaper may be a reason for focusing mostly on negative events or as-
pects of particular political issues.
At the same time two weekly magazines, Polityka and Wprost presented rather
positive image of the Polish EU Presidency. In Wprost almost a half of all items in-
cluding any evaluation provided a positive opinion, while in Polityka one third of
the evaluations was positive. The most balanced picture of the Polish EU Presi-
dency was drawn by Gazeta Wyborcza. Surprisingly, Rzeczpospolita, despite of its po-
litical orientation, provided rather balanced image of the Poland’s performance. In
2011 both Rzeczpospolita and Uwa¿am rze were owned by the same owner, but
Uwa¿am rze hired more radically right-wing, anti-government publicists.
That leads us to the conclusion that the political profiles of the media organiza-
tions were expressed not only by the content of opinions and evaluations, but also
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by categories of sources of these comments. As the findings of the study showed,
most of the items including the opinions and evaluations were written by staff
members. Furthermore, journalists seemed to be more interested in the opinions of
national politicians, than either national or foreign experts. As a result, the frame-
work of the coverage was predominantly domestic. Journalists working for daily
newspapers focused mostly on providing news and their own interpretations of the
reported events. On contrary, weekly magazines provided comments and inter-
views, but again, most of the opinions were expressed by journalists and editors,
than experts. The following paper, written by Artur Lipiñski, presents the conse-
quences of such features of the Polish media organizations on a discourse style and
aruments provided by journalists during first Polish EU presidency term.
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Presidency as a Political Battleground. Media and the
Polish Presidency of the European Union Council
Introduction
The Presidency of the Council of the European Union is of particular importance to
Poland and other new member states, for which it marks a significant shift from be-
ing a mere subject of others’ decisions to the status of a crucial player in the EU insti-
tutional architecture. In this sense, the Polish Presidency may be perceived as
a culmination of the integration process – a sort of ‘rite of passage’ followed by a full
initiation into the twists and turns of EU politics (Nowak-Far, 2011:18). Interestingly,
the coverage of the Presidency in the Polish media and their political role in this re-
gard has so far been discussed relatively little. However, implementation of the many
tasks of the Presidency, including the role as a broker of interests, is not possible with-
out the mass media, being capable of strengthening, weakening or even undermining
the actions of political actors (Lipiñski, 2010). The importance of media representation
is best evidenced by the fact that successful cooperation with the media is one of the
measures of the effectiveness of the Presidency as a whole (M³ynarski, 2011:201–248).
This paper aims to cover this shortfall through an analysis of the discursive
means of constructing the Polish Presidency in three influential national weekly
journals with different political positions and editorial lines: Polityka, Wprost and
Uwa¿am Rze. In the analysis they are treated as agents with observable behavior,
unified enough to pursue coherent discursive strategies (Page, 1996:20), i.e. inten-
tional plans of practices used to achieve social, political, psychological or linguistic
purposes (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001:44). This presentation of media as political actors
is especially justified in Poland where strong political polarization is being en-
hanced by the media, and where political groups are supported not only by their
constituent social organizations, but also by the openly partisan press. For example,
Polityka and Wprost have a pro-government stance and strongly pro-European sym-
pathies, while the softly eurosceptic Uwa¿am Rze is a sharp critic of the policies of
the Donald Tusk’s government.
This article uses analytical tools from discursive-historical version of critical dis-
course analysis, especially the concept of discursive strategies proposed by Ruth
Wodak and Martin Reisigl. A particularly useful heuristic tool in the study of politi-
cal discourse is the analysis of the means of nominalization developed by M. Reisigl.
These means include nomination (the construction of social actors), predication (at-
227
tribution of specific, positive or negative traits), and argumentation (justification
or delegitimization of claims containing specific nominations and predications)
(Reisigl, 2008:99).
The analytical framework of a discursive-historical approach is used in the system-
atic study of texts to determine a picture of the Polish Presidency in selected media.
This general goal is connected with two more specific research questions. First, what is
the representation of Poland in the discourse about the Presidency? Second, what is the
representation of Europe/European Union in the discourse about the Presidency? The
results of the analysis shall reveal the diversity of images and evaluations of the Presi-
dency and the main parameters of the “battleground” that the discourse on national
identity and Europe has become in many European countries (Diez, 2001).
A comparison of alternative constructs of the same reality is the best way to re-
veal subtle ideological mechanisms that constitute the discourse (Carvalho, 2008:171).
Accordingly, a detailed analysis of the mechanisms of representation of the Polish
Presidency in the European Union shall reveal the means of naming and identifying
the main actors in the discourse and the methods of quatation, evaluation and argu-
mentation. In particular, the analysis of representations of Poland focuses on pre-
dictions and hopes regarding the Presidency, representation of the government, the
opposition and their mutual relations, the role of the Polish Presidency, evaluation
of the government and the opposition during the Presidency, and the overall assess-
ment of the Presidency. Representations of Europe are examined based on the anal-
ysis of how the actors define the status quo (‘what is the EU?’, ‘what is its current
condition?’), the internal diversity of the EU and differences of interests between
countries.
There are two general positions towards the Polish Presidency and two major
representations of Poland and Europe/EU. These positions can be distinguished on
the basis of frequently repeated, assumed or explicitly expressed views on the sta-
tus of the Presidency in the press representations. The first position, dominant in the
discourse of Polityka and Wprost, frames the Presidency as a task, while the second,
typical for Uwa¿am Rze, defines the Presidency as appearance. Both approaches are
systematically employed in the corpus of analyzed texts and are used to construct
arguments, rhetorical figures and metaphors. They are associated with a variety of
topics, such as the role of Poland in Europe, Polish actions during the Presidency,
the question of the future of Europe, the importance of the parliamentary elections
during the Presidency, and the importance of the Presidency for those in power.
The Presidency as a task
Social and political actors – quotation and representation
The attitude towards the Polish Presidency of the EU Council is shown by the selec-
tion of authors and interviewees. In the case of Polityka, texts heralding the begin-
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ning of the Presidency and summarizing the periods were prepared by: Mark
Ostrowski, the author of texts on international affairs, Jerzy Baczyñski – edi-
tor-in-chief, Pawe³ Œwieboda – the president of pro-European foundation de-
mosEuropa European Strategy Centre and a regular columnist of Gazeta Wyborcza,
and Adam Krzemiñski – a journalist specializing in topics related to Germany. The
authors of texts that appeared in Wprost were Magdalena Œroda (a regular colum-
nist) and Jacek Pawlicki – a journalist of Gazeta Wyborcza who specializes in the Eu-
ropean issues.
Interestingly, in both journals, authors from the outside were presented as im-
partial experts on the European Union, even though they were directly associated
with other magazines supporting the government of Donald Tusk. The dominant
objective and expert style in the articles was also supported by the selection of inter-
locutors, usually government or the EU officials and experts. These included Janusz
Lewandowski – commissioner for financial planning and the budget of the EU,
Miko³aj Dowgielewicz – Secretary of State for European Affairs in charge of the Pol-
ish Presidency at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Jacek Kucharczyk – President
of the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych). Wprost also inter-
viewed Pawe³ Œwieboda, author of texts in Polityka.
Due to the characteristics of the journalism genres in the analyzed weekly maga-
zines (current affairs article, editorial, interview), the number of quotations is much
smaller than in the case of newspapers (Wojtak, 2004). Using direct and indirect
speech, the articles quoted the Prime Minister Donald Tusk, spokesman for the
Polish Presidency Konrad Niklewicz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Rados³aw
Sikorski, scientists, left-wing intellectuals, experts (such as Michael Porter from
the Harvard Business School, Jürgen Habermas, Timothy Garton-Ash, Daniel
Cohn-Bendit), as well as politicians, other countries, or the EU (such as Jean-Claude
Junckner – Prime Minister of Luxembourg, and Martin Schulz – president of the So-
cialist Group in the European Parliament). Quotes from government politicians
usually expressed the line of the journal or individual journalists, which sometimes
assumed the form of openly expressed support for a particular position: “Mean-
while, Sikorski is right [...]” (Krzemiñski, 2011b:12).
Discourse on the Presidency with reference to Poland and its internal situation
most frequently used the metonymic term “Poland”. The name of the country
served to describe the actions taken by the government and its representatives, and
often was meant to denote the entire nation (Kucharczyk, 2012:92). This procedure
was used to build a community of identity and interest, and at the same time sus-
pended the question of internal differentiation. While constructing the role of Po-
land an anthropomorphic representation of the country as an actor who should take
or has taken concrete action was used. Poland “showed”, “received” or even “does
not like” (Kucharczyk, 2012:92; Œroda, 2011:31).
Other frequently mentioned domestic actors included government politicians:
Donald Tusk, Rados³aw Sikorski, The Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski, and
a prominent figure of the Civic Platform political party – Stefan Niesio³owski. They
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were represented as perlocutively effectiveactors whose words are cited in an affir-
mative way. For example, D. Tusk was a “European modernizer” (£akomski,
2011:28), while the “reasonable politician” R. Sikorski was the author of a very im-
portant speech which had been awaited since the beginning of the Presidency
(Krzemiñski, 2011b:12). The government officials were not criticized but rather en-
couraged to be more active. For example: “The Prime Minister must begin to be
visible” (Ostrowski & Œwieboda, 2011:52). An important instrument was functio-
nalization, a tool using the mention of positions in the representation of social actors
(Van Leeuven, 2008:42): “The idea that the Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski, as
representative of the Presidency, could sit at one table of the euro-group without
the right to vote (17 finance ministers of the euro area) had to be shelved” (Pawlicki,
2012:86).
The opposition actors were presented in a completely different manner. The rep-
resentation of Jaros³aw Kaczyñski and his political party The Law and Justice (PiS)
often assumed a deprecating and ironic tone. Jaros³aw Kaczyñski was described as
“steadfast” and ironically compared to Reytan1, a deputy from late 18th century
remembered for a dramatic gesture to prevent the legalization of the first partition
of Poland (Paradowska, 2011b:34). Also the mechanisms of psychologization or
even psychiatrization (“obsessed Kaczyñski”) were used (£akomski, 2011:28). The
traditionalism of Kaczyñski was identified as anachronistic, and resulted in his
description as an “antediluvian fossil” (Krzemiñski, 2011b:12). The Law and Jus-
tice party was the subject of direct criticism (Materna, 2011:9) and polemics with
slogans, past statements and beliefs promoted by the party (Krzemiñski, 2011b:12).
The demands of the opposition were ridiculed (Ibidem) and their significance be-
littled (“cat music”) (Baczyñski, 2011:12). Generally, the largest opposition party
and its leader were alternately portrayed either as a threat to the Polish Presidency
or as completely anachronistic and anti-European political actors unable to recog-
nize reality.
Representation of the internal situation in Poland was not a particularly impor-
tant part of the discourse on the Presidency, and such references were sporadic and
usually implied. Three themes dominated: the domestic economic situation, diag-
nosis of social support for the EU, and the parliamentary elections which were to be
held during the Presidency. At an economic level, Poland was portrayed as a coun-
try doing exceptionally well during the global downturn, a strong and valuable
member of the EU. At the social level, emphasis was put on the Euro-enthusiasm of
the society, underlined equally by journalists and their interlocutors, both Polish
and the EU politicians (“overwhelming support for the European idea”) (Dow-
gielewicz, 2011:90). Parliamentary elections, an important political parameter of the
Presidential period, were regarded as a danger, especially because of the potential
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1 Tadeusz Rejtan tried to prevent the legalization of the first partition of Poland in 1773.
A 1866 painting by Jan Matejko pictures Rejtan lying on the threshold of a chamber trying to
prevent the members of parliament from entering it and signing the partition document
[translator’s note].
negative exploitation of European issues by the political opposition. The argument
by the opposition that the government could exploit the Presidency in their elec-
toral propaganda was not discussed. This reversal of the argument concerning the
elections was a clear sign of support for the government. In this perspective, the
Presidency was represented as not only an advantage to the government, but a pos-
sible burden during elections (Paradowska, 2011a:15).
Presidency – expectations and hopes
In both weeklies the timeline heavily influenced writing about the Presidency. De-
scriptions of the event were divided into a preliminary and a final stage. The dis-
course first focused on the expectations and hopes associated with obtaining the
position, and then on summaries and evaluations. The basic premise in both types
of expression was belief in the great significance of the Presidency for Poland, while
perceiving its limited powers at a European level and the short duration (Baczyñski,
2011:12). For example, M. Dowgielewicz, a government plenipotentiary for the Pol-
ish Presidency, said in an interview: “It is important to have realistic expectations
for the Presidency. It is only 184 days, so we can only initiate certain processes”
(Dowgielewicz, 2011:90).
Researchers of the EU discourse have repeatedly pointed to the presence of the
EU topos as a national test (Krzy¿anowski, 2008:290; Zuk, 2010:106–107). This way
of thinking was also present in a discourse on the Presidency. In particular, follow-
ing issues were discussed: mobilization, hopes for the future, fear of failure, the
problem of shame after failure. All of them clearly indicate that the conceptual field
for the Presidency was closely associated with perceiving it as a task, an examina-
tion, a test meant to certify a new kind of identity. Accordingly, the Presidency was
represented as a “national project of strategic importance for the Polish state”, being
“the largest logistical operation in the history of the Polish government to date.” Its
importance was emphasized by the identity-formation function of the Presidency.
The presidency was supposed to actually change the identity of the state by making
it a full member of the EU (Ostrowski & Œwieboda, 2011:52).
The part of the discourse on the Presidency which related to the future, made use
of sentences with deontic modality, i.e. expressing a duty, obligation, but also the ex-
pectations of the speaker (Grzegorczykowa, 2001:133). Opinions using this type of
modality, (“Poland must build coalitions carefully”, “Poland should therefore
mention it as often as possible”), were formulated by journalists and experts
(Ostrowski & Œwieboda, 2011:52). On the other hand, the government plenipoten-
tiary, M. Dowgielewicz formulated his assertions and declarations using expres-
sions such as “we will begin”, “we will dismantle” or “we will try” (Dowgielewicz,
2011:90).
The main expectations formulated by journalists and experts included, among
other things, an active and dynamic Presidency, influencing the European agenda;
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constructing a narrative about the EU which would provide a pro-integration impe-
tus for stagnating Europe; launching a debate on a new European solidarity, pre-
venting division into a two speed Europe; and Poland’s involvement in the
European Neighbourhood Policy in the South (Ostrowski & Œwieboda, 2011:52).
Similarly, the expressions of M. Dowgielewicz related to energy, the benevolence of
Poland, and also the compatibility of Polish interests with those of the EU. In addi-
tion to mentioning the Polish priorities, the plenipotentiary (similar to the journal-
ists and experts) drew attention to the rhetorical and symbolic importance of the
Presidency: “First of all we will try to change the mood in the depressed cri-
sis-stricken Union to a more optimistic one” (Dowgielewicz, 2011:90).
Image of Europe/EU
The vision of a successful Presidency, and the accompanying argumentation, were
closely associated with the vision of a future Europe. However, the point of depar-
ture was a diagnosis of a current situation, including problems that the Presidency
was supposed to address. All statements were based on normative assumptions
about what the EU should be. The current image of the EU was similar to the
inter-governmentalist concept where the EU institutions are considered to be the ef-
fects of the rational decisions of member states striving to solve problems (Wiener
& Diez, 2004:8). Therefore, texts mentioned a slow action of the EU institutions
which must reconcile individual interests with the interests of the Union as a whole,
or the different interests of individual countries which must be reconciled by the EU
institutions. Such a vision of Europe was close to a liberal perspective in the theory
of international relations, which perceives the multiplicity of interests as a kind
of natural state of affairs resulting from the pluralism of agents (Lewandowski,
2011a:13).
Secondly, the community of interests was presented as a project or a perspective
of international relations built within the EU institutions rather than a natural ele-
ment of identity: “We must know and honestly talk about all differences and dis-
crepancies. At the same we must build a better understanding of our common
interests”. (Ostrowski, 2012:46). Characteristically, this vision of Europe was legiti-
mised instrumentally as an institutional system that is more functional for solving
global problems than a nation state (Eriksen & Fossum, 2004:437). J. Baczyñski
wrote, for example, that “it is increasingly clear that any of the significant problems
that the governments of the EU members states face cannot be solved individually”
(Baczyñski, 2011:12).
Thirdly, the normative vision of Europe referred to a federal concept of the EU.
The motto of the Polish Presidency “More Europe in Europe”, which unambigu-
ously showed the pro-integration orientation of the government, was frequently re-
peated in the statements of politicians (Lewandowski, 2011a:13; Dowgielewicz,
2011:90) and experts (Kucharczyk, 2012:92). The federational sympathies of Po-
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lityka and Wprost were also clearly visible in the titles of texts: “More Europe in
Europe”, “Together where only we can”, “European Commonwealth”. They en-
couraged implementation of a more federal-oriented policy through the use of
a rhetorical tool of fabricating consequences, by presenting a pessimistic scenario
(Kochan, 2005:99) – squandering the “great success of our accession to the EU”
(Kucharczyk, 2012:92). A. Krzemiñski (Polityka) agreed with R. Sikorski on the
threat of pushing Poland eastwards. The alternative constructed by the journalist
was: “Either Poland enters the core of the EU through co-creating efficient federal
structures, or – as Ukraine – it will slip eastwards into political and economic grass-
lands” (Krzemiñski, 2011b:12).
Fourthly, all authors emphasized the significant changes in the intergovernmen-
tal status quo, posing a serious threat to the functioning of the EU as a whole, and
which started to appear after 2005. Among the factors responsible for disrupting the
EU stability, the authors mentioned erosion of the legitimacy of the EU, the growing
strength of re-nationalization tendencies, and the economic crisis. The EU was
anthropomorphized. Namely, the texts referred to its “sloth”, lack of “energy”,
“vigour”, or “great idea”, the pessimistic “mood” (Lewandowski, 2011a:13; Baczyñ-
ski, 2011:12; Pawlicki, 2012:86; Dowgielewicz, 2011:90). The tendencies towards
more nationalist attitudes were described negatively as egoistic (Krzemiñski,
2011a). There was also a negative term of “extremely anti-European parties” (Le-
wandowski, 2011a:13). Populism was presented also by metaphors referring to nat-
ural disasters, for example compared to a tidal wave (Pawlicki, 2012).
Metaphorization was also used to describe the crisis as a fire (Ostrowski & Œwie-
boda, 2011:52), flood or fever (Ostrowski, 2012:46). The discursive construction of
the crisis was not the instrument of hyperbolization, but rather it was used to legiti-
mize the reformist ideas that were leaning towards federalism (Krzemiñski, 2011a, b;
Œwieboda, 2011). In this approach, the crisis was not a dysfunction that showed an
incorrect structure of the whole, but rather as a stage of development leading to
a deeper integration (Lewandowski, 2011a:13).
Fifthly, the federalist vision forces questions about the relations between the
EU and Poland, primarily the relation to the discrepancy between national and EU
interests. In both weeklies, the membership of Poland in Europe and a non-antag-
onist nature of mutual relations were subjects to no doubt. The EU was supposed
to be a natural environment for Poland as the nation state, and a object of natural
loyalties of Poles. For Poland, that was supposed to mean the “end of history” in
the sense of reaching the status quo, sufficiently and permanently ensuring Polish
national interests (Ostrowski, 2012:46). One of the articles included the inter-
textual reference to the interview with Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Polityka in
2009, in which he mentioned a strict dependence between the economic growth
and modernization of Poland and the progress of European integration. The au-
thor’s praise of the PM presents the uniqueness of D. Tusk in comparison to other
European politicians who had started to distance themselves from the EU (Ba-
czyñski, 2011:12).
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Evaluation of the Presidency
Both weeklies present a positive evaluation of the event, formulated by their jour-
nalists and interviewees from a political field. Critical opinions, when appeared,
used language that emphasized positive intentions (“good intentions”, “political
will”), or failures limited to selected areas, with a generally positive opinion about
the Presidency as a whole (Pawlicki, 2012:86). Also, at the level of evaluation,
Polityka maintained the image of the Presidency as a task, writing that “during the
Presidency, Warsaw did a good job” (Ostrowski, 2012:46). A similar metaphor was
used by J. Pawlicki, who evaluated the Presidency as a “passed exam” (Pawlicki,
2012:86).
This success was not presented just as the effect of the efforts of the country as
a whole. The reference to the words of D. Tusk in the context of the Polish Presidency
personalized the effects and ascribed them to the Prime Minister. The journals not
only included their own evaluations, but also created an opportunity for reviewing
the Presidency by the politicians and officials preparing and overseeing the Presi-
dency. For example, in an article summarizing the Polish Presidency, Wprost cited
solely K. Niklewicz (spokesman for the Polish Presidency), who for example, com-
mented on the question of the patent package: “It is a great success, given the nego-
tiations on a uniform European patent have taken 30 years” (Ibidem).
Polityka and Wprost put a great emphasis on the opinions of the EU and its con-
stituent entities, and hence often cited positive opinions of European politicians, for
example on the Polish readiness to eschew partisanship (Ibidem). Positive evalua-
tions were strengthened by underlining the unique situation during the Presidency,
(“a difficult period”, “the most difficult Presidency in the history of the EU”)
(Mielnik, 2012:90; Pawlicki, 2012:86), or the usually critical language of the EU poli-
ticians. The latter mechanism was used by Jakub Mielnik when he compared the
words of Martin Schulz (President of the European Parliament) about Poland (“the
best Presidency in years”) and his reaction to the Czech President during Czech
Presidency (“a few years ago he scolded President Klaus at Hradèany”) (Mielnik,
2012:90). Apart from expressing opinions, the authors often listed individual
achievements of the Polish Presidency, using verbs in the past perfect tense: “Po-
land had exerted an influence of the European politics, it had shown its significance
as a political player, it had prepared the Accession Treaty for Croatia, it had saved
the food aid programme” (Kucharczyk, 2012:92; Pawlicki, 2012:86).
Presidency as appearance
Ch. Perelman indicates that argumentation technique that is quite rarely mentioned
in lectures on traditional rhetoric is the dissociation of concepts. In particular, he
writes about the construction of division between the appearance and the reality,
where the latter is a criterion that makes possible to distinguish between significant
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and insignificant. The dissociation of concepts enables the construction of hierarchy
and the evaluation of possible aspects of the defined situation. For example, the use
of the expression “apparent democracy” presupposes the notion of “real democ-
racy”, treated as a system of reference (Perelman, 2004:144). In the case of discourse
on the Polish Presidency the division between appearance and reality was an im-
portant technique used by the weekly Uwa¿am Rze, critical towards the government
of Donald Tusk. The appearance was a category used first of all with regard to the
Presidency, and so to the decisions and actions of D. Tusk in the international arena
and in domestic politics. That double approach also served to describe the EU and
its institutions. The division into appearance and reality was the principle used in
the construction of argumentation strategies and metaphors in items on the Presi-
dency published in Uwa¿am Rze.
Social and political actors – quotation and representation
In Uwa¿am Rze the issues associated with the Presidency or politics in the European
scale were not given as much attention as the domestic politics. The texts that were
entirely focused on the Presidency were editorials and opinion articles, written by
authors not specializing in international politics, such as the editor-in-chief Pawe³
Lisicki, Dorota Gawryluk, and Micha³ Karnowski. The selection of interlocutors in
interviews about the Presidency is also characteristic. The analysed corpus of texts
includes four interviews, three of which were carried out with opposition politi-
cians: Adam Bielan (a politician of PiS and later of its splintering party Polska Jest
Najwa¿niejsza), Ludwik Dorn (a right-wing opposition politician, cooperating with
PiS and its splintering party Solidarna Polska), Anna Fotyga (a member of PiS and
a former PiS Minister of Foreign Affairs and a close associate of the President Lech
Kaczyñski), with the fourth interview carried out with Arnulf Baring, presented as
a German historian, political scientists, law specialist, and a best-selling author.
The examined corpus is characterized by a very low number of quotations, both
direct and indirect. There are no statements by the PM, the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, and the spokesman for the Polish Presidency K. Niklewicz. There is only one
quotation of M. Dowgielewicz (S³ojewska, 2011). Characteristically for a journal
with right-wing sympathies, quotations (direct and indirect) on Europe often came
from Pope John Paul II (Gawryluk, 2011a). But the discursive mechanism of exclu-
sion of social actors, through the absence of governmental statements, exposing the
voices of the opposition, was only one of the instruments used to construct the
anti-government stance.
Another mechanism was based on a specific way of presenting social agents. Al-
though references to the government were based on functionalization: “Prime Min-
ister”, “Minister of Foreign Affairs”, “President of the European Parliament”,
“Minister of Finances”, the labels, ways of describing actions, and ascribed charac-
ter traits or contexts in which those politicians were mentioned, were negative. The
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authors wrote about Donald Tusk: “Donald Tusk let himself get trapped”, and
about the Minister of Finances, J. Rostowski: “He hid information about the most
important problems in the EU, accepting some kind of a hybrid decision-making
mechanism [...]. He accepted another extra-Treaty degradation of leadership” (Fo-
tyga, 2011). The Minister of Foreign Affairs was described as a “main specialist in
killing off flocks (of opposition, referring to his questionable remark during 2007
elections) or a “darling of the mainstream media” (Ozdowy, 2011:63). In the politi-
cal dimension, the significance of D. Tusk and the politicians of his government
were systematically degraded. Depreciation was performed through psychological
attributions, ascribing them naivety, lack of dignity, vanity, dishonesty, excessive
compliance (e.g. Dorn 2011:56; Fotyga, 2011).
Secondly, the importance of D. Tusk was belittled using ironic comparisons of la-
bels in the foreign press: “President of Europe”, “man responsible for the entire EU”
and the actions of the largest Member States that did not pay attention to the Polish
Presidency (Karnowski, 2011a:59). Many texts included statements that indicated
tendencies of numbing the voices of the opposition, or even the authoritarian man-
ner of ruling the country. This was also associated with the construction of historical
analogies to communist Poland (Gawryluk, 2011a:57). In the context of the Polish
Presidency, an especially significant accusation was the abandonment of the de-
fense of Polish national interests for the sake of purely publicity-related actions
(Fotyga, 2011).
Contrary to critical and ironic remarks about D. Tusk and the ministers, the im-
age of PiS was decidedly positive. The construction of this image was based on sev-
eral strategies. First of them was victimization. PiS was presented as a victim of
the authoritarian tendencies of the D. Tusk’s government and a subject to “de-
struction”, “repressions”, or even “extermination” (Czabañski, 2011:52; Wildstein,
2011a:54). Secondly, PiS was presented affirmatively as a competent political party
with more realistic approach to the European issues, in line with Polish interests,
and with a “down-to-earth” programme for the Polish Presidency (Czabañski,
2011). This pattern of argumentation was supported by references to the period
when PiS was a governmental party (years 2005–2007). Durig that time, according
to Fotyga (2011: 20) PiS attempted “to elevate the position of Poland, justified by the
size and the potential of the country”. Fourthly, J. Kaczyñski was portrayed as
a strong leader who “acted tough and defended the Polish national interest”
(Bielan, 2011:26). His brother, President Lech Kaczyñski was also presented as
a statesman, capable of distinguishing between the national interest and propa-
ganda (Fotyga, 2011).
Presidency and the domestic situation
Representation of the domestic situation was an important part of the analysed dis-
course. The definition of the status quo was based mainly on the hyperbolization of
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a threat on the side of the government and indication of the dramatic situation of the
persecuted opposition (Zdort, 2011:59). The description of political conditions re-
sembled an authoritarian state and the attempts of suspending the difference be-
tween non-democratic states and Poland were frequent. For example, L. Dorn said
in an interview: “I am far from presenting Poland as Belarus, but this government is
indeed testing how far it may go” (Dorn, 2011:56).
Elections were a significant element of internal situation’s descriptions. While in
Polityka and Wprost journalists expressed fears that the opposition may use the Pres-
idency to criticize the government, the interlocutors and journalists of Uwa¿am Rze
were afraid of marginalizing domestic problems due to the focus on EU politics.
Such approach to elections not only revealed a different hierarchy of events (domes-
tic elections being more important that the Presidency) used by analysed media or-
ganizations, but also the journal’ s political orientation. Uwa¿am rze was actually
afraid that a symbolic dimension of the Presidency may strengthen the government
(Bielan, 2011; Dorn, 2011; Fotyga, 2011; Gawryluk, 2011a).
The deprecation of the Presidency in Uwa¿am Rze was articulated in several
ways. Fo rexample, the hierarchy of significance presented in other media was
questioned through the expression “media hysteria” (Bielan, 2011:26). M. Karnow-
ski pointed out a difference between the image of the Presidency and its real status,
writing in passive voice that the “ordinary” and “trivial” event was “trumped up”
to the rank of the “historic and exceptional” (Karnowski, 2011b:3). Moreover, the
framework used during coverage of the events and actions associated with the Pres-
idency led to an impression that it was a wasteful elitist spectacle (Burdzy, 2011:38).
Belittling the significance of the Presidency was strongly associated with argumen-
tation that the government was actually creating an image, building a fasade, or
even using a propaganda. The government’s was accused of paying attention exclu-
sively on image creation:
“we would have much more to say if we were not focused solely on pub-
licity (…). For some time, the general line of the Polish foreign policy has
been a pure game of appearances focused on publicity. Our partners can
sense it. They know that our government will give a lot in real business for
a few praises, pats on the back, a sentence here and there about being Eu-
ropean leaders, to then be sold nicely in the Polish media.”
[Fotyga, 2011:20]
Justification of the deprecation of the Polish Presidency was based on legal argu-
ments and the argument of a lack of the government’s direct merit in this regard: “It
was not our doing, it was in the schedule” (Bielan, 2011:26). Also, the mottos of the
Polish Presidency were presented as unrealistic and reduced to “nice-sounding slo-
gans”, “empty words”, or “words in vain” (Gawryluk, 2011b:59). By contrast, the
programme of the opposition political party – PiS was described as “down to
earth”. Furthermore, the party’s agenda was often covered by Uwa¿am rze. For ex-
ample, one of the opposition’s priorities was to follow “the teachings of the Pope
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John Paul II on Europe” (Priorities of the Polish Presidency in the EU according to
PiS 2011). Almost exact idea appeared in D. Gawryluk’s article indicating that one
of the deficiencies of the Polish Presidency was a lack of references to values ex-
pressed by the Polish Pope (Gawryluk, 2011a:57).
In Uwa¿am Rze, like in Polityka and Wprost, a timeline played a significant role in
the organization of discourse, although in Uwa¿am rze hopes and expectations were
replaced by concerns. They were based on the assumption on an inadequate hierar-
chy of priorities of the Presidency. A focus on publicity stunts, ascribed to the gov-
ernment, were contrasted with “real” and “serious” actions that would defend the
Polish national interest, and emphasized the axiological dimension, crucial from
the point of view of the situation in Europe (Fotyga, 2011:20; Gawryluk, 2011a:57).
Concerns expressed by interlocutors and journalists referred to a few issues, such
as: a possibility of using the symbolic value of the Presidency by D. Tusk, and an in-
ability of the opposition to counteract it (Dorn, 2011); the probability of blocking the
articulation of opposition parties or social discontent (Gawryluk, 2011a); the inabil-
ity to pursue Polish interests due to the excessive dependence on good opinion from
Western partners (Fotyga, 2011); or strengthening the symbolic dominance in the
sphere of culture (Wildstein, 2011b).
Image of Europe/EU
The image of the EU in the analysed discourse was based on a system of assump-
tions typical for realism in the theory of international relations. First, the signifi-
cance of a nation state is a basic entity in the international arena. This view is
associated with a view on marginalization of the significance of the EU by the stron-
gest member states, mainly Germany and France (Karnowski, 2011a). The strength
and role of an international organization is decided by the interests of its major
powers (“egoisms of the great”) (Fotyga, 2011:20). Secondly, the depicted ontology
of the international environment is strictly related to the antagonistic character of
international relations, based on a zero sum game. This was the basis for the asser-
tion that the position of the Polish Presidency was purely formal, hiding the real role
of “strong states” (Ibidem). The European crisis shown the lack of will to compro-
mise in pursuing the interests of major powers and revealed the real balance of
power (Karnowski, 2011a). In this approach, striving to improve the international
position of Poland is always bound to face opposition from other countries. Since
the international system is perceived as an anarchic power game, a nation state is
seen as the best means to ensure national interests. As M. Karnowski wrote: “It is
still valid that if you want peace, prepare for a war” (Karnowski, 2011b:3).
Thirdly, the EU was not presented as a community, but rather an arena for pursu-
ing national interests. The perception of the EU as a community was ascribed to the
government and this vision was treated as dangerous naivety. In Uwa¿am Rze, the
EU was legitimised technocratically as a network of relations that protects against
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the arbitrary policies of stronger states. This is the reason behind fears of a ‘two-speed
Europe’, not its federalist premises (Lisicki, 2011a:3). Fourthly, the normative con-
cept of the future Europe on which the analysed discourse is based, is Europe of
homelands, “the association of states responsible for their own fates”, contrasted
against a concept of a super-state which violates the principle of sovereignty. An in-
terview with A. Baring contains expressions typical for eurosceptics: “eurocrats”,
“empty rhetoric about the United States of Europe”, “superstate”, “directives from
Brussels” (Baring, 2012:52).
Fifthly, the definition of the current state of the EU focused on negative and cri-
sis-related aspects. The journalists mentioned the “economic downturn threatening
Europe”, “real problems” of Europe, “chaos in the EU” (Karnowski, 2011b:3; Za-
remba, 2011:14). The crisis was represented as a phenomenon that may lead to the
breakdown of the entire EU and proof that the EU is economically unfounded, ideo-
logically driven project. Sentences with weaker modality only suggested a probabil-
ity of the EU disintegration, while sentences with strong modality treated the
breakdown as an axiom: “It is not easy to predict that the EU has no chance to con-
tinue in its previous shape,” “The common home of Europe and the common cur-
rency were phantasmagoria from the very beginning, and the present actions are
doomed to failure” (Gawryluk, 2011b:59; Baring, 2012:52).
The breakdown of the EU was not a part of the rhetoric of fear, warning against
the end of the EU, but a part of nationalist discourse, calling for a focus on internal
interests. In other words, journalist were not afraid of the EU collapse; they used the
image of crisis to justify the nationalist ideas. Moreover, the problems of the EU
were explained by using a dualist division into appearance and reality. According
to this view, the existing institutions were only appearances, due to their inade-
quacy for the requirements of the reality. In this case, appearance reflected the ideo-
logical character of the institutional system (Lisicki, 2011a).
Different discursive strategies served to represent the EU as the other. For exam-
ple, the deixis “there” built the opposition between the EU and Poland as the deictic
centre “here”: “Because a good impression is the only thing that counts there”
(Gawryluk, 2011b:59). Texts openly used, or presupposed, comparisons to the com-
munist or Nazi regimes (Gawryluk, 2011b; Baring, 2012). Othering was also per-
formed by the positioning of the EU elites on a right-left scale at the position
opposite to the journal’s line. The authors wrote about the left-wing roots of the EU
and the desire to uproot national traditions from modern societies. The pejorative
explanation of the term ‘Europe’ (“Europe, the canon of negation”) was accompa-
nied by a series of statements that defined the situation as a “culture war” (Wild-
stein, 2011b:54).
Finally, in contrast to the discourse about the EU as a task, where the EU was
treated as the natural environment for Poland and the accessionto the EU was pre-
sented as the end of history, in the discourse of the Presidency as appearance the EU
was juxtaposed with Poland and the interests and identities in these two areas were
presented as alternatives. Europeanisation was presented as a zero sum game
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threatening the Polish identity (Ibidem), and the interest of the Prime Minister in
European matters was a kind of liability that weakens the efficiency of domestic
policies (Gawryluk, 2011b).
Evaluation of the Presidency
In the analysed discourse, negative evaluations of the Polish Presidency had oc-
curred during its six months. According to the authors of Uwa¿am rze, the Presi-
dency had not fulfilled the task of strengthening the Polish voice in Europe: “The
Polish Presidency in the EU shows that the voice from Warsaw has little effect there”
(Ozdowy, 2011:63). The symbolic or rhetoric dimension of the Presidency that
seemed to be important for the government and the authors in Polityka and Wprost,
in Uwa¿am rze is showed as a proof of the superficiality of the EU institutions and
is treated as a material for building negative opinions. However, the evaluations
presented in Uwa¿am Rze were rarely explicit and usually assumed the form of
meta-commentaries, referring critically or affirmatively to the others’ evaluations.
For example, the editor-in-chief of Uwa¿am Rze wrote: “Right were those who
shown that the Presidency is primarily a symbol and we should not pay too much
attention to it” (Lisicki, 2011a:3).
Authors who critisized the Presidency used irony concerned not only a subject
matter per se, but also those who expressed positive opinions: “Poland, I have no
doubt, is a model country. For long six months it carried on its shoulders the burden
of crisis, bravely and successfully leading the European Union. It is not surprising,
therefore, that when finally the Prime Minister Donald Tusk arrived at the head-
quarters of the European Parliament with the feeling of a job well done, he was
greeted with only appreciation, thanks and loudly expressed admiration” (Lisicki,
2012b:3). The hyperbolization used in this fragment stands in sharp contrast to the
critique of the Presidency and the government, known from other texts published in
the journal.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to analyze the image of the Polish Presidency in three Pol-
ish weeklies treated as political actors that intervene in the space of the actions of
politicians responsible for the Presidency and those remaining in opposition. Due to
the specific frames of perception, two discursive positions were developed: Presi-
dency as a task, and Presidency as an appearance. The radically different constructs
of reality that were realized through these discourses were visible in a representa-
tion of individual political and social actors, the Polish Presidency, and the defini-
tion of situation in Poland, as well as the image of the EU and the evaluation of the
Presidency.
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The discourse presenting the Presidency as a task used in the articles and inter-
views of Polityka and Wprost assumed a consistently pro-government stance. It was
expressed by an affirmative mechanisms of quotation and representations of the
government side, a positive evaluation of its actions during the Presidency and the
entire Presidency itself. Both titles supported a resolutely pro-integration attitude of
the government, encouraging it to pursue further and deeper integration.
On the other hand, Uwa¿am Rze, since being critical towards the government of
Donald Tusk, ignored statements of the officials. The lack of quotations and a nega-
tive representation of the government officials contrasted with a positive image of
the opposition. The evaluation of the domestic situation and the Presidency was
also unambiguously critical. In the assumed realist perspective, the EU was pre-
sented as an appearance intended to conceal the real interests of the strongest
member states. The Presidency was also presented as a mere appearance, devoid
of significance, hollowed of real power and serving only to boost the image of the
government.
Both positions express the current polarization of the Polish public sphere,
where the expression of one’s own identity is much more prevalent than the search
for inter-subjectivity. In this sense, these postitions give an insight into the mecha-
nisms of building a political conflict in Poland that ensnares a much greater area
than solely the sphere of the European politics.
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